protection of the sinking Chrysler Corporationnfrom the onslaught of creditorsnas it attempted to satisfy the requirementsnof its Federally guaranteed loans, of thendefense of IBM against the Federal government’sn13-year antitrust suit, and ofnthe implementation of Nelson Rockefeller’snproblematic last will and testament,ncannot fell to inspire interest, admiration,nand perhaps even awe. Yet in facilitatingnthe resolution of such disputes, thesenblue-chip attorneys demonstrate littlenmore than their efficacy as senior engineersnoverseeing the operation of thencapitalist, democratic dynamo. To membetsnof society at large, these elite lawyersnare (partly by their own deliberate intention)ndistant and all but unknown, anmere shadow of an aristocracy, attractingnno firm loyalties or intense commitments,nholding to no vision or inspirationnapart from the resourcefiilness withnwhich they defend the particular interestsnof their gargantuan clients. Evenntheir aristocratic maimer and temperamentnare eclipsed, and their professionalnsolidarity belied, by the intense bitternessnarising from litigation for high stakes.nProcedure and precedent, those suj^xsednbulwarks of rectitude and authority, becomenfinely exploited instruments ofnwar. The solemn vocation of the pursuitnof justice within a venerable tradition isnobscured by the Byzantine imperativenof expediency; it becomes a brutal contestnwaged according to complex rules.nMr. Stewart’s narrative makes it clearnthat the most astute of these attorneysnare cognizant of the contradiction betweennthe duties they must perform andnthe stature of their profession, and thatnthey ultimately find themselves unablento reconcile the two.n1 his is not to say that the straightforwardnpursuit of equal justice under thenlaw by the solitary citizen will always benfree of moral paradox or ignobility. Mr.nGoodman’s account of his lawsuit i^ainstnthe Heublein Corporation for its practicenof age discrimination is a strikingndemonstration of how easily the aspfrationnfor legal justice can degenerate intonselfish small-mindedness cloaked in righteousness.nEven as he used the legal systemnto defend himself against injusticen(the use of age as an overriding criterionnin upper-level promotion), Mr. Goodmanndeprecated that system unceasingly,nyearning for the simpler methods ofnSolomon. He endured some of the system’snmost apparent, yet fundamentallynunavoidable, deficiencies: the court’snpreoccupation with procedural and stamtoryntechnicalities, and the consequentnadvantage given to the litigant with morenmoney to spend on skilled attorneys. Henfound solace in one of the system’s mostnsalient virtues: the right to a trial by anjury of laymen unaJflBicted by extensivenlegal training.nYet vindication by the jury and laternbefore an appellate court (before whichnMr. Goodman was compelled by a lacknof funds to argue for himself) did notnsatisfy his yearning for justice. Only ifnthe considerable sum awarded by thenjury were adjusted for the effects of thenInflation of the late 1970’s, Goodman believed,nwould the wrong inflicted uponnhim be fuUy rectified. His feUure to winnthis point on appeal left him “stupefied.”nnn”I then ceased,” he recaUed, “to be a TruenBeliever in the legal system. It was thenfinal blow, after six years of pummelingnand struggle in the courts.” Goodmannthe litigant regards the system of litigationnwith contempt. Mr. Goodman hasnwritten a morality play in which a virtuousnman is wronged and, in the coursenof his arduous stru^e for justice, mustnstru^e to retain his feith in the Americannlegal system. Ceasing to be a “TruenBeliever,” the chastened Goodman becomesnnot a cynic, but a skeptic with diminishednand tentative hopes. That thencharacter of his feith should ultimatelyndepend not on the just settlement of thenfundamental issue, but on the resolutionnof a derivative matter, is an indication ofnhow the system of litigation can producena dismaying mediocrity of spirit.nIf justice proves elusive and unsatisfyingnwhen pursued by litigation, mightnone attain it pure and unsullied by somennonlegalistic means? Psychiatry is sometimesnconsidered to be one such alternative.nYet the very feet that the legal systemnexplicitly recognizes psychiatry as annonlegal means of effecting justicenrenders psychiatry more an adjunct ofnthe legal system than an alternative to it.nSo much is clear from Mr. Janos’s descriptionnof the role of psychiatry in the casenof a teenager who killed the remnants ofnhis broken family while under the influencenof LSD. The young man was foundninnocent by reason of his insanity at thentime of the deed. The law thus recognizesnlimits on its own authority beyond whichnonly psychiatry can effect a just outcome.nIn fact, the insanity verdict imposes an^ ^ H 2 1nMay 1984n