nothing was at stake. He states that WorldnWar 11 “all but wrecked Western civilizationnfor no purpose.” In his discussion ofnClausewitz, he mentions that the NapoleonicnWars were useless. This is not annew outlook for Powers. In his earliernbook The Man Who Kept the Secrets:nRichard Helms and the CIA (for whichnhe won a Pulitzer), he dismisses the fatenof Vietnam, Angola, Cuba, and Chilenunder Allende as unimportant; too unimportant,nat least, for the U.S. to worrynabout.nBut what has been at stake in recentnwars? The governments of 1914 had variousnmotives for expanding a terroristnincident into a general war, but at thenheart of the matter lay the fate of Austro-nHungary threatened by revolutionarynnationalist forces. As Austrian expertnPaul W. Schroeder always told his classesnin diplomatic history, “A Great Powerndoes not disappear from the map withoutna struggle.” Austria moved to crushnSerbia, the revolutionaries’ base; Russiancould not allow this without losing credibilitynas the protector of the Balkan Slavs.nGermany had only one ally and couldnnot let Austria go down to defeat, whichnmeant fighting France as well as Russia.nThe entire political organization of Centralnand Eastern Europe was at stake; itnwas changed dramatically by the defeatnof Germany, Austria, and Russia. Warsndo have consequences.nWorld War II and die French Wars ofnthe Revolution and Napoleon also centerednon the political organization ofnnearly all of Europe. Ideology and thendesire to limit apparently limidess expansionnby one power are characteristicsnof both. What stakes could be higher?nThe ideological wars since 1945 evennmore clearly revolve around the verynfoundations of how current and futurengenerations will live. This seems beyondnPowers’s comprehension. “A chunk ofnCentral Europe” is “something small” tonPowers and not worth fighting for. It maynmake a difference, however, to many asnto which side of the Berlin Wall they livenon.nPowers has considerable tacticaln16 inChronicles of Culturenknowledge about weapons. He can easilynwrite about accuracy, counterforce,nB-52 bombers, etc. Indeed, his essay onnthe evolution of strategic forces in thenNovember 1982 issue of The Atlantic isnexcellent, 6r better than this book However,nhe lacks a strategic understandingnof war. This is most apparent when, afternwresding with Clausewitz and losing, henfalls back on General Sherman’s simplenremark that “War is Hell.”nYet, he does have a realist streak. Henunderstands that the new accuracy innmissile warheads allows targeting of militarynunits and moves us away fromngenocidal assaults on cities. He alsonStrange BedfellowsnUberal pseudopluralism has finally metnitself both coming and going in the politics/moneyngame. The ground rules gonsomething like this-. Right-wing money isninherently bad, antihumanitarian, probablynacquired either through shady meansnor Irom the sweat of the poor proles. I.cltwingnmoney, on the other hand, is good;nits origins may he oliscure, but in the handsnof socially acceptable liberals it is alwaysnused to furdier the propagation of propernideas, wtiich, of course, are always of greatnlicnefit to “the people.” A ptri- Ml that OIK-of iheir own LS actuallynassi )(.’ialiiig wilh tlit- right-wingers, or thatn.Mr. .Moll has .stt-ppeil outside the boundariesnof the gamey One ironic aspect ofnIhls mlnllempesi Is ihat the politicalncauses and opei-ators lo whom .Mr. Mottnwould like U) ladk- out his money are certainlynthe i.-r- iiiK-.s the Wcollectivistsndearly k)vi-. Iliiis. the liberals’ “free choice”nseems to be rather similar to Henryni’ord’s color si-li-iijoii ibr his Model T’s:nyou can financi- ainihingyou want as longnas it’s theirs. ( UVi ) •n