he was personally engaged in secretnnegotiations for the release of the hostages,nand he helped to direct Carter’sncampaign for reelection. Although henprovides copious details on these activities,nJordan fails to provide much analysisnor even to deal with broad issues. ButnCrisis does provide insight about thenCarter Administration’s foreign-policynoutiook, though it is often more revealingnby what it doesn’t say than by what itnactually presents. It indicates that whilenCarter did not discuss foreign policy innbroad, conceptual terms, he unreflectinglynretained the same liberal foreignpolicynperspective with which he enterednoffice, littie changed by the impact ofnevents. This unchanged outiook was evidentnin the hostage issue, where Jordannshows Carter to be preeminentiy concernednabout preserving the lives of thencaptive Americans. The watchword wasnrestraint, with both Carter and Jordannfearing that the American people mightnbecome so frustrated as to demand anmilitant solution. There was no apparentnconcern that the failure to punish Irannfor this heinous crime might encouragenother countries to capture Ainericanndiplomats or to harm American interestsnin other ways. In feet, neither Carter nornJordan demonstrated any awareness thatnthe United States had suffered a grievousnwrong—that for a country to seizenanother’s diplomats was an act of war.nThus, in his fruitiess, secret negotiationsnJordan was almost completely on thendefensive, while the Iranians haranguednthe United States for its alleged crimes.nWwie the book makes little mentionnof A^anistan, since Jordan was not personallyninvolved in that issue, the informationnprovided presents no evidencenthat Carter was greatiy troubled by thenSoviet threat to American security.nAbout Afghanistan, Carter told Jordannthat “It raises grave questions aboutnSoviet intentions and destroys anynchance of getting the SALT treatynthrough the Senate. And that makes thenprospects of nuclear war even greater.”nTo Carter, apparentiy, the concern forngood relations with the Soviet Unionnstill overrode the containment of Sovietnexpansionism.nJordan recognizes that American toreignnpolicy appeared inept and impotentnduring Carter’s last year in office. And itnwas the Mure to settie the hostage issue,nhe believes, that was the crucial cause ofnCarter’s reelection defeat. Yet, evenntoday,Jordan (like Carter in 1980)is unablento make any connection betweennthe problems during that terminal yearnand the foreign policy that had beennpursued during the three previous yearsnand which had caused the loss of Americannpower and prestige, making suchncatastrophes almost inevitable. Jordan,nin feet, describes key elements of thatnforeign policy—the Panama CanalnTreaties, the actions of Andrew Youngnin “making friends for America in thenThird World,” and the human-rights policy—^asngreat successes. The dire problemsnof tiiat last year he attributes solelynto bad luck.nU nlike Jordan and Carter, the Americannpeople viewed their country’snforeign-policy problems as symptomaticnof something fer deeper than bad luck.nThey sought a reorientation that theynUncritical CaressesnJoan Givner: Kaiherine AnnenPorter: A Life; Simon & Schuster;nNew York.nPaul Mariani: William Carlosn’Williams: A New World Naked;nMcGraw-Hill; New York.nby Linda ThomenJ. have a friend who, having recentlynundergone therapy of the encounter-groupnvariety, tends to treatnevery conversation in the same context.nThese interactions often takenMs. Thome works for the Universitynof Chicago.nnncorrectiy recognized would not be providednby the incumbent administration.nIn electing Ronald Reagan, the Americannpeople believed they were choosing anPresident who held no illusions aboutnthe Soviet threat and who would pursuena self-confident, assertive foreign policy.nUnfortunately, the Reagan Administrationnhas not lived up to its promise innforeign policy. However, while thenReagan Administration is hardly blameless,npart of the cause must be attributednto a shift in public opinion. To make thenAmerican people aware of the importancenof power required the dramaticnjolt of 1979. As the memory of thesenevents recedes into the background,nand without comparable new crises, thenAmerican people, guided by the liberalnmedia establishment, have largely forgottennthe lessons these events vividlynpresented. Thus, once more emergesnthe refrain to cut military spending,neliminate nuclear weapons, abandonnterritory to pro-Soviet forces, negotiatenwith “peaceful” Soviet leaders. Perhapsnnew crises are required before thenAmerican people really awaken to theirnplight. Unfortunately, these might bringndown not only the incumbent administration,nbut the American republic itself Dnthe form of mild interrogations duringnwhich innumerable questions arenasked about femily, friends, and “interpersonalnrelationships.” Thesendialogues can be uncomfortable;nthey are inevitably tedious and annoying.nChanging the subjectnamounts to “emotional defensiveness”nand wishing to avoid the topicnaltogether is anathema. Ours has becomena society of instant intimacy, innwhich new acquaintances and nearnstrangers think nothing of recitingnthe details of their lives and assumenthat we are interested both in listeningnand in reciprocating. My new upstairsnneighbor came down one eveningnto introduce himself and then satn^Si^ZXnJuly 1983n