many fetuses do look exactly like smallnbabies and that their humanity cannotnbe denied. It seems odd that Nisbet doesnnot find it necessary even to address thisnmoral concern.nA book of this kind is meant to be provocative,nand Nisbet is undoubtedlynaware of what he is doing when he tellsnantiabortionists that their proclaimednloyalty to family values actually worksnagainst them, because, after all, governmentnprohibitions of abortion are an interferencenwith family autonomy. Herenagain, however, there are dimensions tonthe problem which he does not address.nIs not family autonomy severely underminednwhen minor daughters can havenaboaions (paid for by the government)nwithout even their parents’ knowledge,nor when wives can abort without theirnhusband’s consent? In the end, thenmorality of abortion has to be argued innterms of the act itself, not merely in termsnof families. Obviously we do not, in thenname of family autonomy, allow peoplento decide when is the appropriate time tondispatch their elderly grandparents tonthe great beyond.nNisbet’s aversion to the antiabortionnposition seems to have several roots, andnit is an appropriate opening chapternbecause it probably defines his conservatismnbetter than any other part of thenbook. On the simplest level he representsnwhat I have sometimes called “man-ofthe-world”nconservatism, an outlooknwhich is frankly accepting of basicnhuman desires (e.g., for property) thatnliberals often condemn, a view whichnfinally takes the traditional code of conductnof the gentleman as its practicalnnorm. Nisbet is thus critical of thenSupreme Court’s 1973 decision permittingnabortion on demand because itnupset what he regards as a practical solutionnto the problem—abortions werenperformed, no one made much of annissue of that fact, yet society was not innthe position of seeming to condone ornencourage the practice—a “moderate,”nperhaps Burkean arrangement nownthreatened by fanatics from both sidesn12inChronicles of Culturen(although Nisbet clearly regards the antiabortionistsnas the more dangerous). Hisnusual acuity seems to leave him here,nsince he almost totally prescinds from thenwider cultural context of the issue, particularlynits close association with fanaticalnfeminism. It can hardly be denied thatnabortion is antifamily when the ultimatenstated reason for allowing it is so thatnwomen can escape the unthinkable burdensnof motherhood. In other contextsnNisbet sees quite clearly how the variousnaspects of the moral revolution of ourntime stem from poisoned roots. On abortionnhe seems to have a blind spot.nA second source of his position is hisnantistatism, and he regards it as a tellingncriticism that antiabortionists, many ofnthem professed conservatives, are nowncalling on the government to restrict personalnfreedom in this area. But of course,nif abortion is what its opponents say it is,nthen in prohibiting it the government isnmerely exercising its minimal policenpower—the protection of human life. Innaddition, Nisbet misses the point that,nwith regard to abortion, as in other areasnof personal behavior, the moral revolutionnof our times has largely been initiatednand carried forward by the activistnliberal state. Abortion on demand is nownallowed because of the same activistnlawyers and judges of whom Nisbet is sonwitheringly critical elsewhere in his book.nIt is financed with public money (a subjectnabout which he says nothing) and activelynpromoted in the public schools andnby social-welfare agencies. Its strongestnadvocates state openly that they see it asnthe centerpiece in a sweeping moraln”‘” Imi^^fncfioOQai ‘ / ^-^nnnrevolution.nI suspect Nisbet has simply not beennpaying close attention to the thingsnwhich exercise the so-called “social conservatives.”nThus in his entry on thenfamily he makes the small but tellingnmistake of referring to the “White HousenConference on the Family” rather than,nas it was officially called, the WhitenHouse Conference on Families. ThenCarter administration deliberately usednthe plural form in order to indicate thatnthe traditional understanding of familynwas being scrapped and that it was thenconference’s purpose to legitimize everynkind of social arrangement—communes,nhomosexual liaisons, etc.—asnfamilies, one as good as another. Herenman-of-the-world conservatism appearsnto mesh with Nisbet’s sociologicalnassumptions, in that he accepts withoutnquestion the standard social-science explanationnfor the decline of the family asncaused by economic change, especiallynthose changes which have stripped thenfamily of its economic functions andnhave weakened its hold on property.nNisbet apparently agrees with those whonthink that, once the family has beennreduced to a community mainly basednon personal relationships, it has lost mostnof its strength anyway. Thus he treats thenWhite House Conference merely as anforedoomed effort to shore up a failingninstitution, and misses the fact that it wasnpart of a deliberate and continuing socialnrevolution. Surely the family is for manynpeople what Christopher Lasch has callednit—a haven in a heartless world. Manynprofamily people are exercised by politicalnattempts to suppress even that function,nbut Nisbet offers them littlensympathy.nXhe third and perhaps most tellingnclue in his treatment of abortion is hisnreference to Roman practice. The Romans,nhe argues, were the most thoroughlynfamily-oriented people innhistory, yet they permitted abortion.nQ.E.D. For Nisbet it is thus anomalousnthat the early Christians condemned anpractice which the ancient world foundn