hierarchy of political concerns.nAmerican political conservatismnseems to lack philosophical conservatism’snsense of the tragedy of human existence.nOur business-oriented conservativenparty optimistically sought tonpopulate and to develop a continent—nand succeeded. It envisaged a society ofnvirtually unlimited opportunity andnmobility. For generations it dreamed ofnthe New Jerusalem isolated fromnEurope’s sordid history. Hence onenseldom finds in American political conservatismnthe belief that man will stmgglenonly to taste ultimate defeat; or thatnman’s most impressive accomplishmentsnare destined to oblivion. Instead, withnboth Hamilton and Reagan, one findsnHoratio Alger success stories and thentendency to generalize from limitednexperience.nLouis Hartz in The Liberal Traditionnin America argues persuasively that thendilemma of American conservatism isnthat to the degree that it conserves antradition, it conserves a liberal tradition.nHe argues that the U.S. is founded uponnLockean liberal assumptions. The credonof the founding fathers involved an optimistic,natomized view of man, a contractual-mechanicalnconcept of government,nand an obsessive commitment tonthe sanctity of private property. Lockeannliberalism justified the American Revolutionnand became, with its victory, thenofficial orthodoxy. That liberalism wasnintelligible in a society that lacked anfeudal tradition, had been settled by immigrants,nand seemed to possess unlimitednresources. Thus American conservativesnwere put in the peculiar position ofnconserving a Lockean liberal traditionnthat had acquired establishment statusndue to its revolutionary success. Consequently,nthe political conservatism thatnemerged in the U.S. would have to differnconsiderably from the philosophicalnvariety in both concern and emphasis.nThe Hecht and Cannon books seem tonsubstantiate Hartz’s thesis.nThe America of the flimre will be veryndifferent from the worlds that moldednHamilton and Reagan. It will be in allnprobability an arena of nuclear threat,nlimited resources, cultural conflict, andngeneral decline. The unprecedentednprosperity from 1945 to 1975 may onenday seem an aberration as it becomesnincreasingly difficult to compete with thennewly reindustrialized nations. Americanas the workshop of the world maynbecome but a faded memory. How relevantnto that world will be the Lockeannliberalism with its optimism, its individualism,nits faith in progress?nWhat perhaps is needed to face such anfuture is an infusion of Burkean conservatismninto the American conservativentradition. The Burkean pessimism, sensenof mystery, recognition of evil andntragedy, and commitment to traditionnand community might serve as a helpfulnantidote. The conservative love affairnwith the business community—whichnhas never really been conservative—nmight be questioned and more naturalnallies sought. The Burkean organismicnemphasis on subsidiarity might foster annew concern for man’s future environment.nThe Burkean emphasis on subsidiaritynmight inspire a renewed defense ofnfamily, locale, and church. The Burkeannsuspicion of bigness might encourage annew perspective on business, as well as onnlabor and government. American conservatismnwould thus link with a muchnolder philosophical tradition.nIT ossibly the conservative philosophicalnethos has never been effectively representednin American politics. It is probablynin the realm of American literature,nwith writers like Melville, Faulkner,nIn the MailnO’Connor, and Percy, that one wouldndiscover that ethos. Indeed, these twonbooks indicate the poverty of Americannpolitical conservatism. The first describesnAlexander Hamilton, the great modernizer.nBut modernization/development isna liberal, not a conservative, obsession.nThe second describes Ronald Reagan,nthe great communicator. But contemporaryncommunication impresses thenphilosophical conservative with itsnsimplicity and vulgarity. Communicationnwith the massses is a liberal, not anconservative, obsession. Unfortunatelynour Founding Fathers drank freely fromnthe waters of the Enlightenment. Ournvenerated documents, our unquestionednmyths, our political institutions arensaturated with that spirit. But to thenphilosophical conservative, the Enlightenmentnand its fruits are viewed withnsuspicion; hence the tension betweennphilosophical conservatism and thenAmerican experience.nAmerica’s lack of a genuine philosophicalnconservative tradition leavesnmany to opt for the lesser evil. To themnthe two established political parties representnmerely 19th-century liberalism vs.n20th-cenmry liberalism. The GOP representsnthose who become affluent in thenprivate sector, while the DemocraticnParty represents the “newclass” thatlivesnregally off the public sector. WhatnAmerican conservatism needs is an affirmationnof philosophical conservatism:nneither a Hamilton nor a Reagan, butnan American Burke who will adapt thenancient wisdom to the Americannpredicament. DnThe ‘Art’ of Investing While Collecting by Robert Johanningmeiet; Art & Communications;nCarlsbad, NM. Somehow, “art” purchased for monetary, not aesthetic, appreciation loses itsnghmmer, though this investor/author disagrees.nHoover Institution Report 1982; Stanford University; Stanford, CA. Few thitigs founded inn1919 are as far from retirement age as this spry institution.nThe Nature of PuMic Philosophy by Richard J. Bishirjian; University Press of America;nWashington, DC. Public philosophy: as is clear, chaos is a consequence of ignoring its truenform.nnnHHMSInApril 1983n