tion of business and society. How wenthink about business governs how thencorporation views itself and how the corporatenperson understands his function.nThe first constraint Chamberlain has innmind is the profit/efficiency test commonlynknown as “the bottom line.” Butnhis argument is equally true of the socialistnapproach which oflfers no greater hopenof intellectual freedom for those withinnthe frame of modem economic organization.nChamberlain’s second constraint—nspecialization—may be ameliorated bynthe values of craftsmanship. But thenprofit motive implies that corporate culturenis subject to the cultural definitionnof profit. The hope is that “if we cannbroaden the standards by which wenjudge the activity [of giant corporations],nif we can free them from a test of efficiencynmore relevant to the past than thenpresent, we can invigorate the intellectualnclimate within which the specializednrole of employees is performed.” Thisnwould mean falling out of love withnsystems analysis, in which parts arenvalued for their contribution to the efficiencynof the whole, in favor of a systemnwhose social values provide discretionnand purpose to the parts themselves. Tonrise above the bottom line means tonbroaden it by means of cultural redefinition.nThe purpose of the market changesnwith culture. Drucker and Floyd Matsonnhave long since reported the death of thenorganic cash register known as rationalneconomic man. Business makes money,nbut it is a commonplace that people innbusiness have to earn more than money.nFinally, the issue of corporate culture isnthe issue of autonomy in work, the questionnof work made meaningful.nKjorporate Cultures has little to offernthe troubled new business leader. “Thenultimate lesson, of course,” write thenauthors, “is that managers need to benfiilly aware of the ritualistic element ofntheir own culture and not allow themselvesnto be captured by the magic ofnwhat they do day to day.” Such advicenmay keep the manager’s eyes raised, butnits blindness to economic, political, andnpsychological reality is apparent in the rationale:n”A strong culture enables peoplento feel better about what they do, sonthey are more likely to work harder.”nEverywhere, naive specifics confirm thatnCorporate Cultures is another simplisticnorganizational development handbooknmasquerading as cultural analysis. “Ofncourse,” write Deal and Kennedy, “corporatenlife is never quite as simple andnpat as that,” but they seem fully convincednthat it is. This conviction ultimatelyntells us: “A company’s culture isnlike a security blanket for its people. Itntells them what to do and reassures themnthat if they do it they will not be just acceptednby the people around them, butnalso rewarded.” The blanket-bearingnmanager attuned to corporate culturenturns out to be none other than thenorganization man. “The key action,” asnthe final prescription goes, such anmanager “must try is to tailor his responsento the norms of the culture ” of thencompany.nThe arguments in Corporate Culturesnare more than outdated; they arendangerously nostalgic. This makes themnboth fashionable and at cross purposes.nApparendy “the warm, himiane managersnpromoted by business publicationsntoday” are the wrong kind of securitynblanket. “The point is this,” say Dealnand Kennedy in the same breath, “modernnmanagers who try to be humane maynat the same time undermine the valuesnupon which the culture of the institutionnrests. Modern heroes need to be hardnand ‘insensitive’ to keep a company consistentnwith its goals and vision—the verynelements that made it strong in the firstnplace.” How little this understands of thenrelationship of culture and subculture,nand how much it wants to be in step, arenclear when the whip appears: “The realnproblem with managers today is thatnthey are not aggressive enough in tryingnto influence the behavior around them.n… In today’s self-conscious world,nwhere things are supposed to be ‘laidback’nand ‘easy going,’ few managersnhave the conviction to set any standardsnfor behavior. As a result, the cultures ofnnntoday’s companies ebb and flow with thenchanging fads of society as a whole.” Thisnputs the cart before the horse and thennwhips a dead cart. The myth of the laidbackncorporate leader was propoundednby organizational consultants in the 70’snand is now attacked by the same consultantsnin the 80’s. Business has yet tongive it more than lip service.nDeal and Kennedy should know asnmuch, for the leader who exemplifies thenpast they can’t return to mrns out to benthe creator of IBM. In their words:n”Thomas Watson himself confessed tonlearning leadership under NCR’s Patterson,nwhom he described as ‘an amalgamnof St. Paul, Poor Richard, and AdolfnHider.'” Powerful leaders like Watsonn”put the business in their heart and thusnaowd out softer sentiments. It’s a lessonntoday’s managers should learn as an antidotento the hype on business humaneness.n” But then: “We are not arguing forna return to authoritarianism. Rather wenbelieve that managers have a strongnpotential for positive influence if theynwill just exercise it.” This qualification isnexposed in Deal and Kennedy’s finalnchoice of strong culture corporations:nMcDonald’s, the U.S. Forest Service,nand the Roman Catholic Church. Justnwho is who when it comes to St. Paul,nFranklin, and Hitier is not clarified.nIn Democracy in America, Tocquevillenasked: “How does it happen, then,nthat the Americans sail their vessels at ancheaper rate than ours?” His answer: “Inam of the opinion that the tme cause ofntheir superiority must not be sought fornin physical advantages, but that it isnwholly attributable to moral and intellectualnqualities.” The very same questionnis asked in Detroit today, but no onentoday has TocqueviUe’s answer. Today,ndysfunction prevents our knowing thisnanswer, that and the feeling that we mustnknow more because we have more. Thatnwe have more is good. The self-actualizationnthat will again shape a wholeness ofnbelief and reintegrate commerce andnculture is sparked not by need but bynsecurity and tmst. Dn^3nMarch 1983n