be for the whole human race to be wipednout rather than just the combatant countries.nCertainly total extinction is worsenthan a mere catastrophe, but 1 suspectnthat anyone who was undeterred by thendestruction of Eurasia and North Americanwould not be much moved by a threatnto the whole race.nWhile Schell has raised a seriousnissue, his analysis of nuclear war isnsimplistic and dogmatic; in some ways itnactually undersx.2itts the danger. InnSchell’s view, any war is bound to be antotal war of maximum destruction: bothnsides will try to destroy not only thenenemy’s military forces, but its entirensociety as well, and no defense—passivenor active—could stop that. While Schellnroundly denounces the superpowers fornpreparing to commit mutual genocide,nhe doubts that either would deliberatelynlaunch such a war. Rather, he believesnthe danger is that a war might grow outnof a local crisis or begin by accident. Occasionallynhe suggests that the mere piling-upnof arms must lead to a war thatnmethod of defense were developed bynone side, it would make a successhil warnof aggression feasible. Schell’s examinationnof civil defense is just as deficient.nHe is probably right to ridicule the notionnof evacuation, but he confuses thenwhole fallout-shelter issue by blurringnthe distinction between shelters in targetnareas and fallout shelters in the rest of thencountry. Protecting the population ofnthe cities against blast and fire may wellnbe impossible; to protect people fromnfallout in areas well away from the explosionsnis very different, and it is possiblenthat relatively simple measures wouldnsave millions of lives. Schell raises the objectionnthat the Soviets might respond tona shelter program by merely increasingntheir arsenal, but this is neither certainnnor conclusive. He winds up sniffing:n”In the last analysis, however, the civilndefense issue is a strategic, not a humanitariannquestion”—a statement as devoidnof moral sense as any made by the nuclearnstrategists he attacks.nSchell cither does not, or refuses to,nunderstand the concept of “limited nu-n”iiir l-Mi’ iii the F^r.’ij – ;in ;niinir:ilil sfiioiis book.”n—{Loudon) Tinii’s literary Su/ipli’mrntn” ‘Till- l;i[i- of till’ Hiinh,’ tht-M. !.>• IMI only ;i M;iiciiu.-ni. Ii h :i .>.iiriiinoii, ;iii ;il;irm,na loninioiion.'”n—Sriv York Thm’s Book Kcriavnno one wants, but the overall impressionngiven is that we face only a small possibilitynof total disaster. One could argue,nhowever, that there is more likelihood ofna deliberate war that would not be quitenso destructive. Schell roundly ridiculesnthe notion that any defense against nuclearnattack can be constructed, and henrejects the possibility of what is calledn”limited nuclear war.” His treatment ofnthese problems is inadequate, even innthe unlikely event that his assumptionsnare correct. He disregards the possibilitynof an active defense by antimissile missiles,nlasers, or particle beams. Since thisnis the most critical unknown factor in thenwhole problem of nuclear war, his responsenis not reasonable. If an effectivenclear war.” Admittedly, this is a confusingnterm, but there is nothing unrealnabout its concept. In many respects it is anmore likely picture of events thannSchell’s picture of both sides trying tonblast each other off the face of the earth.nThe most logical form of a Soviet firstnstrike would be not an all-out attempt tonwipe out the American population butnan attack directed against our land-basednmissiles and bombers. This would leavenAmerica with only submarine-basednmissiles (assuming the Soviets did notnfind some way to attack them, too) whichnare useful only against Soviet cities. Ournleaders would then be left with thenchoice between surrendering or wipingnout part of the Soviet population. Thennnlatter course would not prevent thenSoviets from launching a far more devastatingnattack against our people—mostnof whom would survive a Soviet firstnstrike against military bases only. (Itnshould be apparent that the phrasen”limited nuclear war” is misleading, forna war of this type would be waged for thenhighest possible stakes. It would be limitednonly insofar as refraining from deliberatelynwiping out a whole civilian populationncan be called “limited.”) Schellnsomehow finds it “dreamlike and fantastic”nto think that the American leadersnwould “acquiesce in the Soviet firstnstrike” without retaliating. It is, rather,nSchell’s ideas of what the Americansnwould do that are dreamlike and fantasticn. They suggest that he is simply unwillingnto work out the logical consequencesnof such a situation. He apparently cannotnunderstand that in some circumstances annuclear war could be won by a carefulnand clever aggressor—using a quantity ofnnuclear explosives small enough not tonendanger the existence of all life, even ifnSchell’s fears on that score are justified.nOchell’s analysis of nuclear war is toonsimplistic to be useful. Unfortunately,nthis is also a flaw in his attempts to delveninto the background of the nuclear threatnand to propose a solution. In Schell’snview, the very existence of the bomb, ornmore precisely the knowledge of how tonbuild it, is the problem: “For the fundamentalnorigin of the peril of human extinctionnby nuclear arms lies not in anynparticular social or political circumstancesnof our time but the attainment bynmankind as a whole, after millennia ofnscientific progress, of a certain level ofnknowledge of the physical universe.”nGiven this view, it is not surprising thatnat times he verges on condemning reasonnand science. Though he backs away fromnblaming scientists for our predicament,nhe does decide that: “rampant reason,nman found, was, if anything, more to benfeared than rampant instinct. Bestialitynhad been the cause of many horrors, butnit had never threatened the species withnextinction; some instinct for self-preser-n113nDecember 198Sn