the Old South—George Fitzhugh andnJohn C. Calhoun; and the various rightwingnmovements of this century—thenAction Franqaise in France and thenFalange in Spain (but definitely not, asnNovak points out, the National Socialistsnin Germany). The best-known livingnrepresentative of old conservatism isnAlexander Solzhenitsyn, whose sentimentsnare baffling and offensive to liberalsn(democratic capitalists) and socialistsnalike. What the old conservatives fearednmost was the rootless and ruthless individualismnset loose in the world by liberalndemocracy. Conservatives—and evennsome liberals—were unable to see thenaura around democracy. For them, it wasnsimply a form of government to benjudged on its not-very-illustrious record.nFreedom was only—in Hobbes’s wordsn— “power divided into small fragments,”nand democracy, far from beingnthe will of the people, was no more thannthe endless contest of wire-pullers andnpolitical scoundrels over who could heapnup the greatest number of fragments. Bynpitting individual against individual in anbestial struggle for survival and power,ndemocracy led to a weakening of familynand community ties, a dissolution ofnmoral and aesthetic standards, and angradual concentration of power in thenhands of the state. In the opinion ofnEuropean conservatives like Joseph denMaistre, Rousseau was the real key tonliberal democracy, because he had thenclearest head. Rousseau realized that individualnliberty could never be guaranteednso long as the ties of family, class,ncommunity, and faith kept men differentnand unequal. For this reason, JeannJacques became the first real Statist, innthe modem totalitarian sense.nNovak meets the old conservativenchallenge largely by shifting the groundnof debate. People are freer, more energetic,nand more productive under democraticncapitalism; liberal Englandnenjoyed an unprecedented growth raten(2 % per annum) in the 19th century;nmodem American workers enjoy a standardnof living unimaginable to earlierngenerations. Americans have not lost anstrong sense of community: it is preservednamong immigrants and has beenntransformed, for the rest of us, into “annew order of community … of freenpersons in voluntary association.” Thenfamily has not been destroyed—indeed,nit was strengthened by the social developmentsnof the 17th century—and todayn”the actual texture of life underndemocratic capitalism is not quite centerednon the individual but on the family.n” The strongest argument, however, isnnot logical but rhetorical. By lumpingntogether old conservatives and socialists,nassociating mercantilist economics withnMarxism, and identifying all precapitalistneconomics with mercantilism, Novakndraws a convincing picture of freedomnagainst servitude, prosperity againstnstagnation. In fact, tiie sort of economicnplanning associated with mercantilism isnan essentially modem ideology. Diocletian’sncelebrated edict on price controlsncame late in the history of the RomannEmpire and had the predictable results.nThe progress of trade and industry hasnundoubtedly made life easier in thenmodern world, but it is impossible tonweigh and measure the value of happinessnof human life. Gibbon, standingnon the threshold of the modern world,nthought man had never been happiernthan in the despotic age of the Antonines,nand many a modern executivenspends his free time mooning over the L.nL. Bean catalogue, dreaming of gettingnaway from it all. Technological progressnhas given us more free time to enjoynourselves, but how we spend our timenmay well be more important than thennumber of hours in our work week. Then!Kung Bushmen of the Kalahari, afternall, have at least as much free time asnmost American workers.nJJemocracy and capitalism are not,nby their very nature, static phenomena,nsince both depend on free choice. In onenview of the matter, democratic capitalismnrepresents a transition from one formnof absolutism to another. The historicalnfuzziness of the phenomena pattly explainsnNovak’s willingness to attribute tonnnit both the virtues it inherited from traditionalnsocieties and the adjustments forcednupon it by socialists. No one deniesnthat immigrants—especially those fromnEastern and Southern Europe—bringnwith them a strong sense of community,nbut the preservation of communitarianntraditions among these immigrants (whondo not come from countries with a profoundnexperience of democratic capitalism)nis largely in spite of rather thannbecause of capitalism. He makes thenvalid point that our community life is notnso impoverished as its critics—includingnthe early Novak—have suggested, butnwhat is the meaning of this new, voluntarynorder of community? That, madendesperate by roodessness, we are lookingnfor community surrogates on the job ornin cult membership? Eliot’s answern(another old conservative) comes tonmind: “There is no life that is not in community,nand no community not lived innpraise of GOD. . . . And now you livendispersed on ribbon roads, and no mannknows or cares who is his neighbor. . . .nWhat is the meaning of this city?.. . Wenall dwell together to make money fromneach other.”nIt is difficult to generalize about patternsnof family life—even in WesternnEurope, where the form of the familynseems to vary from class to class, region tonregion, and age to age; however, it is safento declare that the strong family is not anninvention of democratic capitalism,nquite the reverse. There was a time whennsons were expected to carry on thenfather’s occupation, when stams was bynand large determined by family, whennchildren were required to take care ofntheir aged parents, and where thenprimary responsibility for child-rearingnrested with the family. All that hasnchanged—for the better, some claim—nbut it has not made the family stronger.nThe fact that there is a residue of socialncoherence cannot fairly be used as proofnthat the pursuit of freedom and equalityndoes not diminish the strength of communitynlife. If capitalism has clung, for antime, to certain relics of traditional life, itnhas also borrowed from socialism. Capi-nmm^^mmQnNovember 198Sn