chon landing.nIn his attack on MacArthur’s conductnafter the Inchon landing, Goulden isnshooting at a sitting duck. Few people,nexcept for MacArthur and his staff officers,nhave tried to defend his blunderingncourse in the autumn of 1950. Andntheir dishonest and contradictory alibisndid MacArthur a disservice, drawing attentionnaway from MacArthur’s legitimatengrievances. Moreover, as Gouldennhimself admits, there was plenty ofnblame to go around. MacArthur wasnreckless, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff didnnot restrain him. Practically everyonenchose to believe that the appearance ofnChinese troops in October had been partnof a bluff or a limited move to defend thenYalu River hydroelectric plants. The onlynones who came off well during thisnperiod were the Navy and the MarinenCorps. The naval command in the FarnEast, fearing that the Chinese wouldnenter the war full-scale, undertook vitalnpreparations; the Marines in northeastnKorea were cautious and careful, andnavoided disaster—unlike the Armyntroops on their flanks.nAfter the defeat in North Korea,nMacArthur panicked, concluding thatnKorea would probably have to be evacuated.nThe Joint Chiefs were also in a statenof shock. It was General Ridgway, thenmen in the field and—surprisingly—nSecretary of State Dean Acheson whonperformed exceptionally well. Actually,nthe extent of that defeat has often beennexaggerated. As Goulden notes, it soonnbecame apparent that there was no realndanger of the Chinese driving the Alliesnout of the South, and Truman quicklyndropped any idea of a united Korea.nMacArthur’s program for bombing andnblockading China was simply unnecessarynfor the defense of South Korea, sonthe argument between MacArthur andnWashington was really about what theirnproper objective should be. Whatevernone’s views on that subject—and there isna good deal more to be said in favor ofnMacArthur’s opinion than Gouldennallows—it is clear that MacArthur’snbehavior was improper; his duty as ansoldier was to obey or to resign, not tonsnipe publicly at the administration.nGoulden discloses that MacArthur’s insubordinationnwas worse that has beennknown previously. Truman learned,nthrough the breaking of diplomaticncodes, that MacArthur had indicated tonSpanish and Portuguese diplomats thatnhe was conniving to get American policynreversed in order to decisively defeatnChina. Truman was unable to relievenMacArthur at that point only because thensource of his information could not bendisclosed; he had to wait until MacArthurncommitted a less spectacular butnpublic transgression.nWhile MacArthur’s behavior was indefensible,nit does not negate all of hisnideas. Very few senior military officersnagreed with either the restrictions onnAmerican forces or the limited objectivesnafter 1950. (Perhaps the most eloquentnexponent of MacArthur’s ideas was notnMacArthur himself, but Admiral C.nTurner Joy, after the latter served as chiefnnegotiator with the communists at Panmunjom.)nEven Tmman was unhappynwith the situation: as he explained tonMacArthur in January 1951, “Stepsnwhich might in themselves be fullynjustified and which might lend somenassistance to the campaign in Koreanwould not be beneficial if they therebyninvolved Japan or Western Europe innlarge-scale hostilities.” Some of thenarguments used against MacArthur arenextremely dubious. It is very doubtfulnthat the Chinese could have attacked ournbases in Japan with any success, whichnnegates the notion that the “privilegednsanctuary” given China was therefore anmutual affair. Goulden does not refutennnMacArthxir’s claim that the limited forcenhe needed to accomplish his programnwould not have crippled us in WesternnEurope in 1951.nGoulden, however, does not quitenshare the satisfaction of Truman,nAcheson, et al. He notes: “Tmman andnAcheson went to great lengths to avoid andirect accusation that the Soviets werenthe tme culprits in the war, a failure thatnin essence proved the Soviets’ point—nthat is, that the USSR could use satellitesnto nip at America’s flanks without fear ofnprovoking direct retaliation. Such wasnthe basic flaw of the Tmman-Achesonnpolicy in Korea.” In other words: Pluscanchange, plus c ‘est meme chose.nXVobert Smith, the author of Baseball:nA Narrative History, has producednthe literary equivalent of a spitball.nWhile Joseph Gouldcn’s book occasionallynsounds like it should have beenncalled The Case Against MacArthur, atnleast Goulden knows how to make a casen—Smith does not. His ridiculous book isnsomewhat reminiscent of Joe McCarthy’snfamous philippic against General Marshall.nSmith, a left-wing liberal, has antendency toward ranting, selection ofnevidence and deviousness with a streak ofnsimplemindedness much like that of thenright-wing villain he reviles. True,nDouglas MacArthur is a much betterntarget than George Marshall because hisnreal blunders, as well as the vanity andndishonesty he often exhibited, leave himnfar more vulnerable than the whollynhonorable and self-effacing Marshall.nBut Smith is not content to point outnMacArthur’s real flaws and follies. Forn•MHHS3nOctober 1983n