Return, though, to the assumptionnadvanced by Harrington that most ofnhis readers (and even his critics) todaynaccept unquestioningly. The assumptionnis that income ought to be more equallyndistributed. It would be easy in replynto resort to the economic argument thatnincome differences are a spur to productivity,nand that if everyone had the samenincome no one would want to do thentough or demanding work. Harrington,nhowever, shows either his intellectualnagility or a simple inability to follownthe argument. He “answers” this economicnargument (favoring an unequalndistribution of income) by claiming thatnif there is a productivity problem, itnarises because businesses make investmentsnonly when they generate a profit.nGovernment would not be bound bynsuch a stodgy rule and would thereforenbe free to make investments whichnwould benefit society (and somehow increasenproductivity as well). The questionnof how to get the tough jobs donenis left unanswered, unless we are tonassume that the government will firstninvest in machines to do those jobs.nThe economic argument is valid andnno assertions or intellectual gymnasticsnwill change that. Heilbroner impliesnthat Marxism is in fact designed for ancreature quite different from mankind.nvates most Marxists), and a large proportionnof our elected representativesn(and perhaps even of our population!)nare concerned only with results. Harringtonnis as much a “bottom-line” mannas is the president of any large corporationnin that they both are concerned withnresults. Harrington doesn’t like to seenpeople living in poverty (neither do I);nhe thinks life would be more pleasant fornthe poor if they had the income of, say,nthe average family in the U.S. (whonwould deny that); and I suspect that ifnHarrington understood Marx for the ineptnsocioeconomic philosopher he was,nHarrington would not long concentratenon turning investment decisions over tonthe government. It is possible that Harringtonnwould even today settle fornsomething considerably less than annequal distribution of income. There isnreasonable certainty, though, that Harrington’snsights would still be set onnWashington, that whatever income redistributionnwas to occur would be donenby government. Now, even if someonenever demonstrates that the governmentncould actually accomplish a relativelyneffective redistribution of income (towardnthe poor, presumably), the centralnquestion remains: what in fact have younaccomplished by a redistribution of incomenunder government auspices? Evenn”I/ViWe’ tit Dcchidti is] an t-xtL-llfni Ixxik; librarii-s will want multiple coiiies.”n— Library Jinirnalnand if Harrington’s schemes are ever tonwork, they will most likely require repopulatingnthe earth with these differentncreatures. I am not out of sympathynwith Harrington’s goals—but his meansnfor achieving those goals are simplyninappropriate. And Harrington will alwaysnchoose inappropriate means becausenhe does not understand thenproblem.nIhere is, however, another aspectnof the unequal-income argument whichnseems overlooked. Harrington, Marxistsn(for it is income inequality which moti-n10 ^•^^•^HHnChronicles of Culturenif we end up with more equal income,nwhat have we done?nWhat we will have done is to acceptnthe idea that the purpose of life is tonhave rather than to strive. We willnhave moved to the position that it isnthe possession and consumption of materialngoods that makes it worthwhile tonget up in the morning. That position isnuntenable. That position may be onenwhich Marx’s new creature will be ablento hold, but it is contrary to man as henis now constituted. We do find meaningnand challenge in work. We do find selffulfillmentnand personal growth in evennnnmenial work. We do become “more human”nas a result of participating in thenwork force. But wait a minute. Harringtonnmight rightfully question whethernwe could not continue to hold on to ournwork ethic but simply maintain a differentnstructure of income. At that pointnwe return to the question of how thenredistribution occurs. If the governmentnredistributes income, it must bentaken from some to give to others. Asnthe government can only undertakensuch actions as a result of its coercivenpowers (i.e., there is an implied gunnpointed at the taxpayers), there is noncharity or morality involved. In fact,neven if I support the redistribution,nthere is no quality of a moral choice innit for me because I had no choice. Therenis no virtue in being robbed by a poornthief.nWhen the moral content is removednfrom the income-redistribution act, thennwe can only be concerned with the endnresults—and that is why Harringtonnhas to be considered as one of thenstrongest “bottom-line” advocates. Sonagain, what is accomplished by redistributingnincome when the governmentndoes it? About all that can be said isnthat some people are probably better offnand some are worse off—not a statementnwith any moral or even ethicalncontent. If Harrington were in charge,nthose whom he felt should have morenwould get more, but at the expense ofnthose whom he felt should have less.nAn income-redistribution programnwhich depends for its final justificationnon the fact that someone simplynthinks the distribution of income shouldnbe different is not a program to bentaken seriously.nIncome redistribution, when it isndone by government, suffers from twonmajor flaws: first, it flies in the facenof the work ethic, even when done onna “modest” scale; and second, it removesnthe moral quality from the redistributionnact. Both of those problemsnare absent when the redistribution isndone on the basis of private choice.n