rillas in the mountains. This was impossible.nNevertheless, Wyden believes,nthe operation was not completely hopeless.nIt was a “wild gamble,” but notn”mad,” and with all its defects the plannmight have been carried out successfully.nPresident Kennedy wrecked anynchances of success by blandly ignoringnthe requirement—which the CIA seemsnto have made reasonably clear—for thendestruction of Castro’s air force. ThenPentagon had warned at one point thatnif even one enemy plane survived it couldnsink most of the invasion ships. ThenCIA had planned two air strikes, onentwo days before D-day and one at thenlast minute. In the naive hope of concealingnthe size and origin of the operation,nthe president cut the first attacknfrom sixteen planes to six, and cancelednthe second strike entirely. Castro’s survivingnaircraft played a decisive role,nsinking critical supplies and shootingndown the Cuban exile bombers. ThenCuban exiles fought well and valiantly;nthey were simply isolated and outnumbered.nIt is perhaps characteristic ofnthe Bay of Pigs that President Kennedynwas even more enthusiastic about thendishonest aspects of the operation thannthe CIA—and it was the fraud involvednwhich finally wrecked the whole affair.nJL he planning and failure of the Baynof Pigs, and the CIA’s vaguely relatednattempts to murder Castro are well toldnby Wyden, who managed to secure angood deal of new information fromnboth American and Cuban sources. Hisnconclusions are well argued, and hisncriticisms of President Kennedy andnRichard Bissell, the prime decisionmakers,nare particularly impressive,ngiven his obvious respect for both men.nHis book is far from an anti-CIA diatribe,nand he appreciates the way thenworld looked to those in charge in 1961,nwhich is more than can be said of manynrecent historians.nIn one case, however, Wyden doesnindulge in some unfortunate sensationalism.nAmerican destroyers trying tonrescue survivors after the defeat werenshot at; Wyden suggests that had thenCubans or Americans on the spot beennmore reckless, “World War III” mightnhave been started. Since incidents betweennAmerican and Soviet forces havenoccurred several times without seriousnconsequences, it is hard to believe thatnan American-Cuban clash would havenhad such horrible results.nA. more important defect is Wyden’snfailure to discuss the issue of the moralitynof the operation in a serious manner.nHe merely offers, as an aside, the commentnthat the American leaders’ “urgento eliminate Castro, while ethically indefensible,nis easy to understand.” Notncoincidentally, he also fails to discussnthe consequences of the Castro regime’snsurvival. A brief account of what Castronhas done to his own country, hisninterference in other Latin Americanncountries and Africa, and the 1962nmissile crisis, might suggest a differentnconclusion about the morality—thoughnsurely not the effectiveness—of the Baynof Pigs. While intervention in otherncountries, whether overt or covert, isnhardly an ideal solution for problems,nit is sometimes necessary, Castro, afternall, was already quietly intervening to aidncommunists in other Latin Americannnations. The Bay of Pigs was just annattempt to do to Castro, wholesale, whatnCastro was already doing to his neighbors,nretail. In terms of global strategynhis regime was a Soviet salient insidenthe United States’ innermost defensenperimeter. To declare any Americannintervention wrong, as Wyden seems tonimply, really means to allow the othernside a free hand to continue its interventionsnas it pleases. It is unfortunate thatnour government could not find a moreneffective and open means of dealing withnCastro. But if its actions were immoral,nthey were only because of the futilendishonesty—as opposed to normal andnnatural military secrecy—that the Kennedynadministration insisted on, andnthe carelessness with which it treatednthe fate of the Cuban exiles. DnHas the Prodigal Returned?nNeil Postman: Teaching as a ConservingnActivity; Delacorte Press;nNew York.nby Edward A. WynnenNeil Postman is the author or coauthornof several popular, engaginglynwritten books on education. The perspectivenof his works—up to this pointn—is suggested by the title of his mostnprominent book. Teaching as a SubversivenActivity. His books engagednsome readers because they presentednsimple solutions to complex problems,nand because his solutions often invitedneducators to enlist their students inncovert aggression (against society) orntreat novelty as synonymous with cre-nDf. Wynne is editor of Characternmagazine.nnnativity. In short, his work epitomizednmany of the educational fads of the 60’s.nAs the title implies, Teaching as anConserving Activity reveals that Postmannhas undergone a partial conversion.nIn assessing the significance of thatnchange, we should first interpret itsnimplications for many people who havennot converted—those who alwaysnthought much of the 60’s was a bignmistake.nThe parable of the prodigal son hasnalways troubled me; but one of the purposesnof profound religion is to disturbnbelievers. Remember that one son stayednhome, while the prodigal roamed. Whennthe prodigal had wasted all of his moneynand returned home, the father directednthat the fatted calf be killed to providena welcome feast. The continuously dutifulnson then asked, “Why is all this shownput on for an irresponsible one who hasnH H ^ I M M ^ I OnMarch AprillOSOn