much of Germany and the Netherlands.nThanks to theprewar build-up, the Alliesnjust barely manage to hold the Sovietsnback from the Rhine long enough fornreinforcements to fight their way acrossnthe Atlantic. Trouble develops in thenSoviet rear, and their efforts outsidenEurope are defeated by South Africa.nHere the story becomes both improbablenand contradictory. Halted, the Sovietsndecide to pull out of the occupied areas.nBut they also decide to demonstrate theirndetermination, and terrorize the Westnlieve would quickly lead straight to annall-out nuclear war. I think, however,nthat their picture of what would happenneven if an invasion were stopped is toonoptimistic. But that just emphasizes thenimportance of being strong enough tondeter such an invasion from startingnin the first place.nIt should be recalled that predictingnthe nature and course of future wars isnnecessarily a tricky business. With anfew generally ignored exceptions, suchnas the Polish banker Bloch, few peoplen”. . . the I’hrtinick’rs ot V’/’i’ II’iri! Wuriil \ir urne us to sii|iporf our localnmilitary industri;)! comi’k’.x. and ro watch out lor thf SoiL-is whfU thi-ynlifuin to slip.”n— Tinwn”Thi- !x)ok doi-sn’f rcailv iiave much ri>.-,;i ainiui u.irnyou would ixpecl fnini a grinipot .m-iii-rals.”ninto submission, by a nuclear attack onnBirmingham, England. The West repliesnby destroying Minsk. Before annall-out nuclear war can start, a groupnled by the Ukrainian Communist Partynmachine overthrows the Soviet governmentnand makes peace. The EasternnEuropeans and Central Asians breaknfree of Russian control. Though somenrivalry between an improbable Chinese-nJapanese alliance and the West develops,nthe downfall of Communism, wenare told, is assured.nX he Third World War gives an excellentnpicture of the sheer complexitynof modern warfare; command, communications,nweapons and logistics arenskillfully outlined. As a plea for a NATOnbuild-up it is entirely convincing. Timenand again in recounting the fictionalnmilitary build-up that allows the Westnto barely repel an invasion, the authorsncleverly show just how weak the Westnis, not only on the ground, but also innair defense, tactical airpower and antisubmarinenwarfare. In their view a surpriseninvasion of Western Europe couldnnot now be defeated except by usingntactical atomic weapons, which they be-nmost ot ii i.s whatn— Lsc/u/renforesaw that World War I would lastna long time. Few expected the trenchndeadlock, or America’s entry into thenwar. Predictions about the course ofnWorld War II were about as far off. Fewnpeople expected the Nazi-Soviet pact,nthough a defecting Soviet official hadnwarned of Stalin’s plans for it in 1938.nThe Nazis’ rapid conquest of WesternnEurope surprised almost everyone;nBritain’s decision to fight on, and itsnsuccess in doing so, was unexpectednoutside of the English-speaking countries.nThe West generally expected thatnthe Nazis would overrun the SovietnUnion in three months, that Germanynwould surrender when the Alliesnreached her frontiers, and that Japannwould have to be invaded. The effectivenessnof bombing was overrated earlynin the war, while in 1939 many considerednthe submarine a minor weapon,nand thought major amphibious invasionsnimpossible. And the span of time andnthe amount of technological changenbetween the World Wars was less thannthat between V-J Day and today.nThough Sir John Hackett and his colleaguesnare far from dogmatic in tone,nthe unreliability of prediction in thisnnnfield cannot be too strongly emphasized.nA number of aspects of The ThirdnWorld War seem improbable. Generallynspeaking, it is unlikely that a communistnruling group would adopt a policy asn”adventuristic” as that described, unlessnthe military balance had become sonskewed that it was clear that victory atnany level of warfare was certain. If thenSoviets were to employ their own militarynforces short of an all-out war, ornlaunch a major war by proxy, it is likelyn(on the basis of their previous record)nthat they would launch one crisis at antime, not several as the authors suggest.nChopping off one slice of the noncommunistnworld at a time is more theirnstyle. Trouble in Eastern Europe wouldnprobably cause the Soviets to temporarilyndraw back and concentrate on pacifyingntheir empire, not to push on into WesternnEurope. On the other hand, it isnhard to see an American President sendingntroops to stop Soviet intervention inna Yugoslav civil war.nHackett’s assumptions about whatnwould happen if a Soviet offensive werenstopped seem far too optimistic. It isnunlikely that resistance in Eastern Europenor in newly occupied areas wouldnflare up as quickly as he thinks, or benas much of a nuisance to the Sovietsnas he supposes. More important, it isnimprobable that the Soviets wouldneither let go of conquered areas ornlaunch a single nuclear attack on thenWest; and doing both of these things atnonce would make no sense at all. Therenare several other possibilities that arenmore likely—and even more unpleasant.nFirst, they might try to bargainnwith the occupied areas and call for annarmistice which would leave them muchnor all of what they had seized. Second,nthey might decide to play out the string,nhoping to regain the upper hand bynbringing reinforcements from Asia,nwhile standing on the defensive andnrepelling any Allied counteroffensive,nand strangling the Allies with a submarinencampaign. (Hackett calculates thatn25% of the vital, heavily-escorted reinforcementnconvoys would be destroyednwmmmimmmm^^^mZln]Vovcmber/December 1979n