by men like Father Drinan turn out tonbe without substance. So does the somewhatncontradictory charge that thenPhoenix program, actually an intelligencenoperation, existed to summarilyndispose of the South Vietnamese government’snopponents. As Lewy observes,nmany opponents of the war were readynto believe the wildest allegations againstnthe Americans and South Vietnamese,nbut swallowed the worst sort of liesnfrom the Vietnamese communists.nEpigones of the antiwar movement likenRamsey Clark denied that the prisonersnof war they met in North Vietnam werenmistreated, only to be exposed as foolsnor liars in 197 3. Maybe there is a “moral”nargument against the war left somewhere,nbut a lot of people have madenlong sea voyages in open boats provingnotherwise.nAmerica in Vietnam also disposesnof some of the wishful thinking commonnamong “hawks” and conservatives.nOne example of this is the idea thatnthings would have been all right ifnPresident Kennedy had not connivednin Diem’s overthrow in 1963. In fact,nthe situation worsened steadily beforenDiem’s death, though it went downhillneven faster after he left the scene. Thennotion that the Paris agreements ofn1973 were satisfactory and that SouthnVietnam was sunk by Watergate and/nor Congress is dealt with critically andnrealistically. In fact, as many peoplenpointed out at the time, the agreementsnwere a farce and a “face-saving” measurenfor the Nixon administration. Theirnonly real value was to obtain the returnnof our prisoners of war. The very commonnidea that the war was simply ann”outside job” and that defeat was duento our failure to smash North Vietnamnis effectively refuted, though I feel thatnLewy goes too far in the other direction.nIn fact the struggle in South Vietnam,nthough directed from the beginningnfrom the North, was possiblenonly because of genuine disaffectionnwithin the country. The Southern governmentnwas not the monstrous oppres­nsor so often pictured, but it was nevernefficient or popular, and morale wasnalways low. The war was in some degreena civil war and a lot of the Americanngovernment’s problems were due tonits unwillingness to admit this franklynand forthrightly.nLewy is strongly critical of GeneralnWestmoreland and of American stratengy and tactics. Further, he suggestsnthat Westmoreland was derelict in failingnto see that his own Rules of Engagementnwere enforced, thus contributingnboth to inadvertent civilian casualtiesnand to the Mylai massacre, and thisncriticism seems to be right. However,nit is doubtful that Westmoreland’s strategy—defeatingnthe enemy’s big unitsnas far away from populated areas asnpossible—was quite as complete a failurenas Lewy makes out, though many ofnLewy’s criticisms may be valid. Lewy’snview is that Westmoreland let pacificationntake second place, while the communistnregular forces were able to divertnthe Allied forces from this task, inflictnfairly steady losses, and underminenAmerican morale at home. The properncourse, Lewy thinks, was a “populationcontrol”nrather than an “attrition strategy.”nThere is no doubt that intelligencenwas badly organized, that pacificationnwas given insufficient attention, thatnthe South Vietnamese armed forcesnwere not properly built up, and thatnthe enemy regulars were able to replacentheir losses from the North. However,nthe Viet Cong do seem to have beennlosing their grip in some areas and theynneeded Northern replacements in theirnmain force units by 1967. Westmoreland’snclaim that the enemy was forcedninto the Tet offensive by the feelingnthat he was losing may well be true.nAnd, as Westmoreland has insisted,nit was the enemy’s big units that defeatednSouth Vietnam, though his ownnpolicy of trying to destroy them as theynappeared in the South may have beennno solution at all.nIt is in dealing with this problem thatnLewy is not quite convincing. Lewy rejectsnthe arguments of many militarynleaders that the constraints on actionnagainst North Vietnam and the “sanctuaries”nin Laos and Cambodia preventednvictory. “This argument is less thannpersuasive, for the war, in the finalnanalysis, had to be won in South Vietnam.”nHe points out that the defeat inn1975 was an “ignominious collapse,”n”due not only to ARVN’s inferioritynin heavy weapons and the shortage ofnammunition but in considerable measurenwas also the result of lack of willnand morale.” There is truth in this,nbut was it reasonable to expect thenSouth Vietnamese alone to sustain anstruggle against a better-equipped forcenafter a long, exhausting war which theynhad only been able to survive thanks tonmassive American help.” Many of thenrestrictions on the American forcesnseem crazy, and the war developed inna way that no one in his right mindncould have predicted. In 1965 manynpeople supposed that the United Statesnmight lack the patience or ability tondefeat the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.nNo one imagined that we would benunable or unwilling to stop an ordinarynmilitary conquest of South Vietnam bynthe North—yet that is what happened.nWe succeeded, if belatedly, in the “hard”ntask, and failed at the “easy” one. Therencan be few, if any, historical precedentsnfor such folly. Dn”This is not a good era for leaders. Chroniclers of the contemporary scene note that in allnfields of endeavor there is a scarcity of individuals who are nationally acclaimed and respected.nThe implication seems to be that the American bloodline has run out of the stuff of greatness.nWhat has actually happened is that there is no longer a consensus as to what is forward motionnand what is backward, so that anyone who is successful in moving the group in any directionnis subject to criticism from within the ranks of his own organization as well as from professionalncommentators. Acclaim from some quarters is balanced with censure from others.”nnn—from The Alternative Media: Dismantling TwonCenturies of Progress, soon to be published by thenRockford College Institute.nChronicles of Cttlturen