counterbalance Russia and thereby actnwith a general sense of the nature ofnthings. President Carter took over theirnideas and, characteristically, has botchedneverything.nSupporting the weaker and less oppressivenin the conflict between two ofnour foes is pragmatic, commonsensicalnand is called Realpolitik in the lingo ofnpolitical scientists. A century ago, itnmeant foreign policies with an adherencento the most practical solutions, tonwinning and gaining at any price, tonshedding sentimentalities and moralnprinciples in the name of an absolutizednnational interest. In these terms.nPresident Carter’s heinous, brutal,nfrantic and feckless betrayal of Taiwan,nAmerica’s faithful ally and friend duringnthe last thirty years, makes sense.nHowever, the concept of Realpolitiknchanges, as does everything else. Wenlive in an epoch of public relationsnethics, mass media methodology, MadisonnAvenue mystique. Image, once anninsignificant variable, immaterial asnopposed to gunboat diplomacy, armyndivisions, or the Panzerfaust of thenHohenzollerns and Hitlers, became innour day the supreme and real power. Itnmight be that a skillfully structurednimage is more practical and pragmaticallyncounts more in the internationalnarena than both rockets and economicnfactors: a proper image may meannwinning. During the ’70s America hasnconsistently acquired the image of anchampion of abandonment policy.nVietnam, Angola, Carter’s blunderingnvacillation about South Korea, thencreeping defection of Israel—all havenshaped America’s image as a neurotic,nshifty, underhanded and specious ally.nIf this is Realpolitik in the ’70s, thennGod help us and our pragmatism.nLiberals of the Frank Church—AbnernMikva type have hailed Carter’s versionnof diplomatic practicality as comingnback to grips with reality in Asia:nTaiwan, they claim, was a deceptive,nsurreal construct of the paranoia ofnAmerican reactionary policies based onnthe contrivance that mainland Chinan24inChronicles of Culturendoes not exist. Theirs is the classicnliberal mendacity: no one ever claimednthat mainland China did not exist—wenjust did not like the fact of its existence,nits rabid hostility toward us, its tyrannicalnand murderous sociopolitical system.nBut if communist China, with itsnpolitical terror and economic misery,nexists, so does anticommunist Taiwan,nwhere 15 million Chinese have demonstrated,nfor more than a quarter of ancentury, how political freedom andncapitalism could create a stable, prosperousnand equitable society. In a worldnwhere 16 million East Germans constitute,naccording to the Mikvas andnChurches, a legitimate other andnperfectly real Germany, it’s hard tonunderstand why the Republic of Chinanin Taiwan should be considered a figmentnof our dreams. The only reason fornthis state of things is that the communists—innRussia, China, or elsewhere—nwant it this way. It’s enough for thenChurches, Mikvas and Carters to see anvictory in meekly yielding to theirndemands.nThe 1918 Midterm Election,nor the Tale of the Broken WatchnThe last midterm election, which returnednto power the Jerry Browns andnthe Abner Mikvas of this land, will gondown in history as a surrealistic politicalnevent. In the pre-election campaign,nthe liberal Democrats, who gavenAmerica the scourge of inflation, askednthe voters to be regarded as the onlynones who could stem and harness it. Occasionally,nthey have brazenly lied—nno novelty in politics—presenting themselvesnas thrifty folk unjustly accused ofnbeing big spenders. But most often, theynhave tried to convince the electoratenthat only those who ruined a wristwatchnare capable of repairing it. Which runsnagainst the reason and experience ofneven a 12-year-old. However, AbnernMikva, the most insolent of the PiednPipers, has won. Which tells us nothingnnew about Mikva, and everything aboutnhis electorate.nnnBishop Berkeley SendsHis Best. . .n”Our problem with the Soviet Unionnis largely a problem in our heads …”nThis we could read in The New Yorker,nof late. We never nursed any illusionsnabout that journal’s liberal fixation;nwe nursed a hope, however, thatnin our world, epistemological idealismnhas the standing of snuff, which, innBishop Berkeley’s time, was still considerednmedicine, but today can hardlynaspire to that.nThe essay in question, entitled “Reflections—thenSoviet Myth,” makes anpoint that whatever Soviet Russia is,nwe can do nothing about it, whether itnis a menace or not, because: 1) we arentoo weak; 2) we are too strong, whichnwould make our doing something rathernunbecoming; and 3) primarily becausenit’s not worth our effort.n]i what is visible to anyone with annunprejudiced, naked space satellite eyendoes not convince The New Yorker andnits thinkers about the reality of Russianntanks and submarines in the most unexpectednparts of the globe, let’s tryna speculative approach. The Westernnpowers were mightily conned by Stalinnin Yalta and later in Potsdam; Rooseveltnand Churchill were already awarenof how viciously Stalin had twisted thenagreement on Eastern Europe, wherennonhostile regimes were promised tonRussia by the treaties. This accord hasnbeen brutally eradicated, and local communistsnwere installed by means ofnmayhem and subjugation. But ournstatesmen felt sure, and comfortednthemselves with the idea that the newngeopolitical concept of spheres of influence,nhideous as it was, was firmlynestablished, would be honored and wouldnlast. Roosevelt and Churchill gave thenRussians carte blanche to do what theynwanted, but the deal was that theynwouldn’t encroach on the West andneverybody would live happily ever aftern—the Russians with their political enclaves,nthe Westerners with their socioeconomicnproblems. Now, 33 yearsn