a man is he who screws and kills. Butneverything I see around me in life tells mena man is he who makes money. Maybenthese two are related . . .”n”I’m willing to dispense with them (men)nforever and have children only throughnparthenogenesis, which would mean I’dnhave only female children, which wouldnsuit me fine . . .”n”… if the men I’ve known haven’t muchnindulged in killing and are no great shakesnat screwing and have made money (fornthe most part) in only moderate amounts,nthey haven’t been anything else either.nThey’re just dull . . .”n”… the women I know… (are) great…nYou think I hate men. I guess I do, althoughn… I mistrust generalized hatredn… my hatred is learned from experience:nthat is not prejudice. I wish it were prejudice.nThen, perhaps, I could unlearn it.”nMy belief, however, is that Frenchnand women of her persuasion embracentheir hatred and bigotry with fanaticism.nTheir views may seem stale and flat, butnthey are by no means unprofitable, tonjudge by the critical and popular acclaimnwhich greeted the appearance of thisnbook. These convictions are as much anA Crusade in Reverse GearnDaniel Yergin: Shattered Peace: ThenOrigins of the Cold War and thenNational Security State; HoughtonnMifflin; Boston, 1977.nby Alan J. LevinenUaniel Yergin’s study of the beginningnof the Cold War arouses mixednemotions. Unlike so many recent writersnon this subject, he does not argue extrernmist theories that American leaders werenreactionaries guilty of unprovoked aggression,nor falsify the historical record.nShattered Peace is well-written andninformative; some of the material on thendebates within the American governmentnis often revealing.nBut Yergin frequently lapses intonvagueness, and he avoids analyzing somenessential matters. He often seems to bentrying to convey an impression rathernthan present a straightforward argument.nHis conclusion is that the Cold War wasnthe result of unfortunate misunderstandingsnand mistakes by both sides (butnparticularly by the Americans).nThis theory of “symmetrical sinfulness”nis far from convincing.nA curious feature of Shattered Peacenis that the central theme often seems tonMr. Levine has a Ph.D. in history fromnNew York University.nbe the clash between two supposed setsnof prescriptions for dealing with thenSoviets, rather than the conflict betweennthe Soviets and the West. Yergin dubsnthese the “Riga” and “Yalta axioms.” Then”Riga” school, led by the State Department’snRussian specialists, held that thenSoviets were basically aggressive, theirnactions determined in the last analysisnby Communist ideology. Yergin attributesnthese ideas to the influence of WhitenRussian emigres on American diplomatsnin the listening post at Riga before 1933,nthough these ideas have been propoundednby academics, ex-Communists, RussiannMensheviks and others who take thenCommunists seriously. Yergin admitsnthat there is some truth in these views,nand that the American diplomats werenright to recognize the evils of then”Stalinist System.” But he rejects theirnconclusion that totalitarianism at homenmeant an aggressive foreign policy. Hennever offers any reason for this strangendisjunction; and very good reasons indeednare needed for believing that one of thentwo most vicious tyrannies in historynmelted into moderation beyond itsnborders.nYergin prefers the “Yalta axioms”:nthese held that the Soviet Union was antraditional great power acting within,nrather than against, the internationalnsystem. Its behavior, and aims, while notnnnla mode at this moment as the conceptnof Aryan supremacy was at another time.nThis too shall pass. What is most disturbingnis not that this book was written, butnthat it found its way to the best-sellernlist, which proves that a large segmentnof the American public has a craving fornHitlerian disregard for humaneness. Inonly hope, however, that this holocaustnof reason vanishes without leaving in itsnwake too many battered and confusednminds. Dnnice, posed no threat to America, andntension could be resolved by a deal recognizingna Soviet sphere of influence.nYergin presents President Roosevelt asnthe chief exponent of these ideas, supposedlynvindicated by detente. He interpretsnRoosevelt’s whole design for thenpreservation of peace by the great powersnas implying the acceptance of Sovietncontrol in Eastern Europe, and claimsnthat this acceptance was registered innthe Yalta agreements. But the Trumannadministration “gripped by messianicnliberalism” opposed Soviet actions, breakingnwith Roosevelt’s policy.nThis interpretation is hard to squarenwith the facts. Yergin obscures the factnthat Roosevelt’s scheme for the “FournPolicemen” depended precisely on thengreat powers refraining from expansion,nwithout which it would be a protectionnracket. Roosevelt did not accept a Sovietnconquest of Eastern Europe as a necessarynevil; he differed from the “Riga school”nonly in that he hoped that it would notnoccur. There were no “Yalta axioms”nbased on a considered evaluation; onlynillusions, which Stalin dispelled beforenRoosevelt’s death. The record of the Yaltanconference and agreements, and Roosevelt’snsubsequent protests against Sovietnactions (which Yergin ignores) shownquite clearly that Stalin was not concededna free hand in Eastern Europe. Exceptn17nChronicles of Cultttren