was Vann’s continuing insistence thatnthe war could be won, which Sheehannattributed to his “ignorance” ofnVietnam’s history. Worst of all, Vannnliked Richard Nixon.nMixed into the story of John PaulnVann is Sheehan’s version of thenevents of 1962 and 1963, and this partnis disappointing, even dismaying. InnNovember 1963 South Vietnam’snPresident Ngo Dinh Diem and hisnbrother Nhu were murdered in annAmerican-backed coup. The UnitednStates denied direct complicity. SomenWashington reporters, including MargueritenHiggins, were digging into thenstory when three weeks later PresidentnJohn F. Kennedy was assassinated innDallas. Shock and grief aborted anynpress investigation of the martyrednPresident, and Diem’s fate wasndownplayed or even hailed as justice.nThe reporting by the small Americannpress corps in Saigon in 1962-n1963, because it was lavishly rewarded,nset the tone for adversary reportingnthrough the next ten years of war, andnstill affects American journalism. Thencontroversy continues as to whether thenreporters caused Diem’s death andnthereby doomed South Vietnam, sincenno equally qualified successor wasn30/CHRONICLESnLIBERAL ARTSnYOUR TAX DOLLARS AT WORKnfound.nLong ago the Saigon group’s versionnof events became the media’s receivednwisdom. As the Saigon reporters hadnwarned it must, the United States lostnVietnam. Their accounts — their defense—nhave been promoted by thenestablishment and by Halberstam’s best-insellers, Stanley Kamow’s PBS televisiorinhistory of the war, and Walter Cronkite’sntelevision series. Sheehan, callingnthose who question his judgment ignorantnor criminal, does not help theirncause.nSheehan doesn’t fret over contradictions.nOn the one hand, he reports thatnhe was not picking on Diem or exaggeratingndoom stories—stories that jjecamen”obvious” when well-known reportersnarrived and agreed with hisnconclusions. On the other hand, “Wendid not realize that our dispatches hadnbeen arming Averell Harriman andnRoger Hilsman in their attempt to persuadenKennedy to authorize the overthrownof Diem and his family.”‘ Sheehannand his fellows did not know thatnthey were being taken seriously.nFor Sheehan, nothing has changednsince 1963. The deaths of one-quarternof all Cambodians, give or take a million;nthe hundreds of thousands ofnVietnamese boat people who died innthe China Sea; the decade of revolu-nCommerce and Defense department investigators, whonmonitor American contracts with the Soviet Union tonprevent illegal transfers of high technology to the Russiannmilitary, phoned Robert Trent Jones, golf course architect, tondetermine whether a “bunker gap” existed between Washingtonnand Moscow.n”It was unbelievable,” explains Jones, his eyes rolling.n”They were actually frightened that I’d given the Russiansntoo much information on how to build greens, bunkers, andnsand traps. They kept asking about the ‘military topicalnsignificance’ of a golf bunker. I didn’t know what the hellnthey were talking about, but they said the threat was real.”n—from “Tee Time for Ivan” by A. Craig Copetas, in thenFebruary 1989 issue of Regardie’snnnntionary polarization in the United Statesnthat followed Diem’s death, do notnenter into his account. His heroes remainnHalberstam, Vann (with reservations),nHenry Cabot Lodge Jr., DanielnEllsberg, Roger Hilsman, and GeorgenW. Ball. His numerous villains andndupes include Ambassador Frederickn(Fritz) Nolting, General Paul Harkins,nAdmiral Harry Felt, General WilliamnWestmoreland, sometimes MarinenGeneral Victor Krulak, MargueritenHiggins, and all of the Ngo Dinhnfamily, but especially President Diem.nSheehan detests the dead Diem.nWhen Lodge arrived as ambassador,nSheehan told him that the Ngo Dinhsnwere so mad and so hated that theynwere incapable of governing. AfternLodge assigned the CIA’s Lucien Coneinnto work with coup generals, andnDiem and Nhu were killed, Sheehannreports the ambassador did not regret it.nLodge told Halberstam, “What couldnwe have done with them if they hadnlived? Every Colonel Blimp in thenworld would have made use of them.”nLodge was able to go ahead with thencoup only if Diem’s American defendersnwere sidetracked. He cut GeneralnHarkins out of cable traffic and maneuverednto get rid of. CIA station chiefnRichardson. Halberstam identified JohnnRichardson in a Times dispatch, sayingnthat Lodge wanted him out, and PresidentnKennedy recalled him. Richardsonnis not mentioned in Lie.nI located Richardson in 1979. Hentold me he liked Sheehan personally,nbut he believed that he and Halberstamnwere “young, crusading reporters whonwere out to get Nhu, and quite possiblynDiem and his government. I rememberna cocktail party conversation oncenwith Sheehan. I told him that we hadncarefully and continually canvassed alternativenleadership possibilities andnhad found none. Did he want us tontake a flying leap in the dark in thenmidst of a guerrilla war? His answernwas, ‘Yes.'”nTo Sheehan, Diem’s popularity wasncontrived by General EdwardnLansdale, a legendary CIA operative,nand therefore fraudulent. According tonSheehan, Diem was “willfully ignorant”nof his country’s social conditions,n”almost as ignorant as Lansdale was.”nDiem “did not care” if civilians died.nSheehan writes that Diem condonedn