Sharon. The contrast is most vivid:nHer arms lowered and dangling, hernshort hair tousled, Alexandra resemblednan exotic, stork-legged bird. Shensaid, ‘Who said let there be light.? Hendid. Who saw that all of it was good.’nHe did. Who said let us make him innour own image.’ He did. Who saidnlet them have dominion over thenwhole shebang? He did. We’ve beennliving under him all of these goddamnncenturies. When I swear, MynGod! what am I doing, Sharon Rose,ntell me that.” In spite of what shenheard, of what was said, Sharon wasncomforted. When she heard the voicenof Alexandra she heard his voice, andnknew she was in good hands. ThatnA Connoisseur’s RecipenRichard Nixon: The Real War; WarnernBooks; New York.nby Alan J. LevineniVl any people may not be exactlynoverjoyed to see Richard Nixon reappearnin public life. But such irritation shouldnnot obscure the truths the ex-presidentnhas attempted to publicize about thencurrent state of the Cold War—that is,nwhat he used to refer to as “detente.”nThe appearance of this book after thenIranian crisis and Soviet military interventionnin Afghanistan is most timely.nThough overlong, overloaded with epigrammaticnquotations and written in ansometimes incantationlike style, it suppliesna readily comprehensible surveynof the contemporary situation.nNixon fundamentally returns to thenperception that the West is engaged inna permanent Cold War with the SovietnUnion, its puppets and its allies, onlynhe recognizes that we are now in a farnweaker position than ever before. Henoutlines current problems with a reason-nDr. Levine is a frequent contributor tonthese pages.n2()inChronicles of Cttltiircnwasl s her feeling, of course: the uppermostnof the feelings she was able tc tonbear.nWe are not invited to choose betweennthem, to like one rather than the other.nQn the one hand there is Alexandra,nwhose skepticism is at least evidencenof the torment which is life; on thenother, Sharon, whose implicit faithnis a kind of sleep—the trait that allowednthe Atkins women to bear their individualncrosses. Neither, however, hasnanswers: nor should she. For each plainsongnis, in its own fashion, clear andnbeautiful; each has her own way ofnmeeting her silent, difficult Lord. Dnable degree of clarity. He emphasizesnthe massive Soviet military build-up bothnin nuclear and conventional arms, Sovietnmoves in southern Africa and the Hornnand their pincer moves in the MiddlenEast proper, Yemen and Afghanistan.nThe Soviets’ “antiresources” strategynand the peril to the West’s “oil jugular”nand the subtleties of Middle East politicsnhave rarely been spelled out better.nNixon skillfully tears down some ofnthe devices many people have used tondisguise what is going on from themselvesnand the public. While it is necessarynto change things in South Africa,nhe observes that “We cannot let Africanbecome a stage on which Americansnact out their psychic traumas” (as ournex-segregationist president and formernAmbassador Young have been particularlynapt to do). As Nixon bluntly pointsnout, it is precisely Soviet conquest, whatevernthe guise in which it occurs, thatnwill perpetuate “white domination” innAfrica. He strongly urges a major militarynbuild-up, a revival of emphasis onnrelations with our allies and a recoverynof the will to win. While he is entirelynconvincing on the need to alter coursento avoid defeat, he is not quite clear onnnnwhat would constitute “victory” for thenWest or on how to achieve it, althoughnhe devotes an entire chapter to thisntopic. Let us hope that Nixon’s successorsnwill read his discussion, based onnhard-won experience, of how—and hownnot—to negotiate with the Soviets.nThough Nixon recognizes that “thennations most directly in the path ofnSoviet ambition are weak and unstable,”nhe does not explain just what the Westnshould do to prevent the Soviets fromnexploiting internal crises in these countries.nNixon seems to believe that thenIranian revolution could have been preventednif only the United States hadnbacked the Shah more firmly. I wishnI could agree. This is not, of course, annew problem; dealing with communistnthreats to unstable, usually authoritariannregimes in the world’s backwardnregions has been the great unsolvednpuzzle of the Cold War—starting withnChina. Nixon rightly stresses the moralndistinction between the “authoritarian”nregimes with which we are sometimesnallied and our “totalitarian” enemies.nBut he does not resolve some of thenpractical problems created by alliancesnwith authoritarian regimes. (To be fair,nno one else has been very successful atndoing this either.) Nixon urges thatn”the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Oman,nKuwait and other key states must benunequivocally reassured that shouldnthey be threatened by revolutionarynforces, either internally or externally,nthe United States will stand stronglynwith them so that they will not suffernthe same fate as the Shah.” When onenconsiders the limited bases of supportnfor these usually absolute monarchies,ntheir large foreign populations—oftennPalestinian—and the danger of a completendesertion of such regimes evennby elite groups (as happened in Iran),none wonders whether there would benmuch of a lever by which the Westncould intervene in a revolutionary crisis.nIn other words, it is possible that thesenregimes are simply not viable. ButnNixon does not discuss this possibilitynor suggest how these countries couldn