for George Kennan, the “Riga school”ndid not oppose the Yalta agreements ornother attempts to come to terms withnthe Soviets; they merely doubted thatnthey would work. Yergin’s use of thenvague term “sphere of influence,” admittedlyna widespread fault among diplomaticnhistorians, incidentally obscures the factnthat even strongly anti-Soviet officialsndid not oppose Soviet exercise of a loosenhegemony comparable to that the UnitednStates then commanded in the Americas.nNearly all objected to the imposition ofnpuppet governments in Eastern Europe,nthough American opposition amountednto little more than the dispatch of protestnnotes.nNo clear account of that crucial processncan be found in Yergin’s book, and hendefines it, without producing evidence,nas a move defensive in motivation.nStalin’s aim was to create a “glacis”—itnis not clear against whom; and with anflick of the pen the conquest of half ofnEurope becomes the expression of a policynof “conservatism.” The Truman administration,nhowever, overreacted to Stalin’snactions, and took up a “global, oftenncrusading policy.” This must be the onlyncrusade in history to operate in reversengear. Yet Yergin admits that Secretarynof State Byrnes was a “relentless negotiator”nwhose whole career was dedicatednto compromise. He notes Byrnes’ attemptnto assuage Soviet fears of Germany andnJapan, with long-term demilitarizationntreaties, but fails to explain the strangenSoviet disinterest in them.nXTobably the most salient characterizationsnof Yergin’s book are his consistentnminimizing of Stalin’s aims andnforced insistence on equating Westernnand Soviet actions that were not comparable.nSoviet aims in the Middle East arenportrayed as revision of the Straits conventionnand obtaining an oil concessionnin Iran. The demands for bases and territorialncessions in Turkey and the attemptednsovietization of northern Iran arenbarely referred to, though it was thosenactions that worried the Western powers.nSoviet policy in Iran is thus equated tonthat of the West, which also sought oil,nbut unlike the Soviets carried out agreementsnon troop withdrawals. Yergin’snaccount of the dispute over the controlnof atomic energy is somewhat similar.nAmerican insistence that the Sovietsnpermit an inspection system to operatenfreely before they disarmed is equatednwith the Soviet position that all atomicnweapons must be destroyed and that noninspection could be allowed.nYergin finds that “it seems unlikely”thatnStalin aimed at gaining control ofnWestern Europe; he describes the Sovietnaim as the division of Europe inton^ Other Preferences ^n^n” ‘Shattered Peace’ is one of the finest narrative histories of the early postwar era tondate. This is Yergin’s first book—he is 30 years old—but it is already clear that he is onenof those rare historians who can bring the past to life on the page.”n—Newsweekn”Daniel Yergin … has made Shattered Peace the most comprehensive examination ofnthe American side of the U.S.-Soviet schism yet attempted.”nHarrison E. Salisbury, The New Republicn”The sanest, most vivid account of U.S.-Soviet relations.”n—Los Angeles Timesn”ShatteredPeace is understated, reaching well beyond its author’s modest promise of annarrative eschewing blame for the Cold War to provide considerable, often familiar,nevidence of primary American responsibility for that bitter confrontation.”n— The Progressiven”Daniel Yergin, author of ‘Shattered Peace,’ is by no means the first person to ask suchnquestions—but few have asked them before in quite such a reasonable and persuasiventone of voice.” -New York Times Book Reviewn18 inChronicles of CulturennnSpheres. But the Western EuropeannCommunist parties consistently spoke ofnachieving “People’s Democracies” innWestern as well as Eastern Europe, whilenthe Yugoslavs were told in 1946 thatn”all of Germany will be ours.” EvennYergin admits that the Berlin blockadenwas aimed at preventing the consolidationnof West Germany.nYergin sees the problem of Germannreparations as “crucial,” and seems tonattribute the partition of Germany tonfailure to agree on that matter. ThenSoviets certainly regarded extractingnreparations as very important. There isnhowever considerably more to be saidnfor the American viewpoint on reparationsnthan Yergin allows, and the disputenwas not as decisive as he claims. Sincenthe rest of Eastern Europe was sovietized,nit is hard to see why a special reason isnneeded to explain the creation of the EastnGerman regime. Walter Ulbricht’s instructionsnto his henchmen in Mayn1945—“it’s got to look democratic, butnwe must have everything in our control,”naptly summarized Stalin’s whole policynin the satellites. Korea was partitionednjust like Germany, though the Sovietsnhad few economic interests there, whilenthe example of Austria shows that anCommunist government was not necessarynfor the successful economic exploitationnof an occupied area. Apparentlyndeeming Austria too small to be divided,nthe Soviets permitted a democratic centralngovernment to operate in their zone.nAustrian and Western protests failed tonprevent the extraction of considerablenresources under the guise of administeringnGerman assets.nUespite massive research into thenAmerican side, Yergin’s study thus failsnto give a full account because the authornoften ignores or fails to fully describenthe Soviet policies to which the Westernnpowers responded. It is difficult to takenseriously the judgment implied in thenbook’s subtitle. Yergin seems to feel thatnthe most striking unpleasant feature ofnthe Cold War has been, not the danger ofna catastrophic war or the sufferings ofnmillions under Communist rule and inn