whether the delegates would approventhe Constitution, Willie Jones, havingncounted the house, moved the question.nIn doing so he observed that delegatesnwere certain to be familiar with the issuesnand the text of the Constitution,nhaving had many months to considerntheir opinion on these subjects. Federalistsnraised an immediate hue and crynthat such haste was unseemly and innconflict with the instructions that theynhad all received from the people ofnNorth Carolina to first consider andnthen judge the instrument of governmentnset before them. Jones shruggednhis shoulders and behaved like the greatngentleman that he was, agreeing to permitnhis neighbors to have the debatenthey wanted: to work their way throughnthe text of the Constitution, section bynsection, even if Federalists had to putnthe case for both sides of many disputednpoints.nThis concessionary framework surroundingna conversation whose resultsnwere foreknown is part of the specialnrhetorical character of the North Carolinanratification debates. The otherndefinitive ingredient present from thenbeginning of these deliberations was introducednimmediately after Willie Jones’ndecision to allow a little Federalist oratory.nWhat I refer to is the motionnmade by the Reverend David Caldwell:nMr. President, the subject beforenus is of a complicated nature. Innorder to obviate the difficulty attendingnits discussion, I conceiventhat it will be necessary to layndown such rules or maxims asnought to be the fundamentalnprinciples of every free government:nand after laying down suchnrules, to compare the Constitutionnwith them, and see whethernit has attended to them; for if itnbe not founded on such principles,nit cannot be proper for ournadoption.nIn effect, what the Reverend Caldwellnwas doing with this motion was suggestingnthat the United States Constitutionnshould itself be an embodiment of naturalnrights theory and of Whig teachingnon the relationship between governorsnand the governed. The ReverendnCaldwell would have preferred to livenunder a fundamental law dedicated tonself-evident propositions about the naturenand destiny of man, not accordingn48/CHRONICLESnto a series of discrete provisions for conductingnthe work of government. Whatnis most significant about the reaction ofnhis colleagues to this motion that theyndraw up a generic statement on aboriginalnrights to use in judging the Constitutionnis that they found it to be not onlyninconvenient and obfuscatory but alson”dangerous”: from “the nature of things”n(in the phrase of Davie), unsuited to thenbusiness at hand, which it would delaynor prevent and perhaps render impossiblenof resolution since men could nevernagree on such fundamental “principles”nor “their application” (Davie again) andntherefore would resist and/or reject whateverngovernment that pretended to drawnits primary authority from such abstractnfoundations. The overwhelming majorityn(163 to 90) that rejected the ReverendnCaldwell’s motion was both a Federalistnand an Antifederalist majority,nreflecting the general sense of the peoplenof North Carolina. In their decisionnthey recall the language of EdmundnRandolph in the Great Conventionnwhen, on May 29, 1787, he introducednthe Virginia Plan with a contrast betweennthe concern of the Framers withnthe problems of governance, with practicalnquestions, and the very differentnpreoccupations (with “human rights”)namong the authors of the Articles ofnConfederation.nCiven these predicates, the most importantnthing that can be said about thendramatic structure of the first NorthnCarolina Convention is that, with referencento the strategy of the Federalists,nit very much resembles all the other ratificationndebates for which we havenrecords—or at least all but New York,nwhere Hamilton was sometimes honestnabout the model of government undernconsideration. What I mean is, oncenthey had dispensed with nonsensical objectionsnto specific provisions in its text,nIredell and Davie, Covernor Johnstonnand Archibald Maclaine, all set out tonidentify the proposed Constitution withnwhat the serious Antifederalists said theynwanted, insisting at every stage in theirndiscussions that the great fear of the Antifederalists,nof a new model governmentnthat contained a potential for limitlessnexpansion, was unfounded: thatnthe first amendment suggested in NorthnCarolina’s recommended list, “that eachnstate in the Union shall respectively retainnevery power, jurisdiction and right,nwhich is not by this Constitution delegatednto the Congress of the UnitednnnStates, or to the departments of the federalngovernment,” was unnecessary sincenno implied powers existed and everythingnnot granted by the states was “reserved”nfor their own administration. Innone exchange Judge Iredell declared thatnif the Constitution were subject to suchnexpansion, then no one would oppose itnmore than he would: “No such wickednintention ought to be suffered.” Effortsnto “annihilate the state government, insteadnof exciting the admiration of anynman, . . . ought to excite their resentmentnand execration.”nThat North Carolina Antifederalismnin its most important manifestationsnworried more about encroachment onnthe principles of local control and limitedngovernment than it did about then”rights of man” is, on the whole, betterndemonstrated by what the advocates ofnratification in Hillsborough pleaded fornthe Constitution than by what its criticsnobjected against it. Federalists understoodnvery well what were (given thenfierce Regulator localism of mostnTarheel communities) the greatest fearsnof their neighbors. And these were notnfears of Tory reaction or foreign invasion,nnot mere enthusiasm for papernmoney, suspension of debt and madndemocracy. In fact, very little hadnchanged since 1766-1771: since the Regulatorsnhad successfully identified localnmanifestations of the power of thengeneral government in western NorthnCarolina as an intrusive, exploitative,nsubjugating force. Schemes of overgovernmentnfor purposes of empire or tonenforce a colonial policy not checked bynlocal authority had little local support—nand seemed a surprising innovation.nSuch folk as these Carohnians wouldnnot, in 1788, wish to introduce a remote,narbitrary and sometimes hostile powerninto their midst so soon after having expellednsuch a power from their world.nThe issues raised in other state ratificationndebates were usually treated bynthe delegates in Hillsborough. But thenmost important antifederal objections,nto the Constitution had to do with questionsnnot so regularly addressed in othernstate ratifying conventions as they werenin North Carolina. These most seriousncriticisms concerned provisions for thenjudiciary and for the exclusion of religiousntests from the qualifications fornfederal officeholders. More was saidnabout the judiciary and religion in Hillsboroughnthan in any other part of thenratifying process. Antifederalists arguedn