defense of human nature, has not Mr.rnBethell attempted to foist on us that discreditedrnconstruct, homo economicus?rnMr. Bethell readily turns this objectionrnaside. Let us suppose that someonerndid limit his own use of commonly heldrnland, hoping thereby to aid conservation.rnHe would fail utterly in his purpose. Hernwould merely provide those more self-interestedrnthan himself with more land tornexploit. The main point is incontestable,rnand Mr. Bethell ably illustrates his casernwith many historical examples. Theserninclude Plymouth Plantation, wherernGovernor Bradford quickly learned thatrna communit)’ without private propert}’ inrnland was “afflicted by an unwillingnessrnto work,” and the New Harmony Utopianrnsocialist colony founded by RobertrnOwen. Mr. Bethell duly notes that thernfortune of that sainted philanthropistrnrested in part on child labor.rnBut on one point I must issue a caution.rnWe know, as Mr. Bethell has ablyrnargued, that common property is inefficient.rnNo general argument shows howrninefficient it must be when comparedrnwith a system of individual propertyrnrights: This we must discern from examinationrnof the individual case. Thus,rnwhen Mr. Bethell, with a brilliant suggestion,rnascribes Irish poverty in the 19thrncentury to the uncertain tenure of land,rnit does not at once follow from the “tragedyrnof the commons” argimient that hernis right. A system of firmly embeddedrnpropert}’ rights would have led to morernefficient land use than the radically uncertainrnsettlement in place there, butrnhow much good such a system wouldrnhave caused remains a subject for furtherrnresearch. If Mr. Bethell has not fullyrnproved his case on Irish poverty, though,rnhe has immensely aided the discussionrnthrough his hypothesis.rnAfurther problem confronts any societyrnthat attempts to do away withrnprivate productive property altogether—rnthe famous economic calculation argumentrnadvanced by Mises and Hayek.rnAbsent a capitalist market, a centralizedrneconomy has no means of deciding howrnto allocate resources. Engineering calculationsrnalone will not tell the plannerrnwhether it is a good idea to construct arnbridge with platinum. How can he makernthe decisions needed to assign economicrngoods to their best uses? Readers shouldrnnote that this differs from the “tragedy ofrnthe commons.” The latter argument involvesrnincentives; the calculation argumentrndoes not. Even people totally devotedrnto the common good would, in arncentrally directed economy, confront therncalculation problem.rnMr. Bethell locates another difficultyrnfor any regime foolish enough to strikernagainst private property comprehensively.rn[T]here was a more fundamentalrnproblem. The workers were reducedrnto a state of servitude andrnhad no particular reason to workrnhard. In being compelled to carr)-rnout someone else’s plan, they werernprevented from carrjing out theirrnown.rnMr. Bethell, apparently, cannot for longrnstay away from incentives, and with goodrnreason—the issue is crucial. As he notes,rnthis argument received its classic statementrnin Hayek’s Road to Serfdom, but hernalso suggests that Hayek took over andrndeveloped his case from Walter Lippmann’srnThe Good Society. How remarkablernthat the Great Pundit managed forrnonce in his long career to get somethingrnright!rnThe case for private propert)’ goes beyondrnincentives and efficiency. Morernbroadly, Bethell claims that justice itselfrndemands individual propert}’. He rejectsrnthe view of justice as egalitarian fairness,rnfamously advanced by John Rawls in ArnTheory of]ustice (1971), and resolutelyrnadheres to the classical view of Aristotiernand Aquinas, who thought that justicerngives each person what is his due. Eachrnperson in an economy based on privaternpropert}’ receives the results of his ownrnabilities and character.rnThe industrious will reap the benefitsrnof their industn,’, the frugal thernconsequences of their frugalih’: thernimprovident and die profligaternlikewise. They receive their due,rnwhich is to say they experience justicernas a matter of routine. Privaternproperty institutionaUzes justice.rnThis is its great virtue, perhapsrndwarfing all others.rnMr. Bethell dismisses with appropriaternscorn Rawls’ contention that abilities,rnsince they arise from the “genetic lotter}’,”rnare collective assets best placed underrncontrol of the welfare state. In onernrespect, though, he pushes his argumentrntoo far. He suggests that, contrar}’ to itsrncritics, a market svsteni minimizes selfishrnbehavior. “A selfish person is one whorntakes an unfairly large share of somerncommon good, thereby leaving unfairlyrnsmall shares for everyone else.” Situationsrnthat lack well-defined propertyrnrights render selfish behavior possible.rnThe argument is ingenious, and it sufficesrnto explain many cases of selfishnessrn—but by no means all. Would not arnperson who assiduously seeks gifts and favorsrnfrom others, but never acts generouslyrnsave under compulsion, be consideredrnselfish? And yet no problem ofrncollective goods need be involved in thisrncase.rnThe argument for private propert}’ hasrnmany implications for contemporaryrnpolicy. Mr. Bethell suggests that ourrnhigh-minded Masters of Wisdom inrnWashington have made a fetish ofrndemocracy. A Western-shle political systemrncan function only in a reasonablyrnprosperous society, and this requires privaternproperty. A regime that moves towardrna free market may have much tornrecommend it, even if it ranks abysmallyrnon the index of the Americans for LOeniocraticrnAction. Mr. Bethell’s point needsrnto be taken to heart by self-stv’led conservativesrnanxious to embroil the UnitedrnStates in a conflict with China that couldrnonly serve further to collectivize bothrncountries.rnA few details in the book can be challenged.rnWesley Hohfeld’s definition ofrnrights has nothing to do with Hegel’s philosophy:rnMr. Bethell has not grasped thernquite simple logic of that influential systemrnof legal categories. To call FredericrnMaitland one of those who wrote “at arntime when centralism was admiredrnacross the board” oversimplifies matters.rnMaitland (a great legal historian) wasrngreatiy influenced by flie concept of pluralism,rna decidedly anti-centralist trendrnof thought. To support his incontestablyrntrue point that socialism leads to dictatorshiprnover workers, Mr. Bethell frequentlyrnrefers to a spurious passage fromrnTrotsky’s The Revolution Betrayed.rnSome years ago, I quoted the same passagernand was properly taken to task byrnMr. Williamson Evers of the Hoover Institution.rnBut fliese are only minor points. Mr.rnBethell has written a clear, cogent bookrnthat both sums up and advances ourrnknowledge of property. In learning andrnsuggestiveness. The Noblest Triumph is arntriumph indeed.rn28/CHRONICLESrnrnrn