forts not even remotely equivalent to thatrnenjoyed by financial and informationagernexecutives in New York or Los Angelesrn(a fact that is probably of no consequencernfor the time being, though it isrnnot impossible to imagine circumstancesrnin which it might matter).rnFrom Leavenworth, Kaplan proceedsrnto St. Louis—more precisely, to severalrndisparate St. Louises, his descriptionrnof which amounts to a template for thatrnof subsequent American cities, all ofrnthem breaking into different “communities,”rnthe parts losing relationship to onernanother. St. Louis’s middle class, nowrnensconced in newly incorporated edgerncities, lives in gated communities protectedrnby private police forces; left behind,rnof course, are the black poor. Kaplanrntours North St. Louis with a blackrnpolice department major, 40 years oldrnand all too aware that, by every measure,rnthe place is worse off than when he wasrngrowing up. As with many contemporaryrnAmerican slum neighborhoods, therndecaying architecture is beautiful, dominatedrnby stately brick houses inhabitedrnby squatters and drug dealers. Unskilledrnfactory jobs have disappeared, and withrnthem any market for physical labor offeringrna living wage. Kaplan likens this developmentrnto the closing of the frontierrnat the end of the last century: Both wererndisastrous for those not blessed withrnabove-average intelligence and skills.rnWistfully, he calls for the feds to dornsomething—”it’s as if government werernnever here,” he says of East St. Louis.rnBut there are no easy solutions, and perhapsrneven no acceptable ones: “A culturernrooted in Europe had moved out and arnculture deformed by slavery . . . hadrnmoved in, a transformation too great tornbe controlled by traditional democraticrngovernment, with its limited powers andrnhalf way measures.” As a brief for authoritarianrnredistributionism, Kaplan’s isrnmore candid than most.rnOutside their rotting inner cores, thernMidwestern cities are expanding.rnIn newer office lobbies, dozens of foreignrnperiodicals are on display; in the officesrnbeyond, professionals track market conditionsrnhalf a world away on computerrnscreens. Cities like Omaha now have activernforeign policy associations, whichrnKaplan finds European in tone: veryrnpractical where matters of trade are concerned,rnwith little interest in humanrnrights or crusades for democracy. Thus,rnin the heartland, the middle class has distancedrnitself from the local poor, whilernforging new links to communities beyondrnAmerica’s borders. For Kaplan, therncreation of these distinct worlds recallsrnTeddy Kollek’s concept of Jerusalem as arn”community of communities” where differentrngroups live side by side withoutrnany real contact with one another.rnYet Kaplan is impressed by multiethnicrnLos Angeles, which for him inspiresrnnot Blade Runner scenarios but enthusiasmrnfor the glitzy new malls burstingrnwith a thousand kinds of Asian food.rnEven much-maligned Orange County,rnnow multiethnic and buzzing with commerce,rnhe finds compelling. In a trendyrnrestaurant where crowds of Indian, Chinese,rnand Iranian yuppies gather to makerndeals, he recalls how John Gunther,rnwhose Inside U.S.A. was written 50 yearsrnago, used to ask where the power was,rnfinding it often in the local party machine.rnToday, it was here in this restaurant,rn”dispersed among many more peoplernand much less accountable, for thernissue was simply profit, disconnectedrnfrom political promises or even geography.”rnThe fly in the ointment, of course, isrnthe question of patriotism. “Will thisrnplace fight for its country? Are these peoplernloyal to anything except themselves?”rnKaplan wonders. His host, an OrangernCounty business editor, acknowledgesrnthat loyalty is a problem, but perhapsrn”patriotism will survive in the form ofrnprestige, if America remains the worldrneconomic leader.” If not, Angelenos andrnothers will discover whether or not a societyrnwithout binding ties can survive arnserious decline in prosperity.rnWhile high-end multiculturalism isrnattractive, low-end cosmopolitanism isrntruly dreadful. Kaplan finds Tijuanarnhardly Mexican at all but a multiculturalrnsludge, with street hustlers touting waresrnin Japanese and Hebrew, Disney figuresrnalong with plastic Jesuses. But beyondrnthe border city lies Mexico itself— in Kaplan’srnview a tragic society weightedrndown historically by an “hydraulic civilization”rnwhose tyrannical bureaucraciesrnhave brutally mobilized regiments ofrnforced labor and where effective Americanrninfluence is exerted not by counselingrnon behalf of multi-party democracyrnor rooting out corruption but throughrnthe huge American appetite for narcoticsrn(drug dealers are now the largest enginernof Mexican economic growth).rnKaplan spends several chapters describingrnhis travels back and forth acrossrnthe border—a line he believes to be arbitraryrnand in the process of dissolution, asrnMexico moves north and melds inexorablyrnwith Texas and the Southwest.rnEven as he makes pronouncements concerningrnthe arbitrariness of borders, however,rnKaplan provides contradictory evidencernof his own. Take, for instance,rnNogales, Arizona: a Mexican-Americanrntown in recession because of the weakrneconomy south of the border. Yet muchrnof the style of its Spanish-speaking residentsrn—the way they talk, their gaits,rntheir habits as office workers—is distinctlyrnAmerican. The second- and third-generationrntownspeople advocate the continuedrnmaintenance of the internationalrnborder and have kind words for PatrnBuchanan and Ross Perot. Says onernwhose great-uncle rode with Pancho Villa,rn”We don’t want an open border wherernall of Mexico’s problems come here.”rnStill, the line between the UnitedrnStates and Mexico has blurred, whilerninterior barriers within America have becomernmore distinct. The most depressingrnpart of Kaplan’s narrative is his descriptionrnof the contemporary AmericanrnAn Empire Wilderness: Travels Into America’s Futurern^^’ I ‘he continued existence of the United States should never be taken for granted.rnL Democratic Athens led its allies in the victorious wars against Persia only to inheritrna far-flung maritime empire tliat later crumbled as Athens gradually faded fromrnhistory, leaving a vacuum eventually filled by the rise of Alexander’s empire. In thernwake of Rome’s decline came the tribal configurations from which modern Europeanrnstates emerged. America’s decline would leave a vacuum every bit as large as that leftrnby Greece or Rome—to which America has often been compared—with immeasurablernconsequences for the human race. But this book is not about the decline of thernUnited States; it is about its transformation.”rn—Robert D.KaplanrnFEBRUARY 1999/29rnrnrn