whom Rickover was a hero. When Rickovernwas passed over for promotion tonRear Admiral and faced retirement, Blairndecided that Rickover was being treatednunjusdy. In order to develop this themenhe was given a Naval office and a secretarynby Rickover, who acted as editor fornan encomium that Blair produced. Anfull-scale, and ultimately successful,ncampaign was launched, hnplicit in thisncampaign was the argument that Rickovernwas, and had for years been, a victimnof anti-Semitism. This claim of prejudicenwas accepted by many, and it spreadnthroughout the nation. It gained credibilitynwhen Rickover’s Annapolis yearsnwere confused with those of his classmate,nLeonard Kaplan. Kaplan competednagainst one of the most popular ofnall Annapolis students, a star athlete andnscholar; he was, apparently because ofnanti-Semitism exacerbated by personalityncollisions, sent into Coventry. In thenyearbook of Rickover’s class, Kaplan’snphotograph appeared on an unnumbered,nperforated page. It is remarkablenthat after such an experience Kaplan proceedednwith a respectable Naval career.nHis son later entered the same service.nThe Kaplan episode occurred in then1920’s; it could not have occurred in thenpostwar 50’s, when not only anti-Semitism,nbut such ugly manifestations of injusticenand dislike against any individual,nwere relegated to partisans of the lunaticnfringe. Rickover’s failure to achieve promotionnfrom the Review Board seems, asnSenator Javits said, “more a Billy Mitchellncase than a Dreyfus case.” In othernwords, it was not Rickover’s origins thatnwere involved, but his acerbic and competitivenrelationship with the leaders ofnthe Nayy—a matter of discipline and differencesnover policy.nThat the charge of prejudice worked innRickover’s favor and cast his critics in annunenviable light was only one consequencenof the Blair/Rickover campaign.nA more lasting result was that his aiticsnwere silenced lest they be judged guiltynof malignity. A great media uproarncaused the Review Board (for perhaps thenfirst time in Naval history) to reconsider.nRickover became a Rear Admiral.nl!*rom then on Rickover was barelyncontrollable by Naval authority. Polmarnand Allen compare his appearancesnbefore Congress with those of J. EdgarnHoover. It has been said that Hoover’snpower was based upon private informadon,nbut the fact seems to be that untilnhis last years. Hoover was maintained bynthe press. Much the same appears to havenbeen true for Rickover. And, bearing outnActon’s aphorism, Rickover succumbednto the heady sensadon of being able tontell his titular bosses to go to hell whenevernthe spirit moved him. Rickover’snbehavior grew bizarre. He rarely wore anuniform, and then only in response tonspecial, official orders. His subordinatesndid not wear uniforms either, and thenauthors make it clear that Rickover wouldnnot have approved of the habit of dressingnin one. Rickover could choose mennon all levels to be transferred to hisnbranch, could keep them beyond thenNavy’s official rotation time applied tonall other branches, and could use them asnhesaw fit, without regard to rank. UndernRickover, a commander might takenorders from a lieutenant. Dissidents werentreated in a manner unknown in the restnof the Navy or civilian life. Even as he exercisedntyrannical power, Rickover wouldndescribe himself as persecuted, strugglingnagainst tremendous odds, hamperednby a mentally deficient Navynleadership.nThese tactics were remarkably successful.nRickover rose to full Admiral, andhisncareer continued into his eighties. Hennnwas a service politician who used thenmedia, general myth, and existing prejudicenagainst tradition and brass hats tondistort Naval procedures, to elevate hisnfavorites and disgrace those he disliked innways that went beyond all the rules,nreguladons, and accepted standards. Hisncruelty toward persons who incurred hisndisfavor is described by the authors andnmakes unpleasant reading. AdmiralnZumwalt, who battled Rickover unsuccessfully,nin his autobiography OnnWatch included an account of thenhumiliating tactics Rickover used.nZumwalt’s main argument, however,nis that Rickover injured the Navy byntwisting its priorities, using excessivenfunds in nuclear-powered ship constmcdon,nand thus kept the Navy from developingnother equally essential vessels.nOnly a full-scale war will disclose whethernZumwalt is correct or not. What is beyondnargument is that Rickover workednin demonic fashion to build nuclearnvessels.nFormer President Jimmy Carter, whonis proud of having been accepted intonRickover’s branch (a distinction equivalentnto being accepted on a chattel slavenblock), did not have the sense or thencourage to retire the Admiral. Nor didnGerald Ford, Richard Nixon, or LyndonnJohnson. Rickover retained his medianalliance until his eccentricides expandedninto a loathing for television and journalists,nand into reckless expressions of thisnprejudice. Before that, though, Rickovernhad enraged the nation’s educators by anseries of attacks on public educationn(mostly well-deserved), and infuriatednmany others by his engineer’s dream of anscientific elite cast in his own image.nUntil he achieved unreasonablenauthority, Rickover seems to have been anclassic engineer with all the virtues andndeficiencies of that calling. He was expertnat handling inanimate objects, off thenmark in dealing with human beingsnother than Congressmen or journalists.nIn his last years he fell into disputes withnshipbuilding firms, contractors, andnnearly everyone with whom he came innmmmmmmnnMarch 1983n