substantially enhanced the 1971 act by reinstating overall ceilingsrnon each candidate’s campaign expenditures, b- imposingrnstrict new contribution regulations, and by strengthening disclosurernrequirements. The amendments also encouraged contributionsrnfrom political action committees (PACs) by repealingrnthe Hatch Act provisions prohibiting unions andrncorporations with federal contracts from creating PACs.rnThese strict provisions brought together opponents fromrnboth ends of the political spectrum, including Senator James L.rnBuckley, elected as a Conservatixe Party candidate from NewrnYork, Democratic Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, and the New-rnYork Civil Liberties Union. Their challenge reached thernSupreme Court, and in 1976, in Buckley v. Valeo, the Courtrnruled large sections of the law unconstitutional. While validatingrnthe ceilings on contributions to candidates and politicalrncommittees and the disclosure requirements, the Court overturnedrnon First Amendment grounds the overall campaignrnspending limits, the spending limits imposed on a candidate’srnpersonal funds, and all limits on contributions to and spendingrnby individuals and organizations who act independently of candidates.rnWhile Buckley prevented the shredding of the FirstrnAmendment, it left campaign finance reform much weakened.rnCongress responded to Buckley by passing amendments inrn1976, but these did little to revitalize the reform laws.rnMore recent attempts at campaign finance refonu hae beenrnunsuccessful, hideed, this is the most difficult legislation to enactrnbecause it strikes at the very heart of partisan politics. Overwhelmingrnany arguments on the merits of reform is the lawmakers’rnfear of giving any challenger or the opposite party arnpolitical advantage. Because existing campaign finance lawsrnstrongly favor incumbents, it usually takes a major politicalrnscandal to cause lawmakers to fear their constituents enough tornenact meaningful campaign reform.rnThe chief problem associated with the unregulated flow ofrnmoney in political campaigns is how such funds could influencern(or appear to influence) legislation. But there are additionalrnproblems as well. Tax bills and other legislation may bernaltered not only in response to contributions, but also to stimulaterncontributions. Legislators have a clear understanding thatrnthe power to tax is the power to destroy.rnThere is also the i.ssue of access. While special interests vigorouslyrndeny that their contributions give them undue influencernover legislators, they do acknowledge that they receivernspecial access to the legislative process. However, this, too, isrnnot without ethical difficulty. Most Americans would contendrnthat the political system should be equall) accessible to all.rnWhile this ma not be possible in practice, the common viev-rnis that money should not be the key to a congressman’s door.rnAnother problem concerns the advantages of incumbency.rnThese advantages include the franking privilege, name recognition,rnfree publicity from the media, and the opportunity torncampaign while traveling on official business. But periiaps therngreatest advantage is the ability of incumbents—and especiallyrnmembers of the part- in power—to attract campaign contributionsrnfrom special interests, while their challengers are left tornbeg for the crumbs. Finally, many people view as excessive therntotal resources expended on electing people to national office.rnMost proposals to reform campaign financing draw on thernfollowing concepts; limitations on the size of political contributions,rnceilings on campaign expenditures, public disclosure, andrnpublic funding. The first of these, dollar limitations on contributions,rnis aimed at reducing the potential for buying influencernor access. Ceilings on campaign expenditures, if sufficientlyrnstringent, are designed to limit the nccessit’ of raising largernamounts of money, but tliey also provide another wav to monitorrncampaign receipts, since receipts must equal expendituresrnplus campaign debt. Requiring public disclosure of contributionsrnrelies on the theory that candidates avoid transactionsrnthat cannot stand public scrutiny. Finally, public funding is designedrnto replace prixate funding and the various problems associatedrnwith it.rnBut each of these elements has its problems. The FirstrnAmendment prevents any limitation on contributions tornorganizations that arc not directlv controlled bv the candidate.rnAlso, funding used for “nonpartisan” activities, such as get-outthe-rnvote drives, is usually exempt; thus, loads of “soft mone”rnare often available to partisan groups for getting out the vote ofrntheir people. The First Amendment also poses an effective barrierrnto legislated ceilings on campaign expenditures, unless thernceilings are voluntary, in which case they must be made sufficientlyrnattractive bv inducing candidates with such things asrnmatching public funds, as in our presidential elections. Howe’rner, the popularity of public funding appears to be waning. Itrnseems unlikeK’ that the current funding mechanism—the incomerntax checkoff—could provide sufficient public funds forrnboth presidential and congressional campaigns. Moreover,rne’en vith matching funds, candidates still need to solicit contributionsrnfrom individuals and businesses. Finally, public disclosure,rnwhile apparentU effective in preventing the worst abuses,rnhas not been a sufficiently powerful deterrent to eliminaternat least the appearance of buying influence.rnA recent innovation in campaign finance reform is a pro])osalrnb Representative Linda Smith (R-Washington) to require arnlarge proportion of a candidate’s campaign funds to originaternwithin the candidate’s district. This could restrict the abilit ofrncorporations and other special interests operating outside of therncandidate’s district from influencing the process. Of particularrnsignificance is the potential of this provision to limit sharply thernflow of monc to the pow erful chairmen of major congressionalrncommittees. However, it is not clear whether this proposalrncould withstand First Amendment scrutinyrnIwould like to offer an alternative solution that, ironicallv, isrnbased on Jiondisclosure of contributions and allows unlimitedrncampaign contributions and unlimited expenditures. Its potentialrnfor success rests on a single principle and on two assumptions.rnThe principle is this; Ifofficeholders cannot identifyrntheir contributors, then their legislative actions cannot he influencedrnby them. The device for putting this principle into effectrnis a financial institution that receix’cs campaign contributionsrnon behalf of candidates, but which erects a firewall between therncontributions and the individual campaign expenditure accounts,rnwhich the institution creates for the candidates. Thisrnfirewall is constructed to prevent candidates from knowing thernnames o{ their contributors as well as the individual amounts ofrnthe contributions.rnl\’o assumptions must hold for this reform measure to be effecti’rne. The first is that xoters will reject candidates who do notrnreceive all of their campaign contributions from our special financialrninstitution, which we’ll simply call the Bank; and thernsecond is that candidates will deem it in their interest to receivernall of their campaign contributions through the Bank. If thernfirst assumption is x-alid, the second is likely to be valid as well.rnThe primary function of the Bank is to accept campaignrn22/CHRONICLESrnrnrn