pointed, for it is apparent that oncenO’Keefe departs from purely technicalnpoints or personal experiences, he exhaustsnhis expertise. This is a problemnwith many scientists. They are accordednwide attention because of their ability tonperform laboratory feats that, to the layman,nborder on magic, but their politicalnand strategic acumen is often embarrassinglynnaive. One gets the impression thatnO’Keefe wrote his book in a hurry withoutnmuch thought given to the implicationsnof his opinions on the internationalnbalance of power.nxlis position is that nuclear weaponsnare too horrible to be used under anyncircumstances. O’Keefe contends that itnmay have been a good thing for the U.S.nto develop atomic weapons first, beforenGermany or the U.S.S.R. did so, but thatnthe arms race since World War II hasnbeen a mistake. He regrets that thenTruman Administration moved aheadnwith a crash program to build an H-bombnin 1950. O’Keefe feels that “once againnthe opportunity to alter the course toncatastrophe was lost.” He was in agreementnwith the General Advisory Committeenof scientists under Robert Oppenheimernwhich concluded unanimouslynthat no crash program should be undertakennlest it prove to be irreversible.nHowever, he concedes that no realisticnalternative was possible after the Sovietsnexploded an H-bomb in 1949. ThenKorean War, which broke out six monthsnafter Truman’s decision, only served tonconfirm the fear of communist aggressivenintent.nO’Keefe opposes all present attemptsnto improve the American arsenal. Hencalls the neutron bomb “the most impracticalnweapon yet conceived” becausenit would only provoke Soviet retaliationnif used, thus negating any attempt to limitndamage. However, NATO strategy isnbased on the use of tactical nuclearnweapons to redress its inferiority in conventionalnforces. The choice is either tondeploy the neutron warhead, which limitsncollateral damage, or to rely on older,nmore destructive weapons. The SovietsnThe New Higher CrtticistnnAmong all those coun^eous spiritsnwho forsook religious and traditionalnnorms in fevor of the beatific self-fiilfiUmentnpromised by the sexual revolution, thennames of William Masters and VirginianJohnson have long been invoked withndeep reverence. As one sexologist in NewnYork City explained: “Masters was thenprototypical godlike figure that peoplenhesitated to challenge.” But now icono­ndo not seem to draw a line between conventionalnand nuclear batdefield weaponsnas NATO does, so a war in Europe wouldnprobably be nuclear from the start.nNATO’s choice of weapons should benmade on grounds of efectiveness againstnthe Soviets; on those terms, the neutronnwarhead makes considerable sense.nThis does not mean that NATO can ignorenthe weakness of its conventionalnforces. Whether the battle for Europe isnnuclear or nonnuclear, Soviet superioritynon the ground will be decisive. Thensmaller number of NATO combat unitsnmean a smaller number of targets thatnthe Soviets need to destroy. It is also possiblenthat escalation to nuclear weapons,nrather than redressing the imbalance,nmight exacerbate it, as whatever quaUta-nLIBERAL CULTURE 1nnnclasts are blasphemously mutilating thenbies.M’il images of Masters and his collaborator.n.•Vftcr some (isychologists accusedntile pair of using deceptive data in theirnwork, the ensuing debate left even truenbi’iievers .shjiken. “The lield can no longernloiili with certainty at the bible,” confiditlna troubk”d sexologist to a Time rept)rtcT.n’Ihe Tinw corres(»ndent hastenednto ci:irify: “Tliat bibk- is, of course, Mastersnand Johnson’s Iluniun Sexual Inadequacy.n” Of course. •ntive edge NATO armies possess wouldnbe lost under nuclear bombardment.nO’Keefe ignores this entire issue. He alsonignores the Soviet SS-20, managing tondiscuss the deployment of U.S. PershingnII and cruise missiles to Europe withoutna single reference to the Soviet arsenal.nIt may be that he does not even knownabout the SS-20, for he bases his oppositionnto American deployment on thengrounds that both superpowers currentlynhave obsolete weapons. This providesnan opportunity to fl-ee Europe of nuclearnweapons because each power can removenits obsolete weapons and refiisento replace them. The obvious flaw in thisnreasoning is that the Soviet SS-20 is a verynadvanced weapon that has already beenndeployed to replace older systems. Then•I^M^HISnJanuary 1984n