weapons and grenades against the children’s home.rnAs the siege wore on, the government abused, at least fromrnthe Branch Davidian viewpoint, all the children who surrendered.rnChildren who came out with their parents were immediatelyrntaken from their parents and placed in state custody,rnwhile the parents were almost always arrested, whether or notrnthere was any evidence against them. The FBI sent back tornMount Carmel a videotape which showed that the childrenrnwere being treated well (by FBI standards): the children wererneating candy, jumping on furniture, and watching cartoons.rnThe Davidians were horrified by the violations of their dietaryrnlaws (based on Jewish laws, with elaborations by Koresh). Thernadults were also disturbed at the hyperactive behavior of thernchildren, who were taught to be self-controlled and well-mannered.rnThe Branch Davidians made their own videotape, whichrnthey sent out about a week and a half after the siege started.rnThe video contains numerous complaints about treatment ofrnthe children who were in state custody. As a Justice Departmentrnreport later summarized, “Each person on the video—rnmale and female, young and old—spoke in a calm, assured tonernof their desire to remain inside, even after the experience of thernATF raid only a few days earlier. . . . The abiding impression isrnnot of a bunch of ‘lunatics,’ but rather of a group of peoplern[who], for whatever reason, believed so strongly in Koresh thatrnthe notion of leaving the squalid compound was unthinkable.”rnThe FBI appropriated the videotape, refusing to release it untilrnafter the siege had ended.rnPublic support for the government during the siege dependedrnon the perception of the Branch Davidians as a weird bunchrnof child-abusing “cultists.” The tape, however, portrays dozensrnof normal-looking men, women, and children. In the tape, thernBranch Davidians look like the kind of people one would find atrnany shopping mall on a Sunday, except that the Branch Davidiansrnare somewhat more clean-cut.rnThe government’s failure to understand how seriously thernBranch Davidians took their dietary rules did not constituternchild abuse, even though the Branch Davidian adults took it asrnsuch. But other FBI actions could not have been better calculatedrnto terrify the children and parents remaining at MountrnCarmel. At various times, Bradley fighting vehicles wouldrncharge at the compound. One person inside the compound reportedrnthat men in the BFVs were “shooting the finger at thesernkids.” In one incident, the men reportedly “mooned” somernDavidian girls. Government tanks crushed children’s bicyclesrnand some expensive go-carts the children had recently acquired.rnThe destruction helped undermine the FBI negotiatorsrnwho were promising gentle treatment for children who leftrnthe compound.rnThe FBI’s determination that it would be the only negotiatorrnhad disastrous consequences. Many relatives of the personsrntrapped at Mount Carmel begged the FBI for permission torntalk to the people inside, either in person or by telephone. ThernFBI’s response was “there is no room for family in this operation.”rnAll that was allowed was the occasional exchange ofrnaudio- or videotapes. Family members repeatedly imploredrnAttornc}’ General Reno, by fax and by registered mail, to allowrndirect family contact. Reno later testified that she had neverrnlearned of the families’ attempts to contact her.rnAt one point, Koresh asked to talk to Robert Rodriguez, thernBATF undercover agent who had pretended to be a college studentrninterested in joining the Branch Davidians. Koresh was onrnto him from the start, and, according to Rodriguez, had neadyrnconverted him. In exchange for talking with Rodriguez,rnKoresh offered to send out a six-}’ear-old giri. The request wasrndenied, and the gid later died in the April 19 fire.rnThe FBI’s deception of the Attorney General about ongoingrnchild abuse had been rather casual, but the same cannotrnbe said for the deception regarding the effects of the CSrnchemical warfare agent. Experts assured Reno that CS producedrnshort-term discomfort, but had no long-term effects andrnposed no special threat to pregnant women, children, or others.rnIt would, in short, merely cause tears, coughing, and sneezing,rnand at worst a feeling of suffocation and mild burns in sensitivernpeople. She was not told that these were not the only effects,rnparticulady when the CS agent was used inappropriately—rnindoors.rnAlthough commonly referred to as “tear gas,” CS is actuallyrna fine white crystalline powder. (As a powder, CS can plug uprngas masks, a feature touted by its manufacturer.) Although thernfederal government, during the Waco siege, was also fighting arnwar in Somalia, the CS gas could not legally have been usedrnagainst the Somalis. Use of CS gas in war was outlawed by thernChemical Weapons Convention, which the United Statesrnsigned at Paris in January 1993.rnAccording to Amnesty International, CS chemical warfarernagent is “particularly dangerous when used in massive quantitiesrnin heavily built-up or populated areas… or when launchedrndirectly into homes or other buildings.” One manufacturer ofrnCS stopped selling the product to the Israeli government inrn1986 because CS was being introduced into buildings occupiedrnby Palestinians, with fatal consequences for 40 persons (includingrn18 babies). The U.S. Army’s Manual on Civil Disturbancesrnnotes that although CS and other agents “will not seriously endangerrnhealth or cause death when used properly, their use inrnbuildings or other closed areas requires caution to a’oid producingrnexcessive concentrations of the agent. . . . The dispersersrnshould not be used to introduce a riot control agent directly intorna closed structure except under extreme circumstances.” AnrnArmy field manual explains that CS “causes severe burning ofrnthe upper respiratory passages, pain, and involuntary inabilityrnto open the eyes.” A different Army field manual states,rn”Warning: When using the dry agent CS-1, c/o not discharge indoors.rnAccumulating dust may explode wheir exposed to sparkrnor open flame.” (Emphases added.)rnThe FBI plan which the Attorney General approved calledrnfor a 48-hour “tear gas” attack. The government also knew, asrnan affidavit filed the previous day showed, that gas masks werernavailable. But gas masks are not manufactured for small children.rn(One reason is that infants lack the lung capacity tornbreathe through gas masks.) Thus, the degree of suffering fromrnthe CS attack, as the FBI must have known, would be in inversernproportion to the criminal culpability of those exposed to it.rnDr. Alan Stone, one of the independent reviewers of the Departmentrnof Justice report on Waco in the fall of 1993, notedrnthe case history of a baby suffering a two-to-three hour exposurernto CS, the exposure resulting in first-degree burns on thernface, severe respiratory distress typical of chemical pneumonia,rnand an enlarged liver. “The infant’s reactions were of a vastlyrndifferent dimension than the information given the AG suggested,”rnStone noted. “It certainly makes it more difficult tornbelieve that the health and safety of the children was our primarrnconcern.” In another case cited h Dr. Stone, a half-hourrn18/CHRONICLESrnrnrn