VITAL SIGNSrnCHRISTIANITYrnChurch andrnDemocracyrnby Thomas MolnarrnThere is no docunientan- evidenee ofrnan’ period in the histor- of tlicrnChurch when dignitaries such as bishopsrnworild hac been “democratically” electedrnb’ the assemblage of “‘oters.” On tiiernoriier hand, popular election was neerrnexcluded in die form of acclamation Arnfamous ease of acclamation was that ofrnSt. Ambrose, bishop of Milan, who, beforernhis eleation, had not even been arnmember of clergv. His firmness and hisrn irtues were recognized to such an extentrnthat the acclamaHon was evident. ThernMilanese believers were indeed recognizedrnas a decisive factor in the governancernof the ecclesiastical bodv, but notrnwith oting ballot in hand, the way wernrecognize democrac toda)’. (Co-optingrndiis w as another matter, and there are numerousrnexamples.)rnF,en in the most trving of times, howe’rncr, democracy and its methods did notrnbecome rooted in the Church. “Ibis doesrnnot mean that efforts were not made, hideed,rna name was given to these efforts—rnconciliarism, the most immediate andrndirect term that the Church could accommodate,rnhi short, conciliarism meantrnthat the pope was not the single authoritrnwho assigns policy and makes decisions,rnbecause these decisions and policiesrnneeded for their validit’ and universalit^rnthe contribution of the bishops and,rneventuall), of other officeholders, toorn(and not necessarily just ecclesiastics).rn’I’hc pinnacle of this 14th-centiiry movementrncoincided with various diminutionsrnof papal power: the “Babylonianrneapti’it” in Avignon; the rise in power ofrnthe nation-state; the heretical or nearhereticalrnteachings advocated bv certainrngroups of clerics joined by cit dwellersrnin northern Ital’, in Provence, and alongrnthe Rhine Valley; and so on. It is understandablernthat conciliarism received vcr’rnpowerful support from the Holy Romanrnemperor, from Bavaria, Bohemia, andrnEngland, w hose interest it was to weakenrnand neutralize pontifical authorit)-. Sornstrong was tins imperial sup]3ort that it isrnalmost surprising that the coimeils didrnnot actually become governing factors,rnwhen, for example, following the Avignonrndecades, there were three popes invoKedrnin a power struggle. Yet it neerrnbecame a reigning formula, such as “thernking and his parliament.”rnThe possibilih’ was, however, evident.rnIts chief standard-bearer was Marsilius ofrnPadua, vvbose attractive thesis found publicih’rnin his writing. Defensor Pads, inspiredrnby the Franciscans and the nominalistrnWilliam of Ockham. Marsiliusrntaught that Christians lived in a disorderly,rnwarlike situation, mainb’ becauserntheir “rcpublica” had Kvo heads, the popernand the emperor. Peace could be guaranteedrnif the latter gains the legal upperrnhand, since the establishment of empirernprecedes the e.stablishmcnt of the Church.rnMore precisely, there was a Roman empirernbefore Christ appeared on this earthrnand sent forth His apostles to convert Jewsrnand infidels. In addifion, as the king ofrnFrance proclaimed through his legists,rnthe “king was emperor in his realm.”rnThus, the pontifical authorit)’ extendedrnonly to matters of faith, not to matters ofrnpolicy and militar)- action.rnI low could one bring peace to ChristianrnEurope? asked Marsilius. The highest authority’rnin Christendom, the emperor, po.ssessesrnthe sole right to call councils, byrninviting the pope and all those otiierrngroups and orders (today we would callrnthem “elected representatives” and “lobbies”)rnthat compose his empire. /ny interestrngroup or pressure group vonld be subjectrnto periodic consultation: the freerntowns, the monastic orders, the citizens,rnetc. The problem is that the Church isrnconsidered an other “interest group,” dominatedrnby the emperor and by the machinationsrnof power. At best, c|uasipoliticalrnparties v^’ould form, each focusing on fractionalrninterests. The breakup of the Christianarnrespublica eoild not be preented.rnTil is prospect was well understood byrnthe “papal ists,” who also understood thatrncurrents of secularization were continuingrnunder tire guise of pagan svmpathies,rnthe Renaissance climate, and what mavrnbe called an carl)- “ecumenism,” civcinf larnlettre. It became obious that, in facingrntlie external dangers (for example, thernOttoman invasion), Christendom mustrnpresent a united front. Indeed, the greatrnphilosopher Nicholas of Cusa turnedrnfrom coneiliarist to papalist in the middlernof the 15th century when, as a delegate tornConstantinople, he realized the threatrnthat a lack of authority- in Rome w ouldrnrepresent.rnWhen the Reformation came to thernfore, conciliarism abated. In fact, thernver)’ meaning of tiie council shifted, exemplifiedrnb’ the Council of Trent (1545-rn156>), where the delate concentrated onrnfacing the Reformation and reorganizingrnthe Church’s internal affairs. During thernnext three centuries, the power relationsrnwere such within Christendom that thernquestion of dominance was hardly discussed.rnThe modern sovereigns (Spain,rnFrance, the Habsburgs, England) heldrntheir respective churches well in hand,rnthe council was not convened, and diplomacyrnbecame paramount. Louis XIV’srn”gallieanism” was a policy in itself, andrnthe Habsburgs had their hands full withrnthe Turkisli invasions. In a way, therneclipse of the conciliarfst debate indicatedrnthat the “christiana respublica” was itselfrnliquidated, and calling the councilrntogether was no longer an internal affair.rnThe next great council was Vatican I,rnheld under different auspices. Appropriately,rnit dealt with theological mattersrn(such as papal infallibilit}) and, thus,rnwith the Church’s spiritual response tornliberal ideology and national ambitions.rnThe idea of calling the council togetiierrnwas no longer disputed: Rome had thernmonopoly of this demarche. Ubi paparnihi ecclesia.rnYet this monopol}’ also suggested tiiatrnthe issues debated at the council were nornlonger of an essential nature. Wlien, inrnthe late Middle /ges (from Marsilius tornCusanus), the two “parties” were lockedrnin combat, the bittemess indicated a quarrelrnon the political summit; by the 19thrncentury, “theology” was granted to thernChurch, but the Church had lost its politicalrnweight. The various national assembliesrn—particularly that of France—passedrnanti-Roman and anti-clerical laws, de]:)rivingrnthe Roman Church of her politicalrnand ethical say. And nascent Italy restrictedrnthe Church’s domain to a tiny enclave.rnIs the Church’s goxemance compatiblernwith democracy? Can the Church modifyrnits structure and become democratic, as to-rnOCTOBER 2001/47rnrnrn