l()gilc ich, known as “Sca,” now lics in Ilungan and is arnboss ni (he Solntsc() mafia organization, as an .lnscoitcrnfonkl luic tokl the B?Oi’. Sea is a sitting uicnilier of an informalrncommission ot VSV mob lx_)sscs that was estabhshcd hv thernfather of I’Sf I organized crime, V’yachcshn- hankcn, known asrn”^aponchik” (“the )ap”) for his skinted ees. Yaponchik is nowrnsering a term in a D.S. prison, but liis North American-basedrnOroaiii-citsiva is rnnning at fnll steam, maintaining its ties tornother FSU crime bosses, many of whom, Hke Yaponchik andrnSe a, ha e gone transnationak Russian press accounts have bedrnSea to narcotics and weapons trading, prostitution ringsrn(wliich often lure voung Russian girls to Enrojje on “modeling”rnassignments and then enslave them in Scva’s brothels), andrncontract killings.rnllogi]eieh, lvanko’, and other k’Sl) mobsters establishedrnclose ties w itli tlie politicos and “new Russian” “businessmen”rnwho sprouted up like mushrooms after the rain in Boris Yeltsin’srnRussia. All of die “seven bankers,” die “oligarchs” (includingrnKagalosk’s boss, Khodorkovsky) who formed an informalrncommission of their own in 1996 after enriching themselvesrntlirough insider deals on state-owned enterprises brokered byrnChubays, have maintained ties to the mobsters of the FSU kommisiya,rnwhich brings us back to the BNY scandal. It appearsrnthat another BNY affiliate based in Switzerland may be partlyrnowned, according to some Russian press accounts, by “oligarchrnnmnber one,” informal financial advisor to the “family”rn(Yeltsin’s entourage), modern-day Ra.sputin, and “Russian Moriarh'”rnBoris Abramoich Berezovsk}-, known as “BAB.” Andrnthis is where the hvo scandals —Mabetex and BNY—meet.rn”uri Skuratov is now in limbo, having been suspended byrnYeltsin from his post as prosecutor general of the Russian Federation.rnNevertheless, the Federation Coimcil, the upperrnhouse of Russia’s parliament (made up of regional governors),rnsensing an opportunity to gain the upper hand in parliament’srnefforts to reduce the declining Yeltsin’s powers, refused to recognizernSkuratov’s suspension. The investigations initiated byrnSkuratov of tiie “family’s” business interests have continued,rnand Skuratov has been tacitly supported by Moscow Mayor YurirnLuzhkov, whose premature presidential aspirations have greatlyrnirritated the Kremlin.rnThose investigations uncovered the Kremlin refurbishingrnkickback scheme that Hed the “family” to Paeeoli and Mabetex.rnThey also uncovered, widi the help of aggressive Swiss ProsecutorrnC»eneral Carla Del Ponh (now eonveniently being reassignedrnto the Hague war crimes tribunal), a network of shellrncompanies used by the “Einiily” for laundering siphoned-offrngovernment budget fvinds (and perhaps IMF money), includingrna Swiss firm owned by BAB called “Andava,” originally arnconduit for funds embezzled from the Aeroflot airline eompan-,rnheaded bv Yeltsin son-in-law Valeri Okulov (he is married tornYeltsin’s older daughter, Yelena). The network also includesrnthe BN^Y affiliate in which BAB reportedly holds an interest.rnYeltsin has been severely crihcized in both the West and inrnRussia for his seemingly mercurial behavior, firing governmentsrnw iHi increasing frequency in the midst of an ongoing socioeconomicrncrisis set off by the August 1998 default and rublerndevaluation. It is now apparent to most carefid observers, howe’rner, that Yeltsin’s acfions are hardly imprdsive. The Kiriyenkorngovernment was fired as a scapegoat sacrifice; Someone had torntake the fall for the collapse of Russian financial markets in Augustrn199S, a collapse partly brought on —or at least exploited —rnb die financial s])eeulations of both the oligarchs and theirrnWestern partners. ‘1 exgeni Primako’ was fired not so much becausernhe was a Brezhnevite retrograde, but because he was determinedrnto use Skuratov’s investigations —and his own friend-rnIv fies to intelligence and law enforcement agencies (Primakovrnis a foniier chief of the SVR, Russia’s foreign intelligence service)rn—to imprison the “seven bankers,” an effort that inevitablyrnuncovered the involvement of the “family” in the systematicrnrobberv of the countrv. Stepashin was replaced not because hernwas ineffectual (he held the post for a mere three months), butrnbecause he refused to manipulate the “power structures”—thernsecurit’ and law-enforcement agencies-in order to shut offrnSkuratov’s investigations and imleash a komproiuat war onrnLuzhkov and Primakov, who are now involved in a fragile anfi-rnKremlin political alliance. (Stepashin apparently was also notrninterested in the Kremlin’s plans to provoke a conflict with thernCommunists and ban them before December’s parliamentarv’rnelections.) That is where newly minted Premier VladimirrnPutin, a former KGB operative in East Germany, comes in.rnPufin is allegedly behind the now famous (in Russia, at anyrnrate) video of a man “sinfilar to Prosecutor General Skuratov”rnfrolicking with a pair of prostitutes, who were obviously set uponrnthe lustful man “similar to Skuratov” by the “special services.”rnWhen the tape was aired on state-run ‘IV, it merelyrnboosted Skuratov’s public-approval ratings. Putin, who ranrnKGB shell companies which funneled the party’s gold out ofrnthe collapsing Soviet Union in the late 80’s and early 90’s, hasrnnow been tasked w ith plugging the leaks in Yeltsin’s porous polificalrndike. Most Moscow Kremlin watciiers believe that thernsource of leaks from “Russian law enforcement officials” tornAmerican and European newspapers is the cagey old ex-SVRrnchief Primakov and that Luzhkov is encouraging the leaks as arnmeans of scoring points for the 2000 presidential race. Putin’srntask is either to destroy Primakov/Luzhkov or to cut a deal andrnbuy Yeltsin some time to wangle himself out of the latest “family”rnmess. To that end, the Kremlin appears to be pursuing arn”carrot-and-stick” approach to the Primakov-Luzhkov problem.rnOn the one hand, stories about front companies that iiave financedrnLuzhkov’s political operations (and probably launderedrnMoscow city government money for the mayor) have beenrnplanted in the Russian press: Turnabout is fair play, and if thernKremlin cannot imcover anything on the serupidous ex-SVRrnchief, then it is easy enough to besmirch the reputation of hisrnunserupidous political partiier. (The stories have also implicatedrna Luzhkov front company, Sistema, reportedly founded withrnseed money from Mogilevich’s Solntsevo mafia, in the BNYrnmoney-laundering operation.) Barring that, the Kremlin is allegedlyrnprobing the Primakov-Luzhkov team for a possible deal:rnThe Kremlin will hand over “oligarch number one” in exchangernfor protection for Yeltsin and a few members of thern”family.”rnBAB, who survived an assassination attempt a few^ years ago,rnis not one to go qiuetly. In the Caucasus, he ina- be encouragingrnthe confrontation in Karachay-Cherkessiva (his strong-armrnmen are said to be provoking clashes between the two chief factionsrnin the political struggle), and BAB himself probably suggestedrnto regional elites that he might be of use in mediating therndispute, once again proving to Yeltsin the value of his friendshiprnand the danger of his enmity. Rumor also has it that BAB is financingrnthe Chechen-backed Islamic guerrilla war against therninfidel in Dagestan. Once more, BAB could play peacemakerrnin the region. Alternately, he is not above helping to foment thernnrnornarni-3rnI—Irn>rnDECEMBER 1999/21rnrnrn