two years later in Teheran, Roosevelt attended a secretnmeeting with Stalin (even Churchill was not told about it),nduring which he broke his word given to the Polish Ambassadorsnand in the Atlantic Charter. During this meetingnPresident Roosevelt and Stalin agreed on changes in the Polishnfrontiers; moreover, the President also disclaimed interest innthe political integrity of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia in favornof the Soviet Union.nThe meeting took place on December 1,1943, at 3:20 P.M.nThe United States was represented by President Roosevelt, Mr.nHarriman, and Mr. Bohlen (who served as interpreter). ThenInhiiid.siglu. we ma claim, with a rea.sonable amount ofncertitude, thai tlie Naita Agreenuni was accepteil aminapproed because President KooseNell siicceeiied innconvincing iioth the .nu-rii”iii peojiie cnicl ihi- Americannestablishment oltliat ]iaci”s beneliiialii} for .America, lixennthose •sho tlien spoke of ii.x moral speciousness came to see innit some pragmatic ad ant age or .merieaii iniereM.orsawit asnan exercise in realpolitik. lour decades later, we know that Mr.nRooscNclt’s intentions proed to I)e in error, his reasoning ancalamitous ineptituile. and his a.ssuraiKi- a lie. Ilisiory hasndisproved every one ol’his assumptions and hojies. Innretrospect, Yalta appears to he the lirst debacle—a Dunkirk ofnsorts—^in the subseqiiiiit show ilown with fori IS of totalitarianntyranny that inevitabh’ followed in I litler”s bloodied footsteps,nforces that are waging a lerocioiis a.ssault on our beliefs, ourninstitutions, and our er existence. ^ alta was a moniinientalnconcession to the stubborn So iet tiemand that the postwarnworld should not be i )rilereil by the ict< )rs ace( )riling to somensuperior political and ethical principle, but structured on andndivided into autonomous, impi-ni-trable spheres of inlluence.nAccepting the Soviet postulate. .Mr. Kooseveli fell into a trap:nonly the autonomy of the Soviet spln-re was assiiretl to benhermetic by dint of the nature of communist power. I’he anpriori vxilnerability < )fr>/Hsphere w as a toreg( ine conclusion, anfactor built into Soviet plans, ilu- trump caril ol theirncalculations. Without ^alta. there would haw been neither anwar in Korea nor in>ietnam.nThe peaceful coexistenci- between two coiUradielornsociomoralsystems, especialh when iolenif lonstitutes thenphilosophical essence of one of them, is a futile endeavor. .nfiulure to recognize this was Mr. Uoo.seelts personal mistake.nHe chose to ignore that :\: neutralized Americas militarnsuperiority and freed the Soviets to use their might, wliiili atnthat time w;is inferior to ours, for a neoimperialist drie. Ournrepugnance tor any use of arms except in the defense of ournown territory, or of our liti/ens’ legitimate interests owrseas.nforeclosed a firmer .Vmerican n-spouNc to SON let expansionism.nOf course, /re could not make war then becau.se thenvery idea of war against a putatie ally would have been then> RENOUNCE YALTA •nSoviet Union was represented by Marshal Stalin, ForeignnCommissar Molotov, and Mr. Pavlov (as interpreter). A reportnof this fateful meeting is preserved in Roosevelt’s PresidentialnArchives in Hyde Park (see also the U.S. Department of State’snThe Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943; GovernmentnPrinting Office; Washington, DC).nMr. Churchill’s response to Teheran was anger. “A bloody lotnhas gone wrong” were his words. It is not to say that Mr.nChurchill was impeccably innocent in respect to this deal. Itnwas he who, on Stalin’s insistence, through the British Foreignn(continued on page 31)ngravest offense to oiw lundamental moral sensibilities, to ournery notitxi of inlegrit and honor—and //jcr knew it.nevertheless. our choice and our decision, tiieir ine ilabilitnanil noblenessnotwitiislanding. wereaiardinalerror—ifonlynbecan.se those making the poliiy never .seemeil iosu.s]H-i’t thatnour implacable enemy would not hae hesitateil onesecoiiil ifnhe hail a monopoly on the atom bomb, anil woulil pi’rcei e andncapilali/e upon the slightest chance of instanth making thenworld safe for communism. Uiissian si le. Ihe postwar era ofn”peace” has sufliiientK doiiimenii’il that wheneer thenKremlin sniffed Ihe .scantiest smell of our ineibility. it put itsnproxies iii motion and triggeri-d wars—that is. the Soii-tsncreated those woes that Mr. Koosevi’lt hoped to eliminatenthrough the spheres-ol-inlliieiice arrangement. (lonseiiiieiitly.nour viilner:ibility to the threat of the ultimate solution beiamiincreasinghnpalpable. Now. our acillaiions make it look as ifnour demise is only a matter of time—and time and i’)atience arenweapons with which a totalitarian state can arm itsi-lf at tinlowestncost.nSince I’JiS we liae amply ilemoiistrateil to the worldn(ini’liiiling Ibeir pan of the worlil) that though we are notnperfect, we ari- a moralU superior society and polity, betti-rnsuiteil to proiile an example for iiiankind. Ihe posi-‘ialtanAmerican realitv. however. m:ikes it clear that our worstnenem- is not pi-rhaps een llieSoiet 1 iiion and its ideology,nbut our inivrtituile anil si-lfdoubt. .Ml those among us whonili’iiy us the right to ait as hunianit “s best friend, all those whonfanatii’ally insist that our commitment loileceniy anil fairnessnanil rationality anil ri’sjiect lor the law is actually an emptynpromise, and that we ha’e no moral right toi’laim an moralnprimacN oer the Soii-i crime of geiiociile. subjugations ofnentire n:ilions. anil cruel abuses of entire soi’ii-ties iniluilitigntheir own. are a bleeiling ulier in our bod. fhis subversion ofnfaith in our own value, which is so meliculousK ilociitnenieilnb history, is our worst disease, one which pushes us towardnnational suicide. Its germs can be (bund in the ideologiialnclimate of ^’alta. in the act of moral surrender tliat I’ontaminatednom- histor anil made life for two gem-rations moreniliMicult than it should hae been. (I.f)nnnJuly 1984n