by this: stop harassing the whales because it gives them seriousrnpain, and has not even the excuse of sparing others pain.rnThe oMer ethical system urged us to live as decent humanrnbeings, and might easily have made the wider demand explicit:rnto allow or to help nonhuman creatures to live as decent a lifernaccording to their kind. The righteous man would hae a carernfor his beasts, but would expect to see them suffer for goodrncauses, ones that promoted virtuous living. The newer systemrndenied that anything should ever be made to suffer, except tornreduce the sum total of suffering. That dangerous concessionrnmade it right, after all, to make animals suffer if human sufferingrncould therein be reduced. And moralists retained enoughrnof the outlook of a status society to believe, without thinkingrnmuch about it, that our suffering was of another order thanrntheirs. Animal pains and pleasures must be merely physical.rnHumans would suffer agonies (it was implied) if they could notrnhave their favorite foods, or watch their favorite sports, or findrnout fascinating truths about the worid. Humans suffer (it wasrnasserted) far more pain at bruises, wounds, infections, cancers.rnSo though we might regret giving pain to “animals,” it must bernbetter than allowing “humans” to have those pains instead.rnIt follows, unfortunately for nonhumans, that the humane,rnwelfarist impulse had much less impact than its founders wouldrnhae wished. Some things were outlawed: all those things, inrnfact, that our chief legislators did not themsek’es much want torndo. Bull-baiting, cockfights, dogfights, torturing cats for funrnbecame illegal—though not without protest from those whornthought that these practices encouraged moral virtues such asrncourage (or at least indifference to blood and pain) and love ofrnglory. But of course, it was urged, we should not Go Too Far:rnnonhumans, after all, are of another kind than humans. Theyrnremain, in fact, within a lower status, and depend upon ourrnfluctuating kindness rather than on clear bargains or radicalrnutilitarian concern.rnKindness docs fluctuate, and so does our perception of whatrncounts as pain. Mere (stabbing, throbbing, aching) pains of arnclearh’ “physical” kind are not the only ones we now acknowledge.rnAnimals mav suffer agonies of boredom, loneliness, frustration,rnstress, which are far worse than momentar- pains. Animalrnwelfarists may acknowledge these and seek to prevent orrncure them. The- mav even begin to wonder whether it is wrongrnto deprive a creature of a happy life, or of some natural functions.rne’en if it does not actually suffer: a creature blinded fromrnbirth has been deprived of something good, even if it neverrnknows its loss. Once that step of sympathy is taken it may evenrnoccur to us that killing a happy (or potentially happy) creaturernis a wrong. This goes beyond the muddled doctrines that wernhave inherited. Conventional moralists will usually agree thatrnhurting animals (without a good excuse) is wrong, but not thatrnit is wrong to kill them (painlessly). As so often, even conventionalrnmoralists are not quite so sure in practice: a family thatrnbrings a pet dog to be killed merely because they’re tired of it,rnor want to go on holiday, are surely displaying some defect ofrncharacter, betraing some implicit bargain. We no longer allowrnour children to go out killing cats, squirrels, or birds merely torntr out their catapults or guns. We have begun, in fact, to thinkrnthat causing pain and death, except for very good reasons, mustrnbe wrong. Whether culinary or cosmetic reasons are sufficientrnis in doubt. Are even “medical” reasons good enough? ErazimrnKohak asks in The Embers and the Stars (1984), “What justifiesrnthe totalh’ disproportionate cost of our presence? Ask it forrnonce without presupposing the answer of the egotism of ourrnspecies, as God might ask it about His creatures: why should arndog or a guinea pig die an agonizing death in a laboratory experimentrnso that some human need not suffer just such a fate?”rnPart of the reason for this gradual shift in moral sensibilitv isrnthe discovery that our predecessors were mistaken about facts.rnFor centuries wc had beliexed that human and nonhuman creaturesrnwere of radically different kinds, and wc were in a specialrnsense God’s favorites. The status society itself was parfly basedrnupon a wish to treat the different classes, sects, and sexes of humanityrnas if they were different species. Our view of nonhumanrnnature (as I said before) was formed in a complex interactionrnw ith our view of human nature. Because we had to assumernthat classes, sects, and sexes were distinct, we projected justrnthose patterns on the natural, nonhuman world (as in The LionrnKing). Because humans and nonhumans were of differentrnkinds, it need not be surprising that we should use quite differentrnrules about them. But in the last century, we have learnedrnthat the older account of “species” was mistaken. Creatures arernnot “members of the same species” because they share a distinctrnnature, unlike any other. They share as much as they dornwith each other (and many things with others) because they arernmembers of a group of interbreeding populations whosernboundaries in space and time are vague. Wc have plenty of evidencernthat other, nonhuman animals are ery much like us:rnthe do not only “feel pain,” but engage in social intercourse,rnmake plans, make choices, very much as wc do. The other greatrnapes, m particular, live lives entirely recognizable as hominid, tornthe extent that a truly objective taxonomy might reckon chimpanzees,rngorillas, and orangutans belonged to the same genus,rn/ lonio. I hope to live to see an international recognition of flicirrn”human rights,” and legislation to protect them from abuse.rnWheflicr the same rights can ever be extended to all creaturesrnmust be doubtful; if we cannot even extend them to the apes,rnwe must begin to doubt that any of us can have them.rnWe should not muzzle thernox, nor plough up everyrnfield, nor seek to control the lives ofrncreatures who can manage quiternwell bv themselves.rnAs wc begin to realize that our status is suspect, that wc cannotrnjust go on accepting the pretexts and compromises that allowrnus, in practice, to do almost cverthing “wc” choose to do,rnto “animals,” to “savages,” and to the land itself, we need tornwork out bargains, and new wavs to enforce them. We need arn”new pact with nature.” One route to this involves a GlobalrnEcological Authority, “with teeth.” Unfortunately, a GEArnwould inevitably be a global government, an absolute dictatorship,rnand most of us would shrink from such a thing. Even if itrnwere founded with the best of intentions, it would most probablyrnbe run with the scrv worst. The alternative route to moralrnJUNE 1996/15rnrnrn