concentrated their forces in Boston, leaving royal authority torncollapse elsewhere with scarcely a struggle: the loyalists werernundermined by this foolish policy. However, in 1776, thernBritish sent a major army to crush the revolution and thusrnbegan a second stage that was more widespread, bitter, and sustainedrnthan had at first seemed likely. This was equivalent tornthe British riposte after the Jacobite advances in 1715 and 1745,rnbut the Americans had the space and resources to cope, whereasrnthe Jacobites did not. On the other hand, the British base inrnthe British Isles was not exposed to American attack.rnEven so, the struggle was more close run than is sometimesrnnrade clear in the American public myth which, paradoxically,rnunderrates the challenge posed by Britain and treats its defeatrnas inevitable, and thus both minimizes the American achievementrnand detracts attention from the actual details of the conflict.rnBy 1780, the Americans faced growing exhaustion andrnwar-weariness. The limited creditworthiness of Congressrnand the reluctance of the states to subordinate their prioritiesrnand resources to Congress meant that the army had to live fromrnhand to mouth. In January 1781, short of pay, food, andrnclothes, and seeking discharge, both the Pennsylvania line andrnthree New Jersey regiments mutinied. The Pennsylvaniarnmutiny was ended only by concessions, including the dischargernof five-sixths of the men. The episode was a salutary warning tornthe Revolutionary cause and cannot but give rise to speculationrnas to what would have happened had the army been obliged tornendure another harsh winter without the prospect of a victoriousrnclose to the conflict created by Yorktown.rnThe rifle did not make American victory inevitable. It carriedrnno bayonet, took one minute to load, and an expert to firernit, of which there were relatively few. British muskets could bernfired faster and were fitted with bayonets. This absence of arntechnological gap can be paralleled in the Jacobite ease by recentrnwork, particularly by the American scholar Michael Hill,rnsuggesting that the Highland charge should not be dismissedrnas an anachronistic system of warfare. On September 21,1745,rnthe Highlanders crushed a royal army at Prestonpans, to therncast of Edinburgh. A Highland charge, the formation unbrokenrnby the fire of Sir John Cope’s opposing infantry, led thernroyal forces to flee in panic a few minutes after the first impactrnof the charge. They only fired one round before the Highlanders,rnwith their broadswords, were upon them. Cope’s armyrnwas destroyed, taking heavy casualties during the retreat.rnThe Jacobites were again successful at the battle of Falkirkrn(January 17, 1746). A Highland charge was again decisive, althoughrnthe royal troops were also hindered by having to fightrnuphill, while the heavy rain and growing darkness of a late winterrnafternoon both wet their powder so that it would not igniternand hindered aiming. It is misleading to separate Jacobite fromrnWestern European warfare. Other armies relied on the attack,rntactical or strategic. Frederick the Great was a bold general. Inrn1745 Prussian infantry attacks brought victory over Austro-rnSaxon forces at Hohenfriedberg, Soor, and Kesselsdorf. Thesernvictories appeared to vindicate the commitment to cold steelrnthat had led Frederick in 1741 to order his infantry to have theirrnbayonets permanently fixed when they were on duty. MarshalrnSaxc, the leading French general of the mid-1740’s, was also anrnexponent of the strategic offensive and close-quarter tactics.rnThe rapidity of his campaigns in Flanders in the summer ofrn1745 and in Brabant in early 1746 can be compared to thernspeed of the Jacobite advance. Similarly, Franco-Spanish forcesrnadvanced rapidly in northern Italy in late 1745.rnWestern European warfare is often typecast as slow, limited,rnand indecisive by reference to lengthy sieges. The Jacobitesrnwho lacked heavy artillery, in contrast, are not associated withrnsieges. Yet, again, the contrast should not be pushed too far.rnWestern European armies could rely on storm as Bavarian,rnFrench, and Saxon forces did at Prague in I74I and the Frenchrnat Charieroi in 1746 and at Bergen-op-Zoom in 1747, the lastrnthe best-fortified positioir in the Low Countries. Thus, ratherrnthan seeing Jacobite warfare as totally different from WesternrnEuropean warfare, as alien, for example, as that of Africans inrnthe late 19th century, it is possible to regard it as an aspect ofrnWestern European culture, to place it on a continuum, ratherrnthan contrastmg it with a rigid model.rnThe royal forces only won one of the battles in the ’45, but itrnwas decisive. At Culloden (April 6,1746), the terrain suited therndefending Duke of Cumberland, and the Jacobite plan for arnnight attack failed. His artillery and infantry so thinned thernnumbers of the already outnumbered advancing clansmen thatrnthose who reached the royal troops were driven back by bayonet.rnThe general rate of fire was increased by the absence of anyrndisruptive fire from the Jacobites, while the flanking positionrnof the royal units forward from the left of the front line madernCulloden even more of a killing field.rnThe Americans never suffered a defeat as severe as Culloden,rnalthough they did suffer serious blows. Charlestonrnsurrendered, with 5,500 Continentals, militia, and armed citizens,rnand what was left of the Continental navy, on May 12,rn1780. At Camden on August 6,1780, Horatio Gates’ army wasrnsmashed, with the loss of about 800 dead and wounded, as wellrnas 1,000 taken prisoner and the loss of their supplies. Cornwallisrnhad only 300 casualties. These were serious setbacks. Theyrnestablished the British position in coastal South Carolina, andrnthe Americans were not to regain Charleston during the war.rnYet neither blow was fatal. A major strength of the Americanrncause was that it was based on the free association of differentrncommunities Each colony/state had military and economic resourcesrnof its own, and a British victory in one part of Americarnhad only a limited effect elsewhere. The fall of Charleston didrnnot make that of Boston more likely. Collectively, the Americanrneconomy was very strong and standards of living high, higherrnthan in the British Isles. Successful capitalism was thus anrnessential precondition of American independence.rnClearly the: middle colonics were more crucial, because ofrntheir geographical position. Here again, however, the Americansrnsuffered severe blows, but not fatal ones. In 1776, theyrnwere defeated at Long Island and lost New York; in 1777, theyrnwere defeated at Brandywine and lost Philadelphia. Yet, in neitherrncase did this lead to the collapse of the revolution. In largernpart the Americans were helped by the fact that their defeatedrnforces were able to retreat. There was no total loss, as the Britishrnsuffered when they surrendered at Saratoga (1777) and Yorktownrn(1781), and the Americans likewise at Fort Washingtonrn(1776) and Charleston (1780).rnEven had the British achieved a more decisive victory atrneither Long Island or Brandywine, they would still have had tornface an undefeated New England and South. Compared to thernJacobites, the Americans benefited from having a more dividedrnleadership and more military and political autonomy. There isrnalso an instruc;tive contrast with the French Revolution of 1789.rnUnlike the Jac:obites, but like the Americans, the French Revolutionariesrnwere successful in carrying through a seizure of pow-rnNOVEMBER 1995/25rnrnrn