er and then defending it from domestic and external forces.rnHowever, there were major contrasts between the two revolutions.rnAlthough the Americans and their militia could bernquite harsh in their dealings with Loyalists, their treatment wasrnless savage than that meted out to Royalists in France: in Americarnthe tumbrels never rolled. American society was less mobilizedrnfor war than that of revolutionary France was to be, andrnmore respect was paid to private property and preexisting institutions.rnThis was in part because there was less of a social contestrnin the American Revolution than in its French counterpart.rnFrench local government was reorganized institutionally andrngeographically, provincial assemblies being a major casualty. InrnAmerica there was no equivalent centralization; in fact, avoidancernof centralization was a principle of American revolutionaryrnideology. Before their respective revolutions, Americarnlacked a strong identity, other than as part of the British world,rncertainly nothing comparable with that which France enjoyed,rnand in America, unlike France, there was to be no source ofrnrevolutionary activity able to terrorize those who supported thernRevolution but had alternative, less centralist views of how thernnew state should be organized. Nor was there any comparablernattempt to export the revolution, certainly not outside NorthrnAmerica. The Americans were free of many of the illusions ofrnthe possibility of and need for universality that were to affect sornmany of the politicians of revolutionary France and many 20thcenturyrnAmerican liberals.rnThe conservatism of the American Revolution thus emergesrnclearly in contrast with that in France. This conservatism canrnbe seen as crucial both to the success of the American cause—rnallowing the often differing American regional political culturesrnto combine and cooperate—and to the definition of thernpolitical character of America.rnThe French revolutionaries adopted a harsher attitude towardrnthe rights, responsibilities, and property of individuals andrninstitutions. They also felt it entirely proper for the state to tryrnto change society, as with the creation of a new calendar andrnthe attack on Christianity. Had the Americans emulated thisrnattitude in order to win, the consequence might have been arnvery different American public culture, one that stressed thernnational state more than the individual, obligations more thanrnrights. The ideological underpinnings of the Revolution werernso strong that it is possible that the Revolution would have beenrnabandoned by many, if not by most, Americans in the face ofrnsuch a betrayal of their principles. To a certain extent, the advocatesrnof strong, centralized government in modern Americarnarc trying to reverse the crucial political legacy of the strugglernfor independence.rnThe Jacobite risings were similarly conservative in contrast tornthe French Revolution and, in addition, in contrast to thernAmerican ideology and practice of freedom. The total failurernof the Jacobites stemmed not from their conservatism, butrnboth from the particular geographical circumstances of thernconflict and from contingent political and military factors. ThernJacobites were badly weakened by their failure to coordinaterneffectively with French invasion plans in 1744-46. They werernalso hindered in late 1745 by the lack of substantial support inrnEngland when Bonnie Prince Charlie marched south. Furthermore,rnunlike what happened off the Anrerican coast in 1781,rnthe British navy did not lose its maritime superiority.rnAgainst these factors must be set Jacobite success prior tornDerby, where on “Black Friday,” December 5, 1745, the decisionrnwas taken not to march on for London. Aside from thernvictory at Prestonpans, the Jacobites had also been victoriousrnwhen they invaded England: Carlisle castle, with its weak defensesrnand small garrison, surrendered on November 15 and,rnthereafter, the Jacobites encountered no resistance. As Penrith,rnKendal, Lancaster, Preston, Manchester, and Derby fell withoutrnresistance, the fragility of the Hanoverian state was brutallyrnexposed, as it was to be again when royal authority collapsed sornreadily in America in 1775. As in America, the defense of thernHanoverian regime in 1745-46 had to rely on regulars, whornwere outmaneuvered both in Scotland and England.rnThat the Jacobites could have won is one of the interestingrnconclusions to emerge from a consideration of the strategic situationrnin December 1745. Separately, both a Jacobite advancernfrom Derby, and the invasion of southern England that thernFrench were planning, were serious challenges. In combination,rnthey could each contribute to the threat posed by the other.rnJacobite forces in the L,ondon area could have handicapped anyrnattempt to mount coherent opposition to a French advance.rnThe French could have supplied the Jacobites what they lacked:rnsiege artillery, regular infantry able to stand up to British regularsrnin a firefight, and a secure logistical base.rnThe failure of the French invasion in 1744, thwarted by thernweather, did not mean that their naval power and amphibiousrncapability were not threats in 1745-46. The sole naval battlernhitherto in the war, off Toulon in 1744, had been indecisive,rnleading to bitter disputes between the British admirals andrnsavage parliamentary criticism. Unlike during the next Frenchrninvasion attempt, in 1759, which was to be smashed by Hawke’srnvictory at Quiberon Bay, there was no British blockade of Brest,rnthe principal French naval base, in 1744-46; while Forbin’s successrnin taking a French invasion squadron from Dunkirk to thernFirth of Forth in 1708 indicated the problems of blockadingrnthat port successfully. Had Marshal Richelieu’s force embarkedrnat Dunkirk on December 17, 1745, as he considered, itrncould probably have reached England. Amphibious operationsrnin this period were far from easy—ships were dependent onrnwind and tide, there were no specialized landing vessels andrnfew docks—^but William of Orange had landed successfully inrnTorbay in 1688, and Richelieu, like William, would have had anrnunopposed landing. Richelieu was to be successful with his,rnand France’s, next amphibious operation, the 1756 invasion ofrnBritish-ruled Minorca.rnThus, the role of contingency repeatedly emerges when consideringrnJacobite failure. It can also be seen in the case of Americanrnvictory. What if Admiral I lowe had cut off the Americanrnretreat from Long Island or Washington had failed to achievernsurprise at Trenton? What if Burgoyne had not plunged southrntowards Saratoga in 1777 or if General Howe had takenrnPhiladelphia earlier? What if France had not entered the warrnor had failed to block the Chesapeake in 1781? The list canrnreadily be extended. Each hypothesis can be weighed and nonerndisproves the strength of the American, and weakness of thernBritish, position. Yet, each reminds us of the role of chance inrnwar and of the folly of assuming an inevitable outcome. As tornwhether the South could have won the American Civil War, itrnis misleading to dismiss speculation on this theme as pointlessrnor as revisionist obscurantism and nostalgia. The past, andrntherefore the present, can never be understood if the optioirsrnfacing individuals in the past are ignored and if it is assumedrnnot only that the path of history is preordained and obvious,rnbut that the past belongs to the victors and that they should alsornown the present and the future. crn26/CHRONICLESrnrnrn