study for scholars and general readers.rnIt is fitting that the foreword shouldrnbe written by Francis Canavan, who observesrnthat “this is a book that has longrnbeen needed to be written.” In the greatrnconflict between “realists” and “nominalists”rnof the late Middle Ages, which isrncertainly one of the most crucial issues inrnall intellectual history and which hasrnshaped modern thought in every branchrnof knowledge, Pappin shows conclusive-rnIv that Burke’s metaphysics is in thernrealist tradition. This makes Burke’s politicsrn”basically consonant with the Aristotelian-rnThomistic tradition,” separatesrnhim philosophically from the empiricalutilitarian-rnideologically rational thoughtrnof John Locke and discredits the interpretationrnof contemporary scholars inrnthe tradition of Morley, who reducedrnBurke to a Whiggish political hack andrnskillful rhetorician. Pappin accuratelyrndetails and summarizes the views of thernscholars whom he rejects, thus absorbingrnhis opposition, and in the final fourrnchapters presents cleady and conclusivelyrnthe metaphysical assumptions thatrnconstitute the premises of Burke’s unsvstematicrnbut consistent political philosophy.rnPappin’s book deserves an honoredrnplace on the shelf of every studentrnof Burke, and in every college and universityrnlibrary.rnPeter ]. Stanlis’s most recent book isrnEdmund Burke: The Enlightenmentrnand Revolution (Transaction).rnCui Bono?rnby Paul GottfriedrnThe Economics and Ethics ofrnPrivate Propertyrnby Hans-Hermann HoppernNorwood, Massachusetts: KluwerrnAcademic Publishers;rn288 pp., $59.95rnHans-Hermann Hoppe’s essays willrnnot be everyone’s cup of tea, particularlyrnin view of the author’s statedrnpurpose to defend individual propertyrnrights as the basis of a free and productivernsociety. Hoppe tackles his job ofrnapologetics by engaging in both economicrnanalysis and ethical theorizing.rnThe economic aspect of his work isrnmostly a cogent criticism of governmentrnpolicies that claim to distinguish publicrnfrom private goods and benehts. Hoppernresponds to the humanitarian claims ofrnself-described advocates of the “commonrngood” by asking “cui bono?” Whornexactly is served each time the governmentrntakes under its control some aspectrnof the economy—or provides a servicernthat might otherwise be privatelyrnfulfilled? Hoppe believes the governmentrnis never justified in circumventingrnmarket mechanisms to provide goodsrnand services. He judges such activity tornbe irrational and unjust, ignoring the informationrnsupplied by market demandrnwhile frequently infringing on propertyrnrights.rnHoppe goes on to argue that a cooperativerncivil society would emerge if consentingrnproperty holders could have theirrnway. To an objection made by the lessrnthorough libertarian Loren Lomasky,rnthat the demand for a government basedrnentirely on the contractual activity ofrnproperty holders is “unrealistic,” Hoppernresponds by pointing out the obvious:rnno economic libertarian will likely havernhis druthers in today’s wodd, but it isrnuseful to show that public order wouldrnresult from voluntary activities being undertakenrnby politically uncoerced propertyrnowners. Market mechanisms andrnself-interest would take care of socialrnneeds.rnOne may of course ask whether cooperativernstructures would in fact result ifrnour present welfare state suddenly vanished.rnIn the absence of cultural unityrnand some preexisting community, I tendrnto doubt it. Nor is it clear that Hoppe’srnsociety can function in the face of violentrndisagreement without the use, or atrnleast the threat, of force. ProfessorrnHoppe and I have arrived at our hostilernviews of the welfare state partly by differentrnmentors, he through John Lockernand Jiirgen Habermas and I throughrnThomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt. Unlikernhim, I believe that productive freedomrnis impossible in the absence of politicalrnand social cohesion.rnIn his philosophic essays, Hoppernmakes a number of sound points aboutrnthe implicit assumptions of communication.rnDrawing on Habermas and, to arnlesser extent, Murray Rothbard, Ludwigrnvon Mises, and Kant, he demonstratesrnthe self-contradiction of a totally subjectivernview of knowledge. All communicationrnis based on unavoidable presuppositions,rnhe explains, without whichrnit could not exist; we would not even attemptrnsuch activity unless we believedrnthat the data we transmit and receive isrnmutually intelligible. Our communicationrnreveals another epistemic assumption,rnHoppe observes: namely, that arnconstant self (what German idealists callrnthe “transcendental ego”) lies behind interpersonalrncommunication as a continuingrnsource and point of reference. Eachrnself asserts its identity by entering intorncontractual relations with other consentingrnselves, if the opportunity is present.rnFor self-ownership as well as thernpossibility of mutually intelligible communicationrnare unspoken givens inrnhuman action, Hoppe maintains, andrnthus the self becomes aware of its ownrnintegrity as it projects itself into an everwideningrnweb of social and legal relationships.rnFrom at least an implicitrnrecognition of self-ownership, Hoppe’srnego appropriates external objects byrnbestowing labor upon them and by layingrnclaim to whatever is accessible tornnew owners. It is through these economicrnand contractual self-projectionsrnthat Hoppe’s ego recognizes its own permanencernand its ties to a larger world.rnWhile Hoppe works out this processrnof individual self-discovery with a certainrnrigor, he reaches too hard for ethicalrntruths that his investigation simply willrnnot yield. Unlike Mises, who as an ethicalrnnonabsolutist assumed the subjectivernbasis of human wants while believingrnthat people do act rationally in pursuit ofrnsubjective goals, Hoppe looks for ethicalrnuniversals operative in economic men.rnThe same problematic leap is alreadyrnpresent in John Locke, whom Hopperncites with obvious admiration. Despiternthe mechanistic, experiential epistemologyrnhe later developed in the Essay ConcerningrnHuman Understanding, Locke inrnthe Second Treatise of Government pointsrnto “right reason” and quotes RichardrnHooker’s neo-Aristotelian views, particularlyrnin his description of the state ofrnnature, of man’s natural moral facilities.rnBut Locke writes not as a lawyer arguingrnon behalf of the natural law but as arnpolemicist, denying the gloomy, predatoryrnstate of nature described by ThomasrnHobbes. Because Locke sets out tornmake a case for government by consent,rnhe abandons his skeptical view of innaternideas and his otherwise inflexible materialismrnto embrace the Anglican scholasticrnHooker. People can reason togetherrneven in the absence of civil societyrnDECEMBER 1993/37rnrnrn