didn’t work during the Iranian revolution,nbut contributed wonderfully to thennoise level—out of which came real politicalnchange.nFirst is a proposal that some of thenShah’s supporters pushed in the earlynstages of the revolution: buy off the opposition.nPay the mullahs for peace. Everyonenwill go home, moderate and contented.nThe idea came late and toonmodestly, for it left the system intact.nHere we see the beginnings of this tactic.nGive everyone health care. Cutnmiddle-class taxes. But, with our Treasurynbusted and foreign bankers holdingnthe purse strings, can we find sufficientncash to buy real political peace? An economicnresponse isn’t adequate for a politicalnquestion; it can only sink theneconomy.nThe second and cheaper idea wasnGary Sick’s, presented at a time whennthe Shah was on the ropes. The prescriptionnwas: “Enough wimpishness, bena tough father figure. Get on a whitenhorse and on TV. Show that you, notnKhomeini, are boss.” Gary’s’plan nevernhad a chance because the Shah was toonwise to get in front of a crowd on or off anwhite horse. Will George Bush cranknup an action that will allow him againnto play the glorious leader? Watch outnQaddafi. Or will we have to make donwith the phony stuff of TV image-makers,ni.e., Willie Horton? Bravado cannwin applause and votes. It will not curena system afflicted by leaders who lacknthe courage to make hard choices.nThe third idea is a natural for anynpolitician, whether monarchical orndemocratic: promises and half-measures.n”Let’s try a new Prime Minister,” andn”Free (well, mostly free) elections comingnin a year or so,” were the Shah’s offers.nToo late, too little. Now we hearntalk of campaign financing reform (well,nsort of) and mild versions of term-limitnlegislation. Does anyone think compromisednapproaches will bring in the newnfaces that will bring back the voters whonhave dropped out of politics? Of coursennot. The object of ideas with appeal innWashington is to preserve old faces.nThe choices before the Americannpublic, like those that Iran faced, arenthree: drift with the system and suffernthe slowly accumulating consequencesnof rigid policies and uninspired rulers;nwait for the AyatoUah—maybe next timenwithout the nasty credentials of DavidnDuke—and the destructive energy henwill unleash on the system; or create anclamor against incumbents at all levels,nirrespective of virtue and talent, untilnthe more responsible veterans amongnthem realize that the survival of our politicalnsystem requires their disappearancenfrom political life.n—Henry PrechtnVOTER cynicism and apathy are at annall-time high, and as such we can expectnthe unexpected come November.nThose Middle American Radicals whomnSam Francis has been writing about willneither revolt at the polls or sit at home,ndisgusted. Thus far, during the primarynseason, someone has been staying home,nsince turnout has been abysmal. If thisnis an indicator of turnout during thengeneral elections, then November 3ncould be transformed into a grand opportunitynfor sensible people to seize thenday.nHistorically, low voter turnout presentsnideal opportunities to win elections.nSpecial interest groups and PACsnhave recognized this for some time. Becausenelection outcomes are being determinednby a dwindling number ofncitizens, those who do vote exercise disproportionatenpower. For example, in antypical U.S. congressional election, onlyn35 percent of the potential electoratenvotes. A mere 19 percent votes for thenmajority party, effectively sealing thenfate of the congressional agenda for thenentire nation.nIn 1984, only 68 percent of eligiblenvoters bothered to register to vote andnonly 53 percent actually cast ballots innthe presidential election. Taken one stepnfurther, only 58 percent voted for thenvictor, President Ronald Reagan. Thenbottom line: a mere 3 J percent of theneligible electorate voted for the mannwho would become a catalyst for the collapsenof Soviet communism and beginnrecasting the U.S. Supreme Court.nTurnout fell again in 1988—to just 50.2npercent of the voting-age population. Inn1986, a handful of Republican U.S. Senatorsnlost by such meager margins that, ifnonly fifty thousand more people had votednfor them, the Republicans would notnhave lost control of the U.S. Senate. Putnsimply, a relatively small number of organized,ndedicated citizens can exercisenenormous electoral power.nIt is helpful to look at electoral “campaigns”nin military terms. The map ofnan election can then be broken down intonsmaller components of battle zones—nnnin this case, the precincts—which determinenthe outcome of the larger campaign.nHistory is replete with examplesnof U.S. elections won by a mere one orntwo votes per precinct. Textbook examplesnon the presidential level in the 20thncentury include the razor-thin victoriesnof Woodrow Wilson, Harry Truman,nand John F. Kennedy in one or two criticalnstates by a margin of one vote or lessnper precinct. In 1978, Virginia SenatornJohn Warner won his first electionnby less than two votes per precinctnstatewide against a popular opponent.nMany state legislative contests in Virginiansubsequently have been decidednby even smaller margins—by no rriorenthan 32 votes for an entire district. Ansingle Sunday congregation could thereforenswing such an election.nThe 1989 Virginia gubernatorial racenis a prime example. Former AttorneynGeneral Marshall Coleman (whose policynadvisors had impeccable conservativencredentials) was defeated by LieutenantnGovernor Douglas Wilder, ansocial liberal and born-again fiscal moderate.nThe Coleman defeat came onnthe heels of a last-minute WashingtonnPost poll that predicted a wide marginnof defeat, which so demoralized effortsnto get out the vote that some coalitionnmembers simply gave up. The poll wasnwrong: after a recount, the margin of defeatnwas approximately two votes pernprecinct statewide, an avoidable loss.nJust last year, following a brutal, alsondemoralizing redistricting session, twonVirginia House of Delegates contestsnended in a tie and a near tie. After recounts,nthe declared winners abruptlynwere declared the losers by seven-votenand one-vote margins. Several otherncontests were almost as close, and anrecord number of powerful Virginia Senatenincumbents were unexpectedly ousted.nSome losing challengers complainednthat had they realized how close thenoutcomes would be, they would havengiven that final push to turn out the lastnthirty or fifty votes. (By the way, thenchanges had an impact in the legislature:nfor the first time in Virginia history,nthe General Assembly voted to overridena gubernatorial veto.)nAs in military campaigns with comparablynmatched troops, morale becomesnJULY 1992/9n