4 I CHRONICLESnFrederick the Great of Prussia oncensaid that heads of state should avoidnmeeting one another. With all thenhyperbole surrounding the Reagan/nGorbachev summit, the three-daynmeeting aroused almost hysterical expectations,nsetting up Americans, inevitably,nfor a fall. Previous summit conferencesnshould have taught us at leastnthat much.nIn 1972 President Nixon went tonMoscow to sign the SALT I agreement,nthe ABM Treaty, the “BasicnPrinciples of Relations,” and a host ofnother lesser agreements. The Sovietsnand Americans agreed to refrain “fromnefforts to obtain unilateral advantage atnthe expense of the other, directly ornindirectly.” That may have been thenintent, but in 1972 the U.S. had 1,474nintercontinental missile warheads andnthe Soviets had 1,547; now we haven2,176, while the Soviets have 6,420.nThe Soviets in October of 1973narmed and encouraged the Egyptiansnin their war with Israel, and U.S.ntroops went on a high state of worldwidenalert. This happened after Nixonnand Soviet Secretary Brezhnev exchangednbear hugs in San Clemente innJune of 1973 and signed the “Agreementnon Prevention of Nuclear War.”nAfter Brezhnev and President Fordnmet in Vladivostok in November ofn1974 to talk of SALT II, the NorthnVietnamese, aided by the Soviets,nmade a travesty of the Paris Peacenaccords and went on a rampage innSouth Vietnam in April of 1975.nAfter President Carter and Brezhnevnsigned the SALT II treaty (June ofn1979), the Soviets invaded Afghanistannin December of the same year.nSummit meetings and arms controlnagreements do not, apparently, guaranteenbetter relations. Perhaps they arenmore important for domestic politicalnneeds — winning presidential electionsnor wiping out Politburo rivals. In anyncase, the complex relations betweenntwo large countries should not appearnto depend on whether or not the twonleaders and their wives get along wellnCULTURAL REVOLUTIONSnor badly in talking about complicatednsecurity agreements.nEven if we sign arms control agreements,nwe have to ask ourselves ifnwe are controlling the growth ofnarms. The just-signed INF Agreementnwould reduce the overall nuclear stockpilenby about 4 percent. Nonetheless,nsince the late 1970’s the Soviets havendeployed over 1,000 intercontinentalnballistic missiles, while we have deployedn10.nFurthermore, while the issue of verificationnis spoken about at great length,nthere is little discussion of compliancenwith previous agreements. The Sovietnradar in Krasnoyarsk violated the ABMnTreaty; the Soviet deployment of thenSS-25 ICBM violated SALT II; andnthe Soviet encryption of ballistic missilendata violated SALT II. Why signnmore agreements if the old ones arennot complied with?nBy itself, arms control involves strategic,nintermediate, and tactical nuclearnweapons on rockets, submarines,nand airplanes as well as artillery shells.nIt involves chemical and biologicalnweapons, espionage and communications,ntanks, artillery, and soldiers.nHeads of state cannot weigh snap judgmentsnon the effect of limiting ornreducing one aspect of military force.nThis role could simply be to sign thenfinal documents in their respectivencapitals while letting lower-level diplomatsnand specialists under their supervisionnand authority conduct negotiationsnand reach preliminarynagreements on arms control, trade, andnother issues.nHeads of state need not lose face ifntheir representatives have difficulties innthese areas, and better agreements cannbe negotiated without artificial deadlines.nU.S. and Soviet leaders mightnthen meet at international gatherings,nor perhaps in third countries after treatiesnare signed and ratified in the U.S.nSenate. It seems a peculiarly Americanntrait for our leaders to believe that theyncould change U.S./Soviet relations ifnonly they could show their counter­nnnparts how sincere they were at a summit.nAs long as the Soviets understandnthat the U.S. and its allies are willingnand able to defend their beliefs andninterests, such an understanding isnprobably our best guarantee of peace,nft would seem that we Americans andnour allies need to devote more attentionnto what we value and less tongrasping at signed agreements made inna state of political fever.n—Michael WardernNuclear disarmament has its goodnside. Europeans and Americans havenbeen sheltered by the nuclear umbrellanso long that they have begun to dreamnof a world without war. That sort ofnUtopian rubbish is not only demoralizingnfor the soft, welfare state inhabitantsnof the Western democracies,nbut — even worse — it also compelsnour leaders to engage in public dishonestynwhenever the subject of warncomes up. How long has it been sincenwe had a declared war? How long hasnit been since a U.S. President spokenopenly of the inevitable conflict withnthe USSR? It is all very weh fornMargaret Thatcher to speak of thenpeaceful blessings provided by nuclearnweapons: Britain is not a world power,nand she does not contribute significantlynto maintaining the peace. ThenUnited States, on the other hand, mustnbear the major burden of defendingnthe West. Paradoxically, the nuclearnumbrella may act as a decisive incentivento nuclear war, since the conditionnof our affirmative action armed forcesndoes not permit us to risk a conventionalnconflict with the Soviets.nIt is always a bad sign when greatnnations invest too heavily into defensivenfortification. So long as the Spartansnwere a world power, they refusedneven to build walls for their city. ThenGreat Wall of China and the MaginotnLine are both symptoms of nationsngoing soft. Like the later Byzantines,nwho relied so heavily on siege defensen