HISTORYnDahrendorf andnBurkenby George Watsonn1789 & 1989nJust two centuries on, an echo ofnEdmund Burke and his most celebratednbook has opportunely come outnof Oxford.nIt is by Sir Ralf Dahrendorf, anGerman-born political scientist who isnnow warden of St. Antony’s Collegenthere; and it is called Reflections on thenRevolution in Europe in a Letter Intendednto have been sent to a Gentlemannin Warsaw (1990).nTwo hundred years ago Burke callednhis famous pamphlet Reflections onnthe Revolution in France in a LetternIntended to have been sent to a Gentlemannin Paris, so the echo is knowingnand deliberate. Like Burke, Dahrendorfnis a constitutional liberal, full ofnthe Magna Charta tradition, of JamesnMadison’s Federalist papers, of thencenturies-old tradition of civil societynand the need for the eternal vigilancenthat liberty requires. “Freedom doesnnot just happen,” he writes warninglynto his Polish friend of recent events innEastern Europe, mindful of the dangersnof disenchantment. “It has to bencreated; it has to be defended at everynpoint of the process; the attempt cannfail.” That is blunt talk. Both he andnBurke, what is more, are immigrantsnand Anglophiles rather than English,nsince Burke came from Dublin andnDahrendorf from Hamburg and Berlinnafter a period, in the early 1970’s, as anEuropean Commissioner in Brussels.nSo the conscious echo of Burke is anfitting and timely one, after just twoncenturies; but there the resemblancenends. The French Revolution of 1789nand the East European one of 1989nare in truth not much alike. Burke,nwho hated what the French were at,nwould surely have welcomed what hasnjust happened in Poland, Hungary,nCzechoslovakia, and the Baltic states.nThere are huge differences of scale, innany case, and all of them in favor of then20th century. The French Revolutionnunderstandably looked to the last centurynlike the most epoch-making eventnof modern history, but it was a rathernminor affair compared with what thenworld has just witnessed in the death ofncommunism. It was largely confined tonone continent, for one thing; for another,nit always looked reversible, and atnWaterloo in 1815 it was reversed. Butnas Dahrendorf rightiy insists, there cannbe no return in Europe to the corruptnand arthritic sway of the old Sovietnnomenklatura. He has no truck withnthe easy excuse that the Soviet systemnwas not what Marx or Lenin meant ornthat socialism was misapplied: he callsn1989 the death of socialism. “The oldnpolitics is spent.” There will be nonWatedoo to bring back this anciennregime — the cozy world, as he calls it,nof the dacha, the armored limousine,nand the 99 percent “vote” for the partynleadership. It is Marxism that hasnfailed, not a misunderstanding ofnMarxism. “Communism is gone, nevernto return.” The very parties thatnonce sustained it have splintered andncollapsed. So the 20th century, justnbefore its close, has at long last outiivednits strange obsession with reliving thenbloody fantasies of early Victoriannthinkers about class war and race war.nA dream ended in a nightmare; andnnow the dreamer, frightened by hisnown imagination, has woken up.nThe great issue now, at once speculativenand practical, is whether one cannhave a competitive economic systemnwithout democracy or democracynwithout a competitive economic system.nIs there any connection between thentwo — or rather, is that connection antight and unconditional one? As annex-sociologist as well as an ex-socialist.nnnDahrendorf is by now bracingly skepticalnof immutable historical laws; and inna post-utopian age like this, laws ofnsocial evolution, whether Marxist ornother, are no longer the wear, whethernin or out of academia. But, in theirnplace, there may now be a renewednchance for some close political observationnof historical cases linked, as innBurke himself, less to laws of historynthan to moral principle. The notion ofnan objective morality is now back.n”Why should we not make moral judgments?”nan academic philosopher remarkedndefiantly the other day, impatientnof the easy, fashionable view thatnall morality is personal or communalnand ultimately no more than a matternof social conditioning. Like facts andnstatistics, moral views can be right ornwrong, as anyone who contemplatesnthe age of Hitier and Stalin must surelynknow; and the number of those readynto say so is now growing. Hence thenreturn from laws to principles, fromnMarx to Madison and Samuel Johnson,nfrom theory to commitment.nThat commitment is based not onnscriptures but on instances. Mankindnlearns political lessons from events,nabove all, both corporate and private,nas Central Europeans once learnt fromnNazism and its failure. It listens, watches,nand apprehends; it acquires knowledgenof human affairs as a child learnsnto walk, by falling down and pickingnitself up. •”nSo not all knowledge is propositional,nas the case of the learning infantnillustrates: it knows what it knows aboutnwalking without hearing any accountnof it and without being able to give anynaccount of it. But propositions can stillnprove useful as provisional supports.nAnd one momentous lesson of 1989 isnthat democracy, for the moment, andnthe free market, whether linked ornapart, look far more practical and durablenthan dictatorship and a commandneconomy.nThat is a surprising discovery, andnone never before clear in human affairs.nEven the most dedicated partisansnof democracy or the free marketnhave seldom dared advance it in ourntime; and on a long view, the pioneersnof free institutions have usually beennmore cautious than bold. The firstnConstitution of the United States,nthough elective, was not democratic;nnor, for that matter, were the first fitfulnMAY 1991/55n