tiPls^^PVi^^’S-.- .nr -Jf.nperhaps taken one too man)- trips tonMoscow.nIn a chapter on “Assumptions andnPerceptions,” Bialer writes: “UnHke thenNazis, the Soviets do not want war withntheir adversaries. They do not propagandizenor glorify offensive military actionnas the means by which to achieventheir international goals.” If Afghanistan,nCzechoslovakia, Hungary, andnthose annual November military paradesnthrough Red Square do not evidencena Soviet eagerness for war, theynmake clear, at least, that they wantnpeace on their own terms. But that’s allnHider said he wanted. Elsewhere, Bialerndiscusses recent Soviet militarynadventures—which makes his assertionnabout Soviet reluctance for war all thenmore curious.nEven more dubious is Bialer’s assertionnthat “in Stalin’s day true believersncould and did excuse and accept thencruelty, viciousness, and oppressivenessnof the Soviet construction of socialismnas long as they believed that it representednthe extreme and unique birthnpangs of a better world.” Stalin’snhenchmen were probably not so idealistic.nThe evidence indicates they werenterrified that if they did not torture andnexecute with suiEcient enthusiasm,nthey themselves and their familiesnwould become victims. The theory thatnStalin had to be cruel to modernize andnimprove the Soviet Union was nevernprovable, and 68 years after the Revolution,nthe Soviet Union is still a comparativelynprimitive and backward country.nLike other commentators, Bialer favorablyndescribes Mikhail Gorbachev asn”suave, witty, and vigorous.” Bialernsays nothing about the lapses in Com­nrade Gorbachev’s suavity when asked innpublic about the plight of Jews in thenSoviet Union. Bialer’s favorable assessmentnof Gorbachev similarly fails tonexplain why the Soviet leader so crudelynmishandled the Chernobyl disaster.nAnd Gorbachev still prefers to subjectnpolitical troublemakers to forced psychiatricnimprisonment rather than impalenthem on a witty bon mot.nBialer discusses the American policynof detente, which some analysts date tonMay of 1972 with the signing of Salt Inand the Agreement on Basic Principlesnof Relations. Like most, Bialer believesndetente was dead by 1979 with theninvasion of Afghanistan, and reallyndead with the 1981 imposition of martialnlaw in Poland. But arguably,ndetente died as early as the October Warnof 1973 between Egypt and Israel,nwhen we learned that at the time thenSoviets signed Salt I they were preparingnthe Egyptians for war against Israel.nOr you could date the death of detentenin December of 1974 with the passagenof the Stevenson Amendment on thenExport-Import Bank Bill limiting loansnto the Soviets for the next four years.nThe fall of Vietnam in April of 1975,nthe introduction of Cuban troops innAngola in late 1975, the Soviet airlift tonEthiopia in the fall of 1977, and Vietnam’sninvasion of Cambodia in Decembernof 1978 all belied any meaningfulnsense of detente—though Bialernwould, implausibly, like to see a soberednversion of the policy revived.nBialer believes that “the age of ideologicalncrusades, with their high level ofnemotionalism and self-righteousness, isnover, at least for the great powers.”nSpecialists on the Soviet Union havenbeen saying this for 30 years, and yetneven a cursory look at the latest PartynProgram shows that the Soviets stillnzealously defend their system as legitimatenand attack ours as illegitimate.nBialer himself admits that worseningndomestic circumstances will force partynleaders to employ ideological rhetoric toninspire new economic sacrifices. Meanwhile,nRonald Reagan has again darednto label the “evil empire” and championndistinctively American values in foreignnpolicy.nIn a work that stresses Soviet economicnproblems, Bialer incrediblynclaims that “hunger in the SovietnUnion has been abolished.” That statementnmust warm the heart of the Sovietnhost for Bialer’s many Moscow visits.nFrom available documents, we knownthat rickets, a disease caused by vitaminndeficiency—virtually unknown in thenU.S.—is widespread and was found inntwo out of every five dead infants in thenSoviet Union in the mid-1970’s. ThenSoviet infant mortality rate runs threentimes higher than the American rate.nWhy are all those well-fed babies dying?nBialer blames the Reagan Administrationnfor the “deterioration” in U.S.-nUSSR relations. Reagan’s harsh rhetoricnwas “impossible for the [Soviet]nleaders and elites to swallow, especiallynas they followed so suddenly upon andecade of civility.” The Vietnamese,nEthiopians, Afghans, and Angolansnshare a keen appreciation for the civilitynofthe70’s.nTo improve U.S.-Soviet relations,nBialer proposes more regular communicationnand exchanges at all levels fromnsummits on down to the little peoplen”on the basis of strict reciprocity.” Thisnwill be difficult, since by making nongovernmentalnexchanges equal, all privatengroups from the U.S. would havento be controlled, staffed, and led by thenCIA, a comparatively small and benignnorganization when compared with thenKGB.nThis is an important book in manynrespects, but one can’t help but thinknBialer has been at the Soviet exchangentrough too many times. He must benperpetually applying for the next Sovietnvisa and wondering how his scholarshipnwill play in Moscow.nMichael Warder is director of publicnaffairs for The Rockford Institute.nMOVING?nLET US KNOW BEFORE YOU GO!nTo assure uninterrupted delivery ofnChronicles, please notify us in advance.nSend change of address on this form withnthe mailing label from your latest issue ofnChronicles to: Subscription Department,nChronicles, P.O. Box 800, Mount Morris,nIllinois 61054.nName_nAddress.nCitynnnState_ _Zip_nJULY 1986/39n