tive-born fertility rate, ineluding what would have been itsrnpeaks.rnThe U.S. fertility rate drifted lower through the 1960’s, declinedrnfaster after the first oil-price increase, and reached a newrnlow, 1.7 children per woman, in 1976. Among whites, the fertility’rnrate declined to approximately 1.4 children per woman.rnThese rates are well below the number needed to replace thernpopulation. (A fertility rate of about 2.1 children per womanrnjust replaces its parents, assuming low child mortalit}.)rnThe fertility rate is now rising, hi 1997, it was 2.05, essentiallyrnthe replacement level. However, this statistic combinesrnbirths to native-born Americans with those of the foreign-born.rnAmong the native-born, it appears that the black fertility- raternhas declined to approximately replacement level, and whiternfertility remains at approximately 1.8 children per woman.rnOnly immigrant fertility is high. In 1994, for example, the foreign-rnborn were fewer than 10 percent of the population but accountedrnfor approximately 18 percent of births.rnNewcomers to the United States often do not share the trepidationrnof natives who sense that opportunity for themselvesrnand their children is deteriorating and who, therefore, feelrncompelled to husband resources by limiting family size. Newcomersrnfeel well off because economic opportunity is usuallyrngreater than in the country left behind, the social safet’ net isrnstronger and broader, and educational opportunities for childrenrnare often far superior. Not surprisingly, those comingrnft-om a culture where large family size is highly valued feel freernto raise their ehildbearing target to a number closer to their ideal.rnComparisons suggest that some immigrants—-Mexicans,rnfor example—have larger families in the United States than ifrnthey had remained at home where opportunities are more limited.rnDifferent perceptions of opportunity result in differentrnfertility rates.rnIf native-born Americans are to replace themselves in futurerngenerations, their fertility rate should rise and immigrant fertilit’rnshould fall (converging on replacement level), and immigrationrnitself should be reduced to an annual flow no greaterrnthan the number of emigrants who leave the United States.rnThis discussion of fertility rates exposes issues that invariablyrnraise the emotional pitch during discussions of immigrationrnpolicy. Should immigration serve the national interest?rnIf such interest is judged to be moral, how should it rankrnamong competing interests? Is it moral to give priority to thernnational interest? Should American citizens define the nationalrninterest? Do American citizens have the right to define immigrationrnpolicy in the light of national interest? Is the UnitedrnStates a nation-state in the sense that other politically defined,rngeographically bounded entities are nation-states? Are Americansrnentitied to a countr)’, or is the United States, as Ben Wattenbergrnsays, “the first universal nation”?rnSome advocates for a high level of immigration questionrnwhether American citizens have a legitimate interest in preservingrntheir representation in the population, arguing insteadrnthat global humanitarian goals should control immigrationrnpolicv. This debate would have been familiar in the earU- 20thrncentury, as Kein MacDonald showed in a March 1998 articlernin Population and Environment. Over the vehement oppositionrnof mostly Jewish self-styled humanitarians who assaultedrnimmigration restrictionists with charges of racism. Congressrnpassed the Immigration Act of 1924. This legislation significantK’rnreduced the annual flow of immigrants, established quotasrnthat reflected the European origins of the 1890 population,rnand remained the law of the land until 1965. The act encouragedrnassimilation of the large foreign population then in thernUnited States. Over time, it also reduced prejudice againstrnnon-northern Europeans and created opportunity for blackrnand white Americans from the rural South, who were recruitedrninto well-paying industrial jobs in the North —jobs formerlyrnfilled by immigrants. The small labor force in the decades immediatelyrnafter World War II —limited mosfly to native-bornrnAmericans—laid the foundation for the prosperit}’, higher productivity’,rngrowth of the middle class, and civil-rights achievementsrnwhich were a triumph of the American way of life.rnWhere is the proper moralrnindignation when youngrnAmericans avoid occupations inrnwhich immigrants depress wages,rnor when job seekers find theirrnoptions narrowing?rnThe discouragement of middle-class Americans today stemsrnfrom a combination of factors. Most worrisome to many is therngrowing disparit}’ between high and low earners and the temporaryrnnature of jobs even for those who try to remain employed.rnBetween 1980 and 1996, median income (in 1996 dollars)rnrose less than $2,000, while income to the wealthiestrnone-fifth rose by more than $26,000. In 1980, the richest quintilernhad an income 10.3 times that of the poorest fifth of thernpopulation; by 1996, the multiple had grown to 13.4. This disparityrnis greater than in any other industrialized country, andrngreater than at any time since the Great Depression.rnThe relative decline of middle-class income and the perceivedrnscarcit}’ of non-financial resources —family time, recreationalrntime, and community amenities, including the qualityrnof public schools —contribute to the perception of diminishingrnopportimit)’. This trend not only discourages ehildbearing, itrnundermines the vitality of democracy, which depends upon arnparticipating middle class with a self-conscious stake in conimunih’rnand countr)’.rnPopulation size stabilizes over time if families are smallgivenrnzero net immigration—and this adjustment might be allrnthat is needed to restore opportunit}’ to average Americans.rnOne generation’s low fertility’ gives their (fev’) children the advantagernof reaching maturity’ in an econom}’ that is probably experiencingrna labor shortage. The limited supply of labor leadsrnto a bidding-up of entr)’-level wages. Promotion opportunitiesrnimprove through better-capitalized jobs, as well as through thernshortage of labor.rnStep by step, tracking the improving economic prospectsrnavailable to young people, the fertility rate rises. That is, the fer-rnMAY 1999/15rnrnrn