tility rate adjusts to conditions created by the high (or low)rnchildbearing of the previous generation; thus, both high andrnlow fertility are self-correcting over time.rnRapid population growth in a post-frontier, post-industrialrnsociety is one cause of the many reverses in opportunity, financialrnsecurity, and lifestyle that native-born Americans have experiencedrnin the latter half of this century. The United StatesrnendedWorldWarll with a population of 135 million. In 1950,rnthe population was 150 million; in 1970, about 200 million.rnBy 1995, it had reached 263 million, and the National Academyrnof Sciences estimates that, with a “medium” level of immigration,rnit will be 277 million by the millennium, with nornend to growth in sight.rnSuch population growth has major environmental, fiscal,rnand economic effects. For example, the population addedrnfrom 1970 to 1995, i.e., 63 million persons, accounted for overrn90 percent of the increase in U.S. energy use over the period.rnThe rising demand for energ’ hastens the depletion of domesticrnoil and natural gas supplies (already the United States importsrnover 60 percent of its oil). The enormous dependence onrnfossil fuels may also exacerbate economic dislocations if, orrnwhen, the U.S. economy is shackled by a requirement to cutrncarbon dioxide emissions.rnPopulation growth also accelerates the destruction of habitatrnfor wild species by transforming agricultural and wildernessrnlands to urban and suburban building. In drought-stricken areasrnsuch as Southern California, the growing demand for waterrnby urban users threatens agricultural uses of water. Nationally,rnaquifers (imderground water accumulated over millennia) vitalrnto agriculture are being depleted 25 to 50 percent faster thanrnthe replenishment rate.rnPopulation growth also results in crowding roads, schools,rnand recreational areas, and it is exceeding the capacities of water-rntreatment and waste-disposal facilities. The ensuing demandsrnfor new infrastructure—including roads, schools, fire,rnpolice, water and sewage treatment, electricity-generating andrnhospital capacity, and library and recreational facilities—resultrnin higher local taxes. Although community-developmentrnboosters often claim that new growth pays for itself populationrngrowth actually imposes net per capita tax burdens on establishedrnresidents. Newcomers’ taxes cover only a fraction of therncosts of infrastructure constructed on their behalf Whetherrnthrough bond issues or current taxes, established residents bearrnmost of the costs of development that would not have beenrnneeded or even contemplated if community size remainedrnconstant.rnCertain facts are indisputable. First, population growthrnforces established residents to pav for growth, although it is notrnobvious that they receive any benefits or increments to theirrnquality of life. On the contrar)-, some indicators show diminishedrnquality: The ethos of a small, close-knit community, goodrnpublic education, and open space is almost inevitably sacrificedrnto growth. And, although it is “common knowledge” thatrnmore people mean a larger market, the tax nibble on disposablernincome may reduce discretionary spending. The largerrnshare o{ per capita earnings that goes to pay taxes, as well as thernearnings-depressing effect of a rapidly growing labor market,rnmay offset the increased market: Poor people do not buy.rnIn a nutshell, population growth is the result of more birthsrnthan deaths, and more iminigrants than emigrants. The immigrationrnimpact is annual immigration, plus births to the foreign-rnborn, minus deaths and emigration of immigrants. Thernnative-born account is births minus deaths, and emigration ofrnthis sector.rnThe annual share of U.S. population growth attributable tornimmigration rises continuously as births to recent (post-1969)rnimmigrants are added to the flow of new arrivals. In 1994, immigrationrnand the children of recent immigrants accounted forrnover 60 percent of U.S. population growth. Mexico and therncombined flow from the republics of the former Soviet Unionrn(coming mostly as “refugees”) are the two largest sources of legalrnimmigrants.rnThe annual flow and first-generation births do not fully representrnimmigration’s long-rim impact on national populationrnsize. The cumulative difference can be seen from the 1997rnprojection of the National Academy of Sciences for the yearrn2050. With zero immigration (beginning, hypothetically, inrn1995) the population would peak a few years before mid-centuryrnand then decline to 307 million (which is just about 27rnmillion more than today); with “ver’ high” immigration, thernmid-century population would be 463 million, with no end torngrowth in sight.rnNote that these are only projections, not predictions. Otherrndemographers estimate that, if current trends continue, thernpopulation of the United States in 2050 may be well in excessrnof one-half billion. There is widespread agreement, however,rnthat population growth in the 21st centup,’ would be almost entirelyrn(over 90 percent) due to immigration, if present trendsrncontinue.rnSince the cause of low fertilitv’ (below replacement level)rnamong American women is understood, the changesrnneeded to raise fertility are also clear. Optimism must return tornthe middle class. The fundamental conditions are satisfactoryrncompensation from work (real, personal, after-tax income) andrnpride in country and culture.rnThe discouragement which oppresses many young Americansrnis mediated through jobs, environment, community, andrnfamily, but underlying many negative signs is a single cause:rnrapid population growth and lack of confidence in America’srnright to reduce immigration. Where is the proper moral indignationrnwhen young Americans avoid occupations in which immigrantsrnwho will work for less depress wages, or when jobrnseekers find their options narrowing?rnMany of the Americans affected are the young, who have traditionallyrnused technical specialties to get ahead. They delayrnmarriage and childbearing until thev feel established professionally.rnIn today’s employment climate, that confidence isrnlikely to be some time coming.rnUnlike trade, which can be stopped at any time, immigrationrnleaves footprints. Newcomers stay, reproduce, and changernboth culture and community. Rapid population growth destabilizesrnAmerican communities and deprives young Americansrnof educational and employment opportunities even as theyrnseek to become productive members of socieh’. The economicrngrowth of the past decade should have brought prosperit)-rnand hope to all Americans. Instead, it has principally benefitedrnthe few.rnMiddle-class America would gratefully return to its traditionalrnfamily way. But this is not likely to happen until conditionsrnof work, opportimity, and national pride encourage thernyoung to believe that America cares and that the future will berngood, again.rn16/CHRONICLESrnrnrn