and Roosevelt, however, is a more-thanordinarilynq’nical book. It portrays neithernthe President nor his instrumentnas having been men of any particularnhonor, principle or even pretense. Theynmet to take advantage of each othernand they both succeeded. In the coursenof their long collaboration they servednto both epitomize and symbolize thendegradation of the democratic dogma innthe United States. Mr. Beschloss, beingnyoung and somewhat humorless, hasndone almost too well in his attempt tonprove that fame is the greatest reward,nthat power is worth any price, and thatnin his pursuit of these goals FranklinnRoosevelt was far more clever andnsubtle, perceptive and daring than JosephnP. Kennedy. Yet in this narrativenof the patrician and the parvenu thenremarkable typicalness of both men isnworth a more serious look. Kennedynopened Wall Street’s coffers to Rooseveltnin his first campaign; he helped tonline up Irish-Catholic big-city bossesnin subsequent efforts. Roosevelt madenKennedy head of the first SEC (“Set anthief to catch a thief,” he said, whilenhis sycophants slapped their knees), andnlater made Kennedy Ambassador tonGreat Britain.nThe two men were especially closenduring the years between 1932 andn1936. Roosevelt often visited Kennedy’snrented estate in Virginia, or had thenKennedy family as guests of the WhitenHouse. Kennedy responded like lago:nhe sounded boldly but cringed when thenwhistle blew. Roosevelt never seems tonhave liked Kennedy—but then Eleanorn(who detested the Bostonian) said shencould never grow accustomed to hernhusband’s “lack of real attachment tonpeople.” Other persons could not competenwith Roosevelt’s self-infatuation;nhe lived as if before a mirror. The essencenof the Roosevelt-Kennedy relationship,naccording to Beschloss, wasnthat Roosevelt was socially secure allnhis life, while Kennedy was socially insecure.nThere seems to be a great dealnof truth to this assessment: Rooseveltnwas an aristocrat in his own eyes,nthough that assumption is always slightlynridiculous in a republic. When Rooseveltnattended a London dinner withnWinston Churchill in 1918, he wasnstunned to be subjected to his own sortnof condescension from a son of thenDuke of Marlborough: he never reallynforgave Churdhill for the lesson. Thenfact was that Roosevelt was a snob whonliked to lord it over all whom he couldnimpress. And Kennedy was a self-con-nwithout exception, failed to be hoodwinkednby the dictator. Nevertheless,nJoe Kennedy retained his illusions longernthan most. He thought Munich wasna triumph (as did most Americans, Britons,nFrenchmen, Italians and Germansnat the time). But as the true nature ofnEurope’s peril loomed beyond argument,nthe lifelong selfishness of Kennedy’snnature became increasingly evident.nMoney was paramount to Kennedy; hisn•’.. . iliis wi-ll-rcsfaichi’il work nvi’nls ilicainiplcx moiivcsaml valw.sai work aiiinni;nnitii I’xiTiisinj; power ai llic liinhisl ICM-I.”n-Publishers Weeklynscious Irish-Catholic at a time whennthey were held in contempt by the established,nself-secure Protestant rulingnclass. That the Roosevelt-Kennedy contestnwas uneven from the start was duenas much to their complementary weaknessesnas to any other factor.nKennedy swallowed his resentmentnand his pride on innumerable occasionsnin order to curry favor and to achievenoutward honor and prestige. This behaviornwas the norm in the Rooseveltncourt: subservience marked all thenRoosevelt courtiers, whose descendantsnmust wince as they read the historicalnrecord. The differences between Rooseveltnand Kennedy did not become importantnto the world until the rise ofnHitler in 1937 and Kennedy’s appointmentnas Ambassador to Britain. In thisnpost he was, at first, a great success, fornhis ideas coincided with those of NevillenChamberlain and the ConservativenParty. That party, as history well knows,nwas led by Chamberlain into a policynof sacrificing Czechoslovakia to Hitler.nBut the path toward Munich, as TelfordnTaylor makes clear, was not paved bynBritish Conservatives alone. The BritishnLabour Party and its left-leaning liberalsnwere ardent pacifists up to the edgenof the Second World War, and they werenadamantly against Britain’s arming atna time when it would have been sensiblento do so. There is, in other words,nenough blame to go around regardingnthe rise of Hitler. Not a single group.nnnfamily came next. Then—a long dropndown—came the rest of the world.nNowhere does Beschloss record thatnKennedy ever expressed the slightestnpity for any of Hitler’s victims: neithernthe Jews nor the British, French, Czechsnor Poles. Nor—ultimately—Americans,nRussians or Eastern Europeans. Kennedynargued that American trade would bendisrupted by a war. He argued thatnBritain would not repay its loans. Henargued that Europe’s wars were none ofnAmerica’s business—and an isolationistnand culturally backward nation largelynagreed with him.nMr. Roosevelt thought otherwise—nand there lies his only enduring claimnto greatness. He was well-informed regardingnhis ambassador’s isolationistnarguments around London and tonvarious newspapermen back home:nRoosevelt believed in wiretaps, surveillancenand mail drops. But as the divisionnbetween the two men grew wider, FDRnchose to keep Kennedy in London rathernthan to bring him home to lead an Irish-nCatholic disaffection. On the eve of hisnthird term he ordered Kennedy to comenstraight from the airport to the WhitenHouse and there put on a grand show.nWith Rose Kennedy pleading his case,nFDR held a family hour for the clan.nA private family dinner and warm promisesnturned the ambassador around.nKennedy went on the radio to promotenRoosevelt for a third term, in responsento Roosevelt’s promises of future politi-n17nJanuary/Fcbrttary 1981n