VITAL SIGNSrnFOREIGN AFFAIRSrnGeneral LewisrnMacKenzie on thernBalkans Warrnby Kenneth McDonaldrnEdward Gibbon wrote, “As long asrnthe same passions and interests subsistrnamong mankind, the questions ofrnwar and peace, of justice and pohcy,rnwhich were debated in the councils ofrnantiquity, will frequently present themselvesrnas the subject of modern deliberation.”rnTo a career soldier there is somethingrnincongruous in the business of “peacekeeping.”rnOffensive action is a principlernof war, and the need to submerge that instinctrnin a bland neutrality calls for morernthan ordinary self-control. That Canadarnhas come to play a leading role in thisrnnovel activity derives from the initiativernof Lester Pearson when he was Secretaryrnof State for External Affairs at the timernof the Suez crisis in 1956. When he suggestedrnusing lightly armed forces to keeprnbelligerents apart, the concept of UnitedrnNations peacekeeping was born. Sincernthen, Canada has participated in everyrnU.N. peacekeeping mission as well asrnsupporting non-U.N. missions such asrnthe multinational observer force in thernSinai Desert, two missions in hidochinarnand Vietnam, and the European Community’srnmilitary monitor expedition inrnthe former Yugoslavia.rnIt was there, after the United Nationsrnassumed a protection role in 1992,rnthat Canada’s Major General LewisrnMacKenzie was sent as UNPROFOR’srnchief of staff. Now retired (at his request)rnand running his own communicationsrncompany in a suburb of Toronto,rnLew MacKenzie exhibits all the characteristicsrnof the professional infantry soldier:rnliterate, practical, inventive, courageous,rnand, fortunately for all who wantrnto see the U.N. improve its operations.rnboth outspoken and articulate. Lastrnyear, HarperCollins (Canada) issued arnpaperback edition of his 1993 book.rnPeacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo, whichrnone reviewer rightly called “a first-raternprimer for anyone trying to make sensernof the continuing barbarity in the formerrnYugoslavia. . . . MacKenzie has a storytellingrnknack that eats up the pages.”rnMacKenzie’s book is a faithful guide tornwhat happened, but its core value consistsrnin the conclusions he draws, especiallyrnas they relate to American policyrnand attitudes toward the United Nations.rnWhen I spoke to him last September,rnhe was busy moving (“Our thirty-firstrnmove” will strike a chord with servingrnand ex-service readers), but he took timernto enlarge upon the views he had expressedrnnot long before to the UnitedrnStates Congress. There, he remarkedrnthat “dealing with Bosnia was like dealingrnwith three serial killers—one hadrnkilled fifteen, one had killed ten and onernhad killed five.” This was at the timernwhen NATO air strikes were in progress.rnhi his view, the strikes and the UnitedrnStates-brokered plan for Bosnia “offerrnonly one thing: the demise of Bosnia-rnHerzegovina as a nation and the emergencernof two entities dominated by Serbiarnand Croatia.”rnMacKenzie’s advice to the UnitedrnStates—that it refrain from committingrnground forces to U.N, “peacekeeping”rnmissions—has a solid historical base. Inrn19?6, when the rise of Hitler threatenedrnthe peace again, Winston Churchill reflectedrnon the United States’ entry intornthe Great War on April 6, 1917—whatrnMajor General J.F.C. Fuller called “thernmost fateful day in European historyrnsince Varus lost his legions.” Churchillrntold William Griffen, editor of the NewrnYork Enquirer: “If you hadn’t entered thernwar the Allies would have made peacernwith Germany in the Spring of 1917.rnHad we made peace then there wouldrnhave been no collapse in Russia followedrnby Communism, no breakdown in Italyrnfollowed by Fascism, and Germanyrnwould not have signed the VersaillesrnTreaty, which has enthroned Nazism inrnGermany . . . and if England had madernpeace early in 1917, it would have savedrnover one million British, French, Americanrnand other lives.”rnHistory repeats itself, but rarely in thernsame way. In the late 1990’s, wars are asrnprevalent as ever, but they are local andrnfactional, and the force that stops themrnfrom spreading is not the United Nations,rnnor any perceivable lessening ofrnmankind’s imperfections: it is the fact ofrnthe United States’ preponderant militaryrnpower, of the various factions’ understandingrnthat it can be deployed anywherernin the world with remarkablernspeed and efficiency, and their consequentrndesire to avoid at all costs the riskrnof its being deployed against them ratherrnthan their opponents.rnThis, MacKenzie points out, is the keyrnboth to United States policy and to a successfulrnbolstering of the U.N.’s capacityrnto temper the excesses of mankind’s interestsrnand passions. He said, “I tried tornexplain this in the last chapter of myrnbook, which is why I called the chapterrn’Message to America'”:rnPeacekeeping is no place for U.S.rnfront-line soldiers. If America isrnfoolhardy enough to put troops onrnthe ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina,rnthey will be used as bargainingrnchips. There’s no point in warlordsrnkilling Canadians or Swedes. Itrndoesn’t make the headlines andrnthere’s really nothing Canada orrnSweden can do about it. But ifrnCroats killed U.S. soldiers, andrnmade it look as if the Serbs did it,rnor if Serbs killed some and made itrnlook as if the Muslims did it—thenrnthey’d get the world’s attention.rnIn other words, most of us whornserve on peacekeeping missionsrncome from countries that cannotrnproject military power at a strategicrnlevel. But of course the Americansrncan do that and the belligerentsrnknow it. So they will try everythingrnthey can to get the U.S. tornintervene on their side.rnThat’s why it would be wrong—rnand certainly unfair to Americanrnsoldiers—for the U.S. to get itselfrninvolved in U.N. Chapter 6 peacekeepingrnmissions; they would facerna much higher degree of risk thanrnthe rest of us simply because theyrnwould be pawns in the belligerents’rngames.rn42/CHRONlCLESrnrnrn