formed a striking contrast with the situationnthirty years before,” as thoughnthe 1950’s were one of the sterlingnperiods of Western -history. In fact,neven then some perceptive persons foresawnsome of the disasters that havenrecently come to pass. Although Handlinnrecognizes that the consensus behindnthese policies was mu^h morenfragile than it seemed, he still regardsnthe Truman policies as successful, a •nsort of maximum beyond which thenWest could not go. In this view, thenpolicy of containment worked; only ourndeparture from it was fatal. The dencline in American power and the currentnthreat to the West are perceivednas phenomena of the last two decades.nThis belief, however, cannot withstandnexamination. No doubt American policynin the 40’s and 50’s was far more sensiblenthan it was later, but the senseless managementnof the Indochina War and thendelusions that finally culminated in thengrand illusion of detente had their rootsnin mistakes made during the 50’s. Nornwas the Cold War going swimmingly fornthe West before the 1960’s. We did notnsuddenly start losing under Carter, ornNixon, or Johnson, or Kennedy (a mannwhose fine reputation is due solely to hisndying before the chickens came to roost).nIn fact, there has never been a truen”turning point” in the Cold War, bencause the West has never done anythingnbut lose.nThis argument may seem undulynharsh or pessimistic at first, but wenshould consider one striking fact: notnone country which has fallen to totalitariannrule since World War II has beennfreed. In two instances parts of countries—Irannand Austria—have been disgorgednby the Soviets. A number ofncommunist countries have broken awaynfrom the Soviets—most notably China.nIn no instance, however, has the totalitarianntide actually been turned back—nthe area under totalitarian rule has alwaysnincreased, never decreased. Thenloss or gain of territory is not always thenbest indicator of the way a conflict isngoing, but in the end it is usually a con­nclusive one. It is true that the picturenhas not been all bad. The West has wonnsome defensive victories and, duringnthe two decades after World War II,nthe Western world, Japan and some ofnthe more fortunate “backward” countriesnattained unprecedented degreesnof freedom and prosperity. Aside fromnthat one item of hope, the situation hasnsteadily worsened. In its power positionnvis-a-vis the Soviets the West’s strengthnpeaked after World War II and declinednslowly thereafter. The principal changenfrom the 1945-1965 period is that thendecline since therthas accelerated. Trumannand Eisenhower towered over theirnsuccessors, and their policies were, relatively,nfar more effective. At least itncan be said that they had policies. Butnit was only because their policies werenultimately ineffective that the West nownfaces such unprecedented dangers. Recognizingnthis may not be of much iriimendiate help, but it is essential if we arento understand how we landed in thenmess we are in.nJrlandlin’s analysis of our domesticndilemmas is more interesting, but notnwell focused. Moreover, he treats manynof these issues in a too narrowly Americanncontext, although they reflect problemsncommon to most democraticnWestern countries. We are given a justlynscathing treatment, but no real explanation,nof the follies of the last two decades.nHandlin slices through the obfuscationnand nonsense surrounding the IndochinanWar in a particularly engaging and concisenmanner, demonstrating that the notionnthat the American people and Congressnwere “duped” into supporting thenwar is sheer fakery. He also recountsnthe snake-oil phraseology dispensed innthe mid-60’s by the “moderate” criticsnof the war—“negotiated settlement,”n”political solution,” etc. He points outnthe strikingly similar characters of thenthree politicians who have most attractednliberals in our era: Eugene Mc­nCarthy, George McGovern and JohnnAndersori—men with no executive experience,nno responsibility for majornnnlegislation, no political savvy.nToo often, however, Handlin merelynrepeats conventional, albeit praiseworthy,nsentiments and ideas. He notesnthat the positive features of Americannlife are not treated in “the dominantnforms of cultural expression” but offersnno explanation of why this situationncame about. Occasionally his ideas arenneither original nor convincing. Discussingnthe “shift in tone” of Americannlife, he complains of the change fromn”freedom to permissiveness,” remarkingnthat the “abandonment of old restraintsnhas too often meant the abandonment ofnall restraints.” He briefly suggests thatnthis may be the result of our mobility andnrootlessness. Yet Handlin is undoubtedlynaware that Americans have always beennexceptionally “rootless” and mobile.nComments by Ronald Reagsn, Edwin J.nFeulner, William F. Buckley. Jr., JacquesnBarzun. Milton Friedman. Russell Kirk.nWiilard C. Butcher. Philip M. Crane. TomnWolfe and more…n… in ttie Roclcford institute’s 1981nannual report of progress.nSend us your name and address andnwe’ll send you a complimentary copynof our fiftti anniversary report.nSEND ME A COMPLIMENTARY COPY OFnTHE ROCKFORD INSTITUTE’Sn1981 ANNUAL REPORT OF PROGRESSnMail tills coupon to:nTiie Rocl