enforcing the command economy.nGorbachev received the Nobel Prize for events in EasternnEurope, which were real, but unintended from Gorbachev’snstandpoint. His strategy was to replace shaky Communistsnwith younger ones like himself whom he assumed would benmore popular and more capable of saving socialism. Unfortunatelynfor him, the KGB did not tell him just hownvulnerable the entire communist system was. Thus EasternnEurope became free despite Gorbachev, not because ofnhim.nEastern Europe is not, of course, entirely free fromnsocialism (neither is the West), and the reforms may notnproduce anything but social democracies. But they are freenfrom Soviet domination and that is cause for celebration.nRumors about Soviet influence in reformist movements innPoland or elsewhere should be taken with a grain of salt.nEven if such influence were present, I doubt that it couldnamount to much in a practical sense. Eastern Europe hasnleft the Soviet orbit.nSome conservatives in this country too often assume thatnthe Soviet state, despite its domestic failures, has more abilitynto exert international influence than it really has. Economicnlaw has imposed restrictions on the Soviets’ attempt tonsubstitute chaotic central planning for the rationality of thenmarket. The attempt can only lead to impoverishment, andnthe Soviets off^er the best example I know. Socialism notnonly destroys capacity for producing consumer goods; it alsondoes the same for military goods and empire generally.nFew dispute that Soviet ideology originally included andesire for world empire. Most tyrannical governments desirenempire. But having that as a goal, and having the means toncarry it out, are two different things. Socialism, because itneliminates market prices, has the critical flaw of beingnincapable of putting sausage on the table; it certainly cannotnbe the basis of world domination. Moreover, the inherentnlimitations to global empire are not restricted to socialistnregimes; they limit all regimes. The wodd order is far tooncomplex for one nation to successfully control it, as GeorgenKennan has pointed out. One government can bribe otherngovernments and even bomb them, but it cannot foreverndetermine others’ domestic activities and their relations withnother countries.nToday, the Soviets have turned their attention awaynfrom foreign affairs, not because they want to, butnbecause they have to for the sake of their own survival. Thisnfact doesn’t make the regime or communism any lessncondemnable. But it should mitigate the desire of the Westnto try to counter dying or even nonexistent internationalnSoviet influence. It was not Reagan’s military buildup, butnthe failures of socialism, that led to Gorbachev’s humility innforeign affairs. The need for a bail out will often do that.nThe proper American response to Soviet foreign policynshould be to encourage the breakup of the Soviet Unionnitself, which neither Gorbachev nor Bush want. We certainlynshould not be sending money and food to the GommunistnParty and its KGB allies, as George Bush has done.nThe leaders of most Soviet republics have proven themselvesnquite responsible and capable of carrying on peacefulnrelations. A breakup of the Soviet Union would also increasenthe chances for demilitarization. By refusing the republics’ndemands for independence, Gorbachev is actually increasingnthe chances of civil war. He is also threatening worldnpeace.nWhat does the future hold? Just about anything cannhappen. If Gorbachev consolidates the Stalinist system, thatnsystem can only survive with an external threat, real ornimaginary, and that threat could be the United States.nAlready, for example, Pravda has accused Yeltsin of being anGIA agent. But another U.S. military buildup would onlynprovide an excuse for the most reactionary elements of thenparty and the military to take over.nIt is true that the Soviets still hold 11,000 nuclearnwarheads (some say 16,000, or maybe even 30,000), which,nthey say, means they could destroy us in ten minutes. Ifnthat’s so, I don’t know what the United States can do aboutnit. Moreover, there are plenty of questions about thenreliability of Soviet military strength. Soviet-made weaponsncertainly did not put on an impressive display in the Gulfnwar, and the technological rot probably runs deeper. Duringn1981, the Soviets test-fired 86 ICBMs. Only 13 hit thentarget; 27 blew up in the silos. Even the Soviets admittednthat it was a disaster. In the event of a nuclear exchange, thenresidents of Moscow may have more to fear from their ownnweaponry than from that of the United States.nMost importantly, the United States should not use thenopportunity of Soviet weakness as an excuse to attempt tonrun its own world empire. The attempt will bankruptnAmerica and cause the growth of Soviet-style governmentnhere. <§>nGREAT TOPICS, GREAT ISSUESnCaught in the Cash Nexus — April 1991 — IrvingnHorowitz and Mary Curtis on “bottom-line” thinking andnnational productivity, Josh Ozersky on the seduction ofncable’s Nick at Nite, and Thomas Molnar on why Europeannunification will never occur. Plus Samuel Francisnon the European New Right, George Carey on the presentnhealth of the Constitution, and Frank Bryan on the casenfor Vermont’s secession.nConservative Movement: R.I.P.? — May 1991 — Sixnviews on conservatism by Wick Allison, Charley Reese,nClyde Wilson, Murray N. Rothbard, Howard Phillips,nand Donald Devine. Plus Samuel Francis on the failurenof American conservatism, Florence King on misanthropy,nChilton Williamson on the history of isolationism, andnPeter Stanlis’ vindication of Edmund Burke.nBACK ISSUE ORDER FORMnEach issue $5.00 (postage & handling included)nTITLE DATE Qty.nCaught in the Cash Nexus April 1991nConservative Movement:nR.I.P.? May 1991nCostnName.nTotal Enclosed $nAddressnCity_nStatenZip.nMail with check to: Chronicles • 934 N. Main Street • Rockford, IL 61103nnnJUNE 1991/23n