face, and it isn’t necessary to share hisnvalues to appreciate his analysis.)nBut another threat to continuityncomes from the current prevalence of theneconomic mode of thought, whichnSimon so ably exemplifies. Once somethingnis considered subject to costbenefitnanalysis, its very existence is tacitlynnegotiable, and it is simply a fact thatnwhere the market prevails continuity isnrare, and almost accidental when found.nAt best, continuity gets treated as anpublic good, like defense or parks, and ansociety can decide how much it is willingnto pay for it (conservatives are those whonare willing to “pay” more). KarlPolanyi,na thinker the left should not be allowednto appropriate, was outraged by that sortnof calculus; he insisted that some thingsnshould be outside the market altogethern—literally, beyond price. It is a measurenof how things have changed since hisntime that so few of us can enter wholeheartedlyninto his protest, for all that wenmay admire and share the impulse behindnit. Despite the appeal of the simple,nstatic, preindtwtrial society described bynPolanyi, Engels, and the authors of/’//nTake My Stand, among others, we don’tnlive in that world—perhaps no one everndid. Doubtless, calculation of cost andnreturn has had a corrosive effect on manyninstitutions (think only of the family),nand fewer things strike us as absolutengoods “beyond price.” But many empiricalncases have demonstrated thatnsimply ignoring market forces is a recipenfor disaster, and, as the neoconservativesnhave repeatedly shown, this sort of calculationnis a two-edged sword. It is refreshingnto see that it can be used against thenwishful thinking of those who believe wencan direct change however we please, asnwell as those of us who prefer that nothingnmuch change at all. Simon’s adversariesninclude both sorts of wishful thinkersn, and his book is a serious and thoughtprovokingn(if not entirely cheering) contributionnto debate on an importantntopic.nIn most policy matters there is somensober, boring, meliorative middlenground between price-is-no-object utopianismn(whether of the left- or rightwingnvariety), on the one hand, andnmindlessly going with the flow—or thenjerk—of the market on the other. In thencase of many raw materials, price increasesndemonstrably expand supply innthe long run, and increasing the price ofnany commodity will reduce wastefiil consumption.nBut large and abrupt price increasesncan play havoc with an individualnof it. On the way to that conclusion,nAuletta presents a motley collection ofnpoor folks—urban (mostly black andnHispanic), Appalachian white, and ruralnblack; welfare mothers, ex-convicts, pastnand present drug addicts—caught up innvarious programs intended to help themnreenter the “mainsueam.” To his credit,nAuletta doesn’t oversimplify. Some ofnthese people are hopeless, in this world atnleast, and a few caused me to regret then”But there is more to this message than meets the eye. It contains the hidden assumptionnthat one can exhort the American people to solve their problems only if they arenkept in the dark about being victims of a deeply flawed and mismanaged social system.nThe tmth is that it is absolutely essential for all Americans of whatever class to be informednabout the systematic origins of poverty if any of us are ever really going to helpnourselves.”n—Psychology Todaynhousehold’s financial planning, especiallynif the household is only marginallynsolvent. In the long run, increased oilnprices may or may not prove a blessing,nbut only the willfully obtuse could denynthat many poor families have sufferednbecause of them. Just so, in dealing withnpoverty, there must be a middle groundnbetween virtually ignoring it and attackingnit wholesale in grandiose and illconsideredn”wars.” In The Underclass,nKen Auletta’s major contribution—nmaybe his only one—is to seek that middlengrotind. The standard Great Societynquestion—still echoed from time to timenby Democratic Presidential aspirants—nbegins with the phrase, “If we can put anman on the moon …” If that, why notngive everyone: a good job, free legal services,nquality medical care, public transportation,ndecent housing, lifelongneducation, and the rest? Auletta doesn’tnanswer this question so much as assumenit is silly.nIn the concluding chapters of ThenUnderclass, Auletta rejects both thenwholesale approach and the laissez-fairenposition (or a caricature of one) thatnwrites off the poor as hopeless and putsnits faith in bigger and better prisons. Henurges a “retail” solution: small scale,nlimited in its aspirations, tentative, experimental,nand directed to those whonboth need help and will make good usennnclosing of workhouses. Others, however,nhave enough grit and determination tonwarm Horatio Alger’s heart, and onlynthe most doctrinaire objectivist wouldnbegmdge them a hand up from the appallingncircumstances in which they findnthemselves—circumstances made appalhng,nin large part, by the depredationsnof the hopeless ones. Identifyingnthe—excuse the expression—deservingnpoor, preferably early, would save a lotnof money and wasted effort. Put anothernway, Auletta’s way, antipovertynefforts need more precise “targeting.” Ansocial safety net shouldn’t become anhammock.nX he Underclass is probably on thenside of reason, common sense, and thenangels. But that doesn’t make it a goodnbook. Auletta’s attempt to paint a comprehensivenpicture (if that’s what he isntrying to do) ends up just rambling andnpoorly organized. Even what I take to benits major point—that there is, despitenthe book’s title, no single “underclass”n—is hardly new: anyone who has readnBooth or Mayhew on the poor of VictoriannLondon knows that. Moreover,nAuletta doesn’t address the most interestingnpolitical question about his ornanyone else’s “middle ground” solution:nnamely, whether a democratic societyncan find that middle ground and hold it.ni25nMarch 1983n