the Constitution. His work was herculean,nbrilliant, and irrefutable.nRouted in the arena of serious debate,nchampions of judicial activism fellnback upon a tactic that is characteristicnof the modern left, namely a resort tonobscurantism. Specifically, they developednthe audacious and grotesque doctrinenof “non-interpretivism,” whichnpostulates that the intentions of thenframers of either the Constitution ornthe Fourteenth Amendment are unknowable,nthat although the languagenof constitutions remains the same thenmeaning of the words changes overntime, and therefore that judges arenlicensed to fashion constitutional lawnwithout finding justification withinn”the four corners of the Constitution.”nThe Supreme Court was therebyntransformed from a supposed interpreternand defender of the writtennConstitution into an oracle of its spirit.nNon-interpretivism swept the lawnschools and law reviews; by the earlyn1980’s, as Robert Bork pointed out,nonly a handful of constitutional lawnprofessors at major institutions still defendedninterpretivism, and RonaldnReagan appointed most of them to thenfederal bench.nNon-interpretivism was a tenuousnposition to be holding, however. It wasnsafe only so long as it was confined tonbench and bar and academy, which isnto say, as long as the American publicncould be deceived into believing that itnwas still the Constitution that the SupremenCourt was expounding. Friendsnof constitutional government repeatedlynexposed the deception, and theynreached a steadily widening audience.nThe issue surfaced noisily in 1986 withnthe publicized exchange between AttorneynGeneral Edwin Meese and JusticenBrennan. It was fear that the Courtnmight return to constitutionalism thatnunderlay the savaging of Judge Bork inn1987 by the civil rights establishment,nradical feminists, and civil libertariannideologues.nAmidst that dramatically escalatingnconfrontation, an ardent activist namednMichael Curtis reversed the field bynpublishing a book purporting to proventhat the framers of the FourteenthnAmendment had, after all, intended tonincorporate the Bill of Rights, and thatntheir intention must be binding. Thatnbrings us back to where we began, withnRaoul Berger’s latest book. Curtis’snargument is turgid, garbled,nconvoluted, and self-contradictory.nAnd yet Berger could not let it gonunanswered, lest it be seized as annexcuse for continued judicial usurpations.nAccordingly, the maestro wasnmoved once more to take up his pen.nThere is not much to say about thenbook itself. It is utterly devastating. Innany other context it would be regardednas overkill, roughly comparable tonshooting rabbits with a cannon. Specialistsnmay find it repetitive and even anP^rjf rp,n^•j *AM -r^J —*ii»w» iwj^ •wnKi.lnwwII—r “^MWH**^nbit tedious, though they cannot butnmarvel at Berger’s mastery of the subject.nThe less initiated will find it angood quick coverage of the controversy,nsince it is a fairly small book and isnquite readable despite the complexitiesninvolved. Most importantly, advocatesnof judicial activism — whether of thenincorporationist variety, the noninterpretivist,nor some other—will havento devise an alternative rationale or givenup the chase. Berger has defeated themnat every turn. <^nirtliits toook Jagqueg, By, one ofnthe nioBt powerfutChnSbgn-voices irtfteiWentjeth century,nC3lffirs a Isroadoverviewof bi? bel-^fe Goncemingntiamamty,.historyjMdttie Chn^tan fenih. Ajl rfeadereofnQyf — cafces 3s welt as devotees—witf wefcorne thisnsuccinct but chatactMstioaily f)ovrarfut statefaemt of^nv^ratthis-sth^r Wnkerl^elieves, C|ott1, $1955^n.^i^ WM.J^fiB»I»5CAMiS I’UKWSH1NG<20.nAt^Urtwqlutor^, ortali iOft’iaS^iiinJFAXfilf 4SJ»**540n’ lis m^it^io^livE’S^ i (fiWp4!uiViDS,w^iCfi>fj^iai,nnnOCTOBER 1989/31n