Population Question, placed them atnthe center of policy debate. Concernednthat previous sociology had beennmarred by unspoken commitments tonexisting social structures, they advocatednan approach to social policy basednon the premise that “All institutionalnfactors . . . can be changed.” A centralncontention of their book was thatnSwedes were having fewer childrennbecause of inadequate urban housing.nStudies showing that many small familiesnwith ample finances actually chosento live in substandard housing convincednthe Myrdals not that housingnwas not the problem but that parentsncould not be trusted with cash benefits;nstate assistance would have to be “innkind.” Claiming the “modern miniaturenfamily is … an abnormal situationnfor a child,” the Myrdals pushednfor “collective houses,” apartmentnhouses with a single nursery and singlenkitchen for the entire building.nThe ideas in Crisis in the PopulationnQuestion began to be convertedninto public policy after Gunnar Myrdalnwas appointed to Sweden’s PopulationnCommission in 1935, for the policynrecommendations of the Commissionnwere taken seriously Ly Sweden’s Riksdag.nAs its most active member,nMyrdal” oversaw the Commission’s numerousnreports on subjects such asnmarriage loans, working women, maternitynbenefits, taxes, sex education,nand birth control. The Commissionnrecommended marriage loans to encouragenearlier and presumably morenfruitful unions. It also recommendednsex-education classes, including informationnabout birth control as a naturalnand normal part of marriage, beginningnin the third grade. AlthoughnSweden’s problem was population decline,nthe Commission recommendednthe repeal of (admittedly ineffective)nlaws against birth control; the Myrdalnargument maintained that a system ofnstrictiy voluntary parenthood (madenpossible by birth control) plus economicnsupport from the state would increasenthe birthrate.nAt the same time, Alva Myrdal wasnwielding similar influence, though on ansmaller scale, through the Women’snWork Committee and her own schoolnfor teachers, the Social PedagogicalnInstitute. The Women’s Work Committeenurged the state to accept femalenLutheran clergy, female prison guards,nand female gym teachers in boys’ highnschools. Alva’s Institute encouragedngender neutral toys and games in ordernto overcome sexual stereotyping.nThe approach of World War II andnthe departure of the Myrdals for thenUnited States in 1938 brought an endnto their active involvement in Swedishnsocial reform, but by then they hadnalready transformed public policy innsignificant ways.nThey had also demonstrated justnhow much could be accomplished by anfew dedicated and energetic individuals.nBesides receiving grants from thenRockefeller and Carnegie foundationsnto pursue their policy-shaping sociology,nthe Myrdals invested their ownnmoney in distributing countless reportsnand analyses to study groups and seminarsnthroughout the nation. Personalnmagnetism also played a part in theirneffectiveness. By 1938, Alva Myrdalnwas the seventh most popular womannin Sweden, a ranking that placed hernsomewhere between Greta Garbo andnIngrid Bergman. Indefatigable propagandists,nthe Myrdals set the terms ofndebate, both in society and in thenimportant official committees to whichnthey belonged. The Myrdal name wasnsynonymous with family and fertilitynmatters; in fact, things reached a pointnwhere “to myrdal” became a popularneuphemism for “to copulate.”nCarlson’s account of the Myrdals’nwork reveals a striking feature ofnsociological analysis that might be calledn”selective inevitability.” Although theyninsisted that “all institutional factors . . .ncan be changed,” the Myrdals werenforever encountering inevitable “socialnfacts”: popular acceptance of birth control,nworking mothers, small families,nthe obsolescence of traditional familynarrangements. A shameless double standardnwas at work. Whatever thenMyrdals disliked could be changed;nwhatever already suited their plans wasnan inevitable “social fact.” The inevitabilitynwas unidirectional. Centuries ofnhousewifery were not inevitable, butnworking mothers were. Resistance tonbirth control was a temporary attitude;nits acceptance was a “social fact.”nRelated to this selective inevitability isnthe curious way in which historicalnnecessities often seem to need a helpingnhand from the social engineer. Onenmight suppose that if socioeconomicnnndevelopments are said to be altering thenfamily as an institution, then the transformationnwill occur spontaneously.nBut no. Radical new laws and statenintervention are required to ensure thatnprophecies about the demise of thentraditional family are fulfilled. The linenbetween adapting to the future andncreating it is sometimes hard to detect.nThe Myrdals’ story also shows thenenormous value that “crises” can havenfor social reformers. In response to an”crisis,” all manner of radical changesncan be introduced; “emergency measures”nare called for. The economicncrisis of the 30’s was the justification fornRoosevelt’s New Deal in the UnitednStates; it was the demographic crisis ofnthe 30’s that paved the way fornSweden’s domestic “new deal.” Thenatmosphere of “crisis” helps peoplenswallow the fallacious rhetoric ofn”Something must be done” — regardlessnof whether it will actually help thensituation. Untested policies are thusnimplemented, often, as in the case ofnSweden, without any plans for verification.nThe “AIDS crisis” has become ansimilar tool for drastically reformingnsociety’s attitude toward homosexuality:nit is “necessary” to teach small childrennabout homosexuality; it is “necessary”nto advertise condoms in public; it isn”necessary” to use tax revenue to distributenneedles to drug addicts; it isn”necessary” to allocate disproportionatenfunding to AIDS research. At the samentime, it is not necessary to quarantinenhomosexuals or to discourage homosexualnbehavior, though such measuresnmight well reduce the incidence ofnAIDS.nIf Sweden’s Riksdag had attemptednto verify the effectiveness of thenMyrdals’ recommendations, it mightnhave been surprised. Cadson notes thatncouples who took advantage of thenmarriage loan program actually hadnfewer children (and twice as manyndivorces!) as couples who did not.nToday Sweden has the worid’s lowestnmarriage rate, and fertility is still belownreplacement level. Half of Swedishnmen between the ages of 25 and 29 arencohabiting, and half of Swedish childrennare illegitimate (their fathers are,nfor all practical purposes, the state).nEighty-five percent of Swedish mothersnwith children under the age ofnseven are working.nViewing these long-term conse-nOCTOBER 1990/31n