he in the camp of those who pander tornthe newly mihtant ethnic and victimbasedrnconstituencies. Rather, Haiderrnand his party stress a politics of culturalrncohesion and national pride that aimrnless for a purely economic Europeanrnunion than for one incorporating bothrnregional and federal systems, a possibilityrnyet to be seriously addressed by thernBrussels and Maastricht accords.rnHaider possesses leadership qualitiesrnnot seen in many of the populist leadersrnin Europe or the United States. Eschewingrnthe paternalistic guidance of arnnational political lobby of the Perot varietyrnor the crude racial politics of a DaidrnDuke (figures to whom he is often compared),rnHaider is a politician who hasrnyet to be marginalized by either a singlernissue obsession (his stress on immigrationrncontrol is merely one of severalrnconcerns) or a demand for ideologicalrnpurity. In Austria, as in other advancedrnindustrial nations, many young adultsrndistrust all politicians and want veryrnlittle to do with any form of establishmentrnpatronage, left or right. This stillevolvingrnleader possesses a quick sense ofrnwhat the people want and an ability tornarticulate their sentiment effectively inrntheir own language, not in that of therndistant elites.rnMost annoying to Vienna’s “RinstrassernElite” is that Jorg Haider is hisrnown man. He relentlessly attacks thernruling coalition while seeming alwaysrnto be one step ahead of it. What is sorndisconcerting to opponents—and evenrnto some members of his own party—rnis that while he proclaims his goal to winrnthe chancellorship of Austria in thernnext round of elections in 1998, he can,rnin the interim, very nearly run thisrnnation’s politics without any coalitionrnpartners.rnAs Haider quipped when I asked himrnhow long he could play the oppositionrnrole: “What do you Americans say?rnDon’t change horses in midstream?” Or,rnto translate, if you are the most powerfulrnforce in a nation, the fact of holding officernmay be no more than a mere formality,rnand far less interesting than beingrnthe powerful outsider who pulls thernstrings.rnDonald Warren is a politicalrnsociologist and author of The RadicalrnCenter (1976). He is currentlyrnworking on a book about therndisplaced majority in Europe andrnAmerica.rnJOURNALISMrnTelos and thernPopulist Rightrnby Paul GottfriedrnThe spring 1994 issue of Telos, dealingrnprimarily with the EuropeanrnNew Right, signaled the drift of this formerlyrnMarxist journal toward the populistrnright. This change in direction hasrnbeen increasingly obvious for at least arndecade and could be seen in the turningrnof Telos editor Paul Piccone from hisrnNew Left activism in the 60’s and 70’srntoward the regionally based populismrntoday of Umberto Bossi and the ItalianrnLeghe. For a Telos reader, it is clear thatrnPiccone and his senior editors are takingrnincreasingly traditionalist positions, andrnthis fact occasioned an impassioned attackrnon Telos by the leftist In Thesern’Times. This charge certainly has substance.rnPiccone’s defense of Roman socialrninstitutions and of assigned genderrnroles drove the feminists away from hisrneditorial board (which created an opportunityrnto add to that body Donald Warrenrnand myself). When I ask Picconernwhether he believes in the soundness ofrnthe ancient Roman famih’, he usuallyrnshows what I take to be approing smiles.rnPiccone does not deny that his politicsrnhave changed, but he also insists that hernis not an “American conservative.” Forrnone thing, he points out that the Americanrnright, like the American left, hasrn”collapsed into brain-dead irrelevance.”rnBoth serve and belong to the same politicalrnclass and have learned to “instrumentalize”rnevery form of protest againstrnthe disempowerment of families andrncommunities (a project often carriedrnout, ironically, in the name of “empowerment”).rnBesides, Piccone opines, it isrnnot the postwar conservative movementrnbut the Frankfurt Critical School thatrnprovides the ke’ for understanding ourrnpolitical predicaments. Telos still turnsrnto German refugee radicals of the 30’s,rnMax Horkheimer and Theoder Adorno,rnand to Piccone’s onetime hero (and thernsubject of a distinguished biography byrnhim), the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci,rnfor its interpretive tools. Suchrnthinkers are invoked to demystify thernAmerican managerial state and itsrnaccompanying “cultural industry.”rnNeither “conservatives” nor “liberals,”rnPiccone tells us, are willing to confrontrnthe fraud of contemporary Americanrn”democracy,” which has become anotherrnname for administrative manipulation.rnAny attempt to address this problemrnmust first unmask the wielders ofrnpower and the hegemonic ideology byrnwhich they advance their interests.rnAmericans, Piccone stresses, are toornaccepting of political control. Theyrnmistakenly believe that they run a selfproclaimedrndemocratic state and lackrnthe critical theory for analyzing theirrncaptors.rnPiccone and his fellow editors, scholarrnGary Ulmen and historian of the Italianrnright Franklin Adler, believe that therernare lessons to be learned from the EuropeanrnNew Right. Unlike leaders of thernpostwar American conservative movement,rnEuropean New Rightists—for example,rnGianfranco Miglio and Alain dernBenoist—are at the helm of the populistrnand regionalist protests against the administrativernstate. Such figures are accentuatingrnthe long-lost tie betweenrndemocracy and the exercise of meaningfulrnself-government; in fact, EuropeanrnNew Rightists call for resistance againstrnthe seizure of the state by bureaucratsrnand party bosses by urging their followersrnnot to pay taxes as an act of political revolt.rnIn France, Alain de Benoist, the editorrnof Nouvelle Ecole and a repeated targetrnof attack in Le Monde, has drawn arncritical distinction between Jacobin “humanrnrights” and “le droit a la difference.”rnThe first is seen as a strategy for globalrnhomogenization through the eradicationrnof cultural and gender distinctions; thernsecond is the right claimed by membersrnof a rooted community to preserve theirrnidentity within their own social space.rnDisagreement does persist On thernEuropean New Right as to whether non-rnEuropeans or those without historicalrnclaims to communal identity should bernrecognized by decentralizing nationstatesrnas legally protected communities.rnThis point may be the distinguishingrnone, as Andre Pierre Tagureff notes,rnbetween the New Right and the non-rnJacobin European left, which seeks tornprotect the droit identitaire of ThirdrnWorld immigrants in Europe. The New-rnRight typically insists on the higherrnclaim of European peoples, at least with-rn44/CHRONICLESrnrnrn