to Zionism failed to draw Jewish voters to the ticket; Jews votedrnfor Dole-Kemp bv a mere 16 percent, a far cry from the third ofrnthe Jewish vote consistently won bv Nixon, Ford, Reagan, andrnBush through 1988.rnTwo of the most typically Middle American categories arernthose for family income and the size of the place where the voterrnli’es. The same pattern of Middle American erosion is evidentrnin them too. As for middle-income groups, with incomesrnfrom “15,000 to above 50,000” dollars a year, the NFR averagernfor 1976 (figures for 1972 are not available) through 1984 is 57rnpercent, while for Bush in 1988 it was still neariy 56 percent.rnBut in 1992 Bush took only 39 percent of these middle-incomerncategories, while in 1996 Dole and Kemp, despite all their chatterrnof tax-cuts and perhaps because of their chatter about therninterests of the urban underclass, won only 41 percent, recapturingrna mere two percent of the middle class. In the lower portionsrnof the middle-income categories. Bush in 1992 and Dolernin 1996 won percentages in the upper thirties, in contrast to thernmore than 50 percent consistently won bv earlier Republicanrncandidates.rnAnd the same decline of Middle American support for Republicansrnis apparent in size of place. Nixon, Ford, and Reaganrncarried more than 60 percent of suburban and rural voters fromrn1972 through 1984, and Bush in 1988 carried them in the highrnfifties. Bush in 1992 took only 39 percent of the suburban andrn42 percent of the rural voters, however, while in 1996 Dole andrnKemp carried onlv 42 and 46 percent respectivcK’.rnSince Richard Nixon and his campaign technicians designedrnthe Southern Strategy and similar appeals to the Wallacernvoters and other Middle American categories, the RepublicanrnPart} appeared to be on the verge of inaugurating a genuine politicalrnrevolution in the United States, not only in terms of electoralrnrealignment but also in terms of the eventual content ofrnpublic policy and legislation. Even when Republican Presidentsrnbetrayed their Middle American commitments (as they oftenrndid more than they lived up to them), the influence of a socialrnforce outside the liberal elites of Manhattan and the Beltwayrncould never be ignored and at least had to be stroked and courted.rnIf the Republicans did ignore or betray those forces, theyrncould expect another Wallace-like movement that would eatrninto their votes and threaten to throw elections to the Democrats.rnWhile Nixon did not hesitate to steal Wallace’s issues, hernand his successors knew that the possibility of a Middle Americanrnre olt constituted a standing check on both their own partyrnand that of their major rivals.rnThe Democrats have learned something since the I970’s;rnthey no longer nominate candidates like George McGovern,rnand the Bill Clintons and Al Gores have figured out how tornpursue their essentially McGovernite agenda in the guise ofrnpatriotism and family values. The Republicans can no longerrncount on the Democrats to commit suicide for them. What isrnworse, the Republican Party today is not the same as the GOPrnthat nominated Nixon and his successors. The emergence ofrnthe Beltway conservative (really neoconservative) intelligentsiarnin the late 1970’s and 80’s created an elite group that now exertsrnimmense influence on Republican policymaking, legislation,rnspeechwriting, and electoral strategies, and that group has littlernconnection to or sympathy for Middle Americans and theirrnconcerns. Groups like Empower America and its sisters in thernthink tanks and magazines of Washington now play major rolesrnin determining what the party and its leaders think, read, hear,rnsay, and do, as well as on whom they appoint, elect, and nominate.rnBy 1992, this apparat had developed sufficient powerrnwithin the party to prevent George Bush from connecting tornthe Middle Americans who are the real once and future base ofrnthe Republican Party if it is to have a future, and by 1996 thernsame apparat shaped the nomination and presidential campaignsrnof two of its own Beltway brothers. Bob Dole and JackrnKemp. The alienation of their ticket from the party’s MiddlernAmerican base is the reason they lost the election, and deservedrnto lose the election, against an opponent who should have beenrnmore vulnerable than any other since George McGovern himself.rnIf the Democrats keep learning and the Republicans keeprnfailing to distance themselves from the Beltway right and to returnrnto their core support in the Middle American heartlandrnthat gave them the White House for most of the 1970’s andrn80’s, the partv can expect to keep losing in the future.rnKrummholzrnby Alan SullivanrnHunched like an anchorite behind its boulder,rnA treeline pine weathers the winter storms.rnIts knotty branches shrink as nights turn colder.rnCaught in its tufts, a fluted snowdrift forms.rnWhen summer bares the mossy flanks of bossesrnAnd lakes of lupine bloom on alpine meads.rnThe stunted pine regrows its winter losses,rnCracking the rocks to meet its meager needs.rnUnder its boughs the mantled squirrels nibblernOn tender forage plucked from fields of sedge.rnBelow its roots the braids of snowmelt dribblernIn puding pools from ledge to jointed ledge.rnOff-trail two hikers hunker in its crannyrnFor shelter from the wind-bedeviled sky.rnAt dusk the twisted krummholz looks uncannv.rnIts limbs outstretched as though to prophesy.rnDriving our tentstakes deep in prickly humus.rnWe pitch our camp and gather sticks to burn.rnThe resin-scented plumes of smoke perfume usrnWhile oerhead the Bear and Draco turn.rnAs embers fade, our tangled limbs keep burning,rnA blaze no dozing squirrels smell or seernThough tufted ears might hear us turning, turning.rnO! Crooked love beneath the crooked tree.rnAPRIL 1997/1 7rnrnrn