recall, now that a small army of freemarketntheorists has followed Hayek tonStockholm, what an unexpected seanchange in the world’s approach toneconomics was heralded by his receiptnof the Nobel. Or how unlikely itnseemed in 1974 that Hayek, who at 75nyears of age had produced an unusuallynvoluminous but uniformly profoundnbody of scholarly writing on a widenrange of subjects, was nearer to thenmidpoint of his distinguished careernthan to its end.nFar from resting ori his laurels,nHayek has pursued his scholarly missionnwith undiminished vigor and acuity.nHis latest book, The Fatal Conceit:nThe Errors of Socialism, is being publishednby the University of ChicagonPress as Volume I of a new collectionnof Hayek’s work, a series that is projectednto comprise 22 volumes. The bookntakes its title from what Hayek, afternmany years of study, has concluded isnman’s most dangerous folly: unduenpride of intellect, the indulgence in annunreasonable form of “reason” thatndoes not know its own limitations. Thisn”fatal conceit” manifests itself in severalnforms. In one aspect, it is the notion,nwhich has been a central pillar ofnsocialism, that man, through his reason,n”is able to shape the world aroundnhim according to his wishes,” not marginallynor in a limited manner but tonthe nth degree. Another manifestationnis the self-satisfied belief that man hasnno obligation to obey or respect rulesnthe purposes of which are not fullyntransparent to his momentary intellect.nYet another variation is the belief thatnunless a civilized order can be shown tonbe the product of a comprehensive,nrational, man-made design, it has nonvalue or right to exist.nLike his teacher, Ludwig von Mises,nHayek sees institutions such as privatenproperty and the price system as indispensablento human welfare. These institutions,nHayek notes, make it possiblenfor millions of individuals — eachnacting independently with the widelyndiverse knowledge and ability availablento him — to satisfy human needs andndesires far more efficiently than anyncentral planning agency could accomplish.nBut, unlike Mises, who tended tonview free-market institutions as thenproducts of conscious choice based onnabstract reason, Hayek is sensitive tonthe high degree to which these institu­ntions are dependent for their existencenon traditions, customs, and rules developednover millennia whose full valuenman only dimly perceives.n”Learning how to behave is morenthe source than the result of insight,nreason, and understanding,” Hayeknwrites. “Man is not born wise, rationalnand good, but has to be taught tonbecome so. It is not our intellect thatncreated our morals; rather, human interactionsngoverned by our moralsnmake possible the growth of reason andnthose capabilities associated with it.nMan became intelligent because therenwas tradition … for him to learn.nThis tradition, in turn, originated notnfrom a capacity rationally to interpretnobserved facts but from habits of responding.nIt told man primarily whatnhe ought or ought not to do underncertain conditions rather than what henmust expect to happen.”nHayek attributes the strong emotionalnappeal of socialism to its flatterynof “genetically inherited instincts” ofnsolidarity and altruism that are anachronistic—nthrowbacks to a time longnago when men lived in “small rovingnbands or troops.” Such instincts werenhighly useful to a primitive order innwhich all of the members were knownnpersonally to each other and “werenguided by concrete, commonly perceivednaims,” Hayek argues. But theynare largely unsuited — hence inimicaln—to life in our present, highly complexnorder, which enables millionsnupon millions of individuals to serventhe needs of people about whose existencenthey are unaware and in turn tonhave their own needs served by thesenmultitudes of unknown others.nThough emphasizing that he doesn”not claim that the results of groupnselection of traditions are necessarilyn’good,'” Hayek adds:nI do claim that, whether we likenit or not, without the particularntraditions I have mentioned, thenextended order of civilizationncould not continue to exist . . . ;nand that if we discard thesentraditions, out of ill-considerednnotions … of what it is to benreasonable, we shall doom anlarge part of mankind to povertynand death. . . .nWhile facts alone can neverndetermine what is right.nnnill-considered notions of what isnreasonable, right and good maynchange the facts and thencircumstances in which we live;nthey may destroy, perhapsnforever, not only developednindividuals and buildings and artnand cities (which we have longnknown to be vulnerable to thendestructive powers of moralitiesnand ideologies of various sorts),nbut also traditions, institutions,nand interrelations without whichnsuch creations could hardly havencome into being or ever benrecreated.nIf there is any weakness in Hayek’sntreatment of these issues, it is a tendencynto equate morality with procreationnand survival. In so doing, he blurs thendistinction between economics and ethics:ncategories that, while overiapping,nare not identical. Though Hayek pointsnconvincingly to Aristotle’s static conceptionnof human affairs as a philosophicalnweakness that was to have substantialnadverse repercussions on Westemnthought for the next two thousandnyears, Hayek’s own line of thinkingnmight benefit from Aristotle’s dictumnthat man’s goal should not be a merenlife but the good life. Moreover, becausenHayek identifies morality withnrules that change in response to historicalncircumstances, he concludes that,n”reluctant as we may be to accept this,nno universally valid system of ethics cannever be known to us.” Yet it is anrelatively short distance from Hayek’snposition to the “value-centered historicism”noutlined by Claes G. Ryn in hisnWill, Imagination and Reason, whichndemonstrates that ethical universality isnnot incompatible with change and diversity.nSpecifically, by identifyingnman’s higher purpose with a specialnquality of will rather than with abstractnrationality, value-centered historicismnshows how universality is capable ofnbeing synthesized with ever-new circumstances.nBut these criticisms, though pertainingnto a central issue, are limited reservationsnabout a body of work that •nmerits the highest respect and is wellrepresentednby this volume. It is noteworthynthat Hayek, like very few of hisncontemporaries, has persistently askednthe right questions about extremelyncomplex matters and, with impressivenNOVEMBER 1989/43n