sion, in addition, can make politicalrn”suggestions” to the EU Pariiament andrnto the European Council.rnThe essential issue for all Europeanrnnation-states is whether their national executivernand legislative bodies will makernsense in the forthcoming borderless andrntariff-free Europe. Why should smallrncountries, such as Estonia or Slovenia,rnwhich opted out of the defunct SovietrnUnion and Yugoslavia respectively, continuernto cherish their sovereignty—onlyrnto anticipate a promiscuous Euroslavrnmarriage? Whom should a Portuguesernfarmer or an Irish fisherman trust more:rnhis government and his parliament, orrnan anonymous parliament with anonymousrnpoliticians from Brussels? In hisrnrecent dystopian novel, Euroslavia, Terr-rnPalmer sees the future balkanization ofrnMaastricht Europe .. . urbi et orhi.rnErom Charlemagne and Napoleonrnthrough Hitler and Stalin —Europeansrnhave }earned for a united Europe. Yetrnthe true history of Europe, until now, hasrnalways been that of wars. Wliat makes usrnbelieve that the Maastricht mystique willrnbring forth affection?rnA common currency can hardly bringrndifferent peoples together. The existencernof the dollar did not prevent thernAmerican North from going to war withrnthe American South in 1861; the existencernof the ruble did not prevent thernbreak-up of the Soviet Union and thernsubsec|uent rubble in Chechnya; the existencernof the dinar did not prevent thernbust-up of Yugoslavia. To say, therefore,rnthat monetary’ union is a question of “warrnor peace” is absurd. Historically, peacernreigns where separate, sovereign countriesrnare allowed their own currencv andrnlocal government.rnMoreover, what is the point of havingrna local national assembly if all politicalrndecision-making will be made behindrnclosed doors here in Brussels? Wliat isrnthe point of taking pride in the newly establishedrncurrencies of Eastern Europe ifrnseveral ‘ears down the road everyone willrnbe obliged to trade with the euro? Thernrichest and freest country in the world,rnSwitzerland, has never been a memberrnof the United Nations or the EU. That’srnwh’ everybody likes to stash moneyrnthere.rnNor is big beautiful. The most dynamicrncountries in the world today arernsmall city-states: Singapore, Hong Kong,rnand Luxembourg. Tiny Denmark is therncleanest, richest, and safest state in Europe.rnTherefore, it still has some secondrnthoughts about sanctioning the introductionrnof the euro. In hindsight it is alsornworth recalling what Uncle Joe Stalinrnonce said: “The Pope has no military divisionsrnto fight against victorious communism!”rnYet the powerful papal ministate,rncalled the Vatican, indirectlyrnslayed the dinosaur state called the SovietrnUnion.rnTrue, the EU may be the last bestrnchance for all Europeans. But the oddsrnare that the European Union may turnrninto a huge centralized mega-state inrnwhich all political decision-making willrnstem from one center. Furthermore, thernintroduction of the euro may lead to arnnew division of Europe: first within thernEuropean Union itself, and secondly betweenrnthe European Union countriesrnand other non-member states. Germanrnscholar Thomas Ramb has argued thatrnany enlargement of the European Unionrneastward might also cost European taxpayersrnan additional $80 billion annuallyrnand trigger a further enlargement of thernalready huge euro-bureaucracy. Thernwelfirre gap between EU-member statesrnand non-member states will likely evenrnlead to massive waves of immigrationrnand cause greater social, racial, and religiousrntensions. The peoples of EasternrnEurope, who have suffered under communism,rnwill find themselves divided byrnanother wall: the Euro-wall. Moreover,rneach democracy presupposes the existencernof a people with its own nationalrnmythology. But there is no such thing asrn”the European people.”rnThe founding myths of the Maastrichtrnmystique stem from recent Europeanrnhistor)’. In 1957, the Rome Agreementrnwas signed between the major states ofrnWestern Europe in the hope of greaterrncooperation and economic integration.rnThis document was a natural fall-out ofrnWorld War II. In order to please liberalrnand communist Gauleiter from the twornopposing yet victorious non-Europeanrnsystems, the ravaged postwar protectoraterncalled Europe had to prove that it wasrnmore papal than the Pope (i.e., morernunited than America and the SovietrnUnion combined). The objective ofrnthe 1992 Maastricht treat’, then, was tornfinalize the integration of Europe. Thernirony is that just about this same timernthe mega-states of Europe —the SovietrnUnion and Yugoslavia—were breakingrnup.rnThe naive idea behind the Maastrichtrnmj’stique is that Europeans should neverrngo to war again and that their commonrndestiny must be ruled by common economicrnmeans. Yet Erance and Englandrnexercised their democratic prerogative tornhold referenda on the plethora of Maastiichtrnprovisions. Germans were not offeredrnthis opportunity’, and so the newrnmonetary utopia and the borderlessrnSchengen agreement were delivered notrnthrough the popular will of the Germanrnpeople but by unwritten Brussels ukases.rnMaastricht Europe, i.e., the Europe ofrn15 states, has 18.5 million unemployed,rn15 percent of its active population. Thernpurchasing power of its middle class is 20rnpercent less than 20 vears ago. Thernterms “working poor” and “fuel poor”rnhave become part of the political vernacular.rnHow are strong currencies (notablyrnthe deutschemark) or other pegged-uprncurrencies (such as the neighboringrnDanish crown or the Dutch guilder) goingrnto fuse with the weaker currencies —rnthe sluggish hasta-la-vista Spanish pesetarnor the Italian dolce-vita lira, whichrnhave had an average inflation rate of 12rnpercent over the last ten years? Moreover,rnmany Germans privately worryrnthat a borderless Europe would open uprnthe gates to millions of real and fakernrefugees —not just from Kurdistan, butrnalso from distant Bananistan. There arernalready many doubts about the efficiencyrnof the anonymous Euro-Parliament inrnStrasbourg, the Euro-Supreme Court,rnand the unknown movers and shakersrnfrom Brussels, whose 20 commissionersrnare frequentiy compared to 20 commissars.rnNaturally, those who have benefitedrnmost from Maastricht so far are smallrnsecond-gear countries, such as Portugalrnand Greece; they know that the burlyrnGerman will foot the tab. But for howrnlong?rnThe same servile mindset prevailsrnwithin the new political class in EasternrnEurope whose main Maastricht cheerleadersrnare recycled communist apparatchiks.rnBecause of their inferiorityrncomplex—which is to a large extent duernto their own violent and murky past—rnthey like crawling on all fours in front ofrnEU architects. They think that crawlingrnand mouthing will speed up their entrancerninto the rich man’s club, but theyrnare wrong. The small nation-states ofrnEastern Europe just rid themselves of therncommunist Medusa. The Maastrichtrnequivalent of the latter is the last thingrnthey need.rnTomislav Sunk is the cultural counselorrnat the Croatian Embassy in Brussels.rnNOVEMBER 1998/39rnrnrn