stand, but that, of course, is a languagernthat is too locally circumscribed for foreignrninvestors, the Common Market,rnUnited Europe, and Washington.rnNobody knows at this point what thernfuture orientation of Eastern Europe willrnor can be. The government, the bureaucracy,rnthe opposition, the public figuresrnon television pay daily lip service torndemocracy, the parliament, liberalism,rncooperation, a united Europe, AtlanticrnSpirit, a better world. In most privaternconversations these same slogans are alsornpresent. But they are not flesh-andbloodrnmatters, they are fashionable toys,rnthe games people play.rnThe reason is not only the local temperament,rnwhich is much more “Western”rnthan that of the other nations inrnthe area; it is the nature of regional reality.rnIn the West, people and their representativesrncan afford the luxury ofrnpractically ignoring history, hence theyrnutter mostly gratuitous arguments suchrnas “history is the expression of man’srnwill,” “we shape our future,” “progressrnlooms ahead,” etc. This is not possiblernhere, except in salon conversations whenrnforeigners are present, since the sheerrnweight of daily problems, of frontiersrnthreatened, and of the uncertainties ofrnsuch things as the stability of Yugoslaviarnand the former Soviet republics are constantrnreminders of harsh realities. In thernBucharest parliament, deputies demandrnthe blood of their Magyar colleaguesrnwho are present as representatives of therntwo-million Transylvanian minority. Tornthe north, Slovak nationalists demandrnsecession from Prague and the right torndecide alone how to suppress their ownrnminorities. Since no Germans remainrnafter the brutal deportation of 1945, therntarget is again the Magyar community.rnAH in all, the situation is worse than itrnwas between the two wars when Ilitlerismrnfanned the national hatreds—thisrndid not take much effort—but calmedrnthem at the same time, since the Germanrnwar mobilization was based on regionalrncooperation and support. It is todayrnpathetic to hear the mouse-likernwords of Lord Carrington, the Dutchrnforeign minister, and of the entire councilrnof disunited Europe trying to makernpeace in Yugoslavia, with nobody listening.rnOr to listen to that faraway gentlemanrnin the Oval Room, the Chamberlainrnof the Nineties, chirping slogansrnthat are not more effective for being utteredrnin Latin.rnYet miracles happen, and they arerncalled “daily life.” I have witnessed numerousrntimes that, even with bombsrnfalling, women cook the family meal,rnchildren go to school, people get married.rnBombs are not (quite) falling onrnHungary (although mines explode at thernborder), but Western nations would inrnsimilar circumstances be at least jittery.rnHere, not at all. Discussion groups gather,rnfans crowd at soccer games, bookshopsrnprosper, people go to concerts,rnand the whole nation celebrates in remembrancernof the 1956 uprising. Flags,rnsmiles, tears, speeches, spectacles, andrnmemories. Retired people can’t afford arndollar for a meal, yet restaurants arerncrowded; the controversy rages overrnschool buildings reclaimed by thernCatholic Church, but priest and ministerrnfall into each other’s arms after blessingrnthe Boy Scouts’ new flag; the Ministry ofrnEducation runs on a nonbudget, but myrnstudents ask for a separate meeting timernto discuss the merits of Buddhism.rnThis, by the way, would deserve a separaternarticle: the intellectual status of religionrnafter four decades of (attempted)rncommunist indoctrination. It was absolutelyrnnot successful, yet here againrnthere is a “but.” Souls who could notrninvestigate religion honestly and openlyrnfound exits through devious channels:rninterest in the occult and in orientalrnsects. (There is today a Tibetanrnmonastery in Hungary, as also in Francernand Scotia.) About a fifth of my students,rnproducts of an extremely severernselection system, hence brilliant andrnwell-read, is as aroused by a post-Christian,rnpreferably oriental, credal doctrinernas I found my students at Yale to be sixrnor seven years ago. The latter expectedrnme to teach them magical insights andrnnocturnal dances, while students in Budapestrnexpect proof that man can livernwithout (religious) institutions, on merernenthusiasm, forever renewed. I counterrnwith arguments taken from philosophy,rnarchitecture, symbolization, history—rnand other fields brought together forrnthem for the very first time, since suchrncourses were banned by the Communists.rnPhilosophy was Marxism and thernridiculing of the bourgeois; religion wasrnthe nail that received the “hammerrnblows” of the united working class.rnThe overarching question, which notrneven the three key words in the title canrnsummarize but which must be asked, isrnabout the role that Eastern Europe willrnplay in the Western ensemble. All thernactors claim they are “European,” Russiarnincluded ever since Gorbachev spoke ofrnthe “common European house.” Therncontinent’s name has become what thernname “America” used to be in the sloganrn”America First.” But the more oftenrn”Europe” is appropriated, the less itrnsignifies. From Tallinn to Tirane, fromrnKarlovy Vary to Kiev, people claim thatrntheir integration into a “united Europe”rntook place more than a thousand yearsrnago, that they need no new certificaternof attestation. Budapest itself, havingrnpreviously said “no” to a world expo,rnnow plans one for 1996, the 1,100th anniversaryrnof the settlement of thernCarpatho-Danubian area.rnLiberalism is presented to Eastern Europernas the only exit from its materialrnmisery, from its inferiority vis-a-vis therncontinent’s Western half. Since the latterrnhas usurped the label “Europe,” it isrntold to join the concoction cooked uprnin Brussels, mostly by French Jacobins,rnin order to qualify as “Europeans.” Inrnthe expectation of moneys receivedrn(subsidies, loans, investments, favoredrnexports, and its own say in all this wheneverrnintegration occurs) Eastern Europernsigns on the dotted line and makes somernpolitical concessions. But to expect anrnunopposed “yes” on its part is politicalrnnaivete. For because of Western insistencernthe East has dressed up in drag,rnhas put on a uniform not unlike arnclown’s: ill-fitting, uncomfortable, andrnridiculous because of the gestures itrnforces its wearers to make. While thernWest enjoys its own incantatory rhetoricrnlike “peace-making in Yugoslavia,” thernclown malgre lui executes the dances.rnBut, then, Moscow also believed it couldrncall the tune forever.rnThomas Molnar’s latest book isrnPhilosophical Grounds, published byrnPeter Lang.rn44/CHRONICLESrnrnrn